IP Library › Granted Patent US 12664312
Granted Patent B1
US 12664312 · App. 18/940,057 · Granted Jun 23, 2026

Anonymization for log file access control

Inventors: Jianbing Han (Los Gatos, CA); Fei Hu (Hefei, CN); Nuowen Jian (San Jose, CA); Dan Liu (Hefei, CN); Tengteng She (Hefei, CN); Chao Wang (Hefei, CN); Li Wang (Hefei, CN); Hanqing Zhao (Hefei, CN)
Assignee: Zoom Communications, Inc.
G06F21/6254G06F2221/2141
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12664312
App. No.
18/940,057
Granted
Jun 23, 2026
Kind
B1
Abstract

Aspects and features provide system that accesses an activity log for a telecommunication system and detects, at the code level, sensitive information occurrences within the activity log. The system can anonymize the sensitive information occurrences, for example, using encryption. The system can generate different versions of the activity log including the sensitive information occurrences anonymized using encryption or removed. The system stores the activity logs in a log query database, or otherwise in some manner so that the system can receive log queries and display or print logs or portions of the logs needed to conduct troubleshooting, but with sensitive information occurrences obscured or removed. Different levels of access can be provided using role-based access control.

Claims (65)

1 . A method comprising:

accessing an activity log for a telecommunication system;

detecting sensitive information occurrences within the activity log;

encrypting the sensitive information occurrences;

generating a private version of the activity log including the sensitive information occurrences as encrypted;

storing the private version of the activity log in a database configured to receive log queries;

receiving a cluster key, the cluster key corresponding to a geographic area;

receiving an ephemeral key corresponding to an access request; and

securing access to the private version of the activity log using the cluster key and the ephemeral key.

2 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

generating a clear version of the activity log with the sensitive information occurrences removed; and

storing the clear version of the activity log in the database configured to receive the log queries.

3 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

receiving the access request for the private version of the activity log;

determining a role associated with the access request; and

granting the access to the private version of the activity log based on the role.

4 . The method of claim 3 , further comprising decrypting at least one of the sensitive information occurrences in response to input associated with the access request.

5 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

detecting a tag associated with a sensitive information occurrence from among the sensitive information occurrences; and

automatically tagging at least one additional sensitive information occurrence from among the sensitive information occurrences based on the tag.

6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the ephemeral key is generated by a meeting server.

7 . A system comprising:

a processor; and

at least one memory device including instructions that are executable by the processor to cause the processor to:

access an activity log for a telecommunication system;

detect sensitive information occurrences within the activity log;

encrypt the sensitive information occurrences;

generate a private version of the activity log including the sensitive information occurrences as encrypted;

store the private version of the activity log in a database configured to receive log queries;

receive a cluster key, the cluster key corresponding to a geographic area;

receive an ephemeral key corresponding to an access request; and

secure the access to the private version of the activity log using the cluster key and the ephemeral key.

8 . The system of claim 7 , wherein the instructions are executable to cause the processor to:

generate a clear version of the activity log with the sensitive information occurrences removed; and

store the clear version of the activity log in the database configured to receive the log queries.

9 . The system of claim 7 , wherein the instructions are executable to cause the processor to:

receive the access request for the private version of the activity log;

determine a role associated with the access request; and

grant the access to the private version of the activity log based on the role.

10 . The system of claim 9 , wherein the instructions are executable to cause the processor to decrypt at least one of the sensitive information occurrences in response to input associated with the access request.

11 . The system of claim 7 , wherein the instructions are executable to cause the processor to:

detect a tag associated with a sensitive information occurrence from among the sensitive information occurrences; and

automatically tag at least one additional sensitive information occurrence from among the sensitive information occurrences based on the tag.

12 . The system of claim 7 , wherein the ephemeral key is generated by a meeting server.

13 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising code that is executable by a processor for causing the processor to:

access an activity log for a telecommunication system;

detect sensitive information occurrences within the activity log;

encrypt the sensitive information occurrences;

generate a private version of the activity log including the sensitive information occurrences as encrypted;

store the private version of the activity log in a database configured to receive log queries;

receive a cluster key, the cluster key corresponding to a geographic area;

receive an ephemeral key corresponding to an access request; and

secure the access to the private version of the activity log using the cluster key and the ephemeral key.

14 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein the code is executable for causing the processor to:

generate a clear version of the activity log with the sensitive information occurrences removed; and

store the clear version of the activity log in the database configured to receive the log queries.

15 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein the code is executable for causing the processor to:

receive the access request for the private version of the activity log;

determine a role associated with the access request;

grant the access to the private version of the activity log based on the role; and

decrypt at least one of the sensitive information occurrences in response to input associated with the access request.

16 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein the code is executable for causing the processor to:

detect a tag associated with a sensitive information occurrence from among the sensitive information occurrences; and

automatically tag at least one additional sensitive information occurrence from among the sensitive information occurrences based on the tag.

17 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein the ephemeral key is generated by a meeting server.