Pre-inference execution compliance for artificial intelligence systems

1 . A computer-implemented execution compliance system for controlling execution of an artificial intelligence (AI) system, comprising one or more processors and a non-transitory memory storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to:

(a) receive an execution request associated with execution of the AI system, the execution request including an origin signal from an interface;

(b) generate a Root-Origin Hash Signature (ROHS) for the origin signal to produce an ROHS digest;

(c) authenticate origin of the origin signal by validating the ROHS digest using cryptographic verification material associated with a pre-issued Covenant Root Authority (CRA) credential to produce a CRA match result;

(d) validate an execution context associated with the execution request against an Immutable Constraint Chain (ICC) to produce an ICC validation result indicating whether at least one of an unauthorized execution, an execution drift, or a logic mutation is detected;

(e) route at least the CRA match result and the ICC validation result through a GEN Node arbitration process to obtain an execution authorization verdict that includes a verdict record cryptographically signed by quorum participants;

(f) control an execution gate to: (i) permit the execution request to reach at least one of (A) an inference engine or (B) a downstream action executor only when the CRA match result indicates success, the ICC validation result indicates no detected violation, the execution authorization verdict is verified, and the execution request does not match a lockout scope of an active persistent lockout state, wherein verifying the execution authorization verdict comprises (1) verifying cryptographic signatures of the quorum participants for the verdict record and (2) validating that the verdict record cryptographically binds to a hash of at least a portion of (A) the execution request or (B) an arbitration request packet derived from the execution request; and (ii) otherwise deny execution before the inference engine performs inference or before the downstream action executor performs a downstream action, and record an authorization or denial result in an Eternal Arbitration Ledger (EAL);

(g) determine, before permitting the execution request to reach the inference engine or the downstream action executor, whether a prohibited behavior condition exists based on at least one of (i) a denial-history entry in the EAL, (ii) an ICC validation failure, (iii) a trust tier classification, or (iv) detection of a policy rollback associated with a policy epoch bound to the ICC;

(h) in response to determining that the prohibited behavior condition exists, create or update, in at least one of the EAL, an Encrypted Logic Vault (ELV), or a revocation registry synchronized across linked deployments, a persistent lockout state having a lockout scope; and

(i) enforce the persistent lockout state at the execution gate by denying the execution request and subsequent execution requests matching the lockout scope of the persistent lockout state before the inference engine performs inference or before the downstream action executor performs a downstream action.

2 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the origin signal further comprises a hardware-backed attestation token, and wherein authenticating origin further comprises verifying the hardware-backed attestation token using a verification key bound to the CRA credential.

3 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the ICC comprises a logic-sealed hash tree or Merkle structure defining permissible execution behaviors, encrypted and sealed at system deployment.

4 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the ICC is stored within an Encrypted Logic Vault (ELV) that is inaccessible to a host runtime, and wherein the system denies a runtime override attempt to modify the ICC.

5 . The system of claim 4 , wherein the ICC validation result includes a Merkle proof binding a constraint leaf to an ICC root hash stored in the ELV, and wherein quorum participants verify the Merkle proof before producing the execution authorization verdict.

6 . The system of claim 1 , wherein quorum participants of the GEN Node arbitration analyze an arbitration request packet independently and reach consensus through a Distributed Verdict Engine (DVE).

7 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the execution authorization verdict includes a trust tier classification validated by a Tier Trust Engine (TTE), the trust tier classification comprising at least one of Tier Alpha, Tier Beta, or Tier Gamma.

8 . The system of claim 7 , wherein the trust tier classification controls a quorum threshold required for cryptographically signing the verdict record based on at least a requested execution type or risk classification.

9 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the system validates at least one of a jurisdictional fingerprint or a compliance entropy score before permitting the execution request to reach at least one of (A) the inference engine or (B) the downstream action executor, and denies execution before performing inference or before performing the downstream action when the jurisdictional fingerprint fails to satisfy one or more criteria of a machine-readable permitted jurisdictional profile or when the compliance entropy score fails a threshold.

10 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the system intercepts the execution request at one or more of an inference API boundary, a model runtime wrapper, a tool-invocation boundary, a privileged action gate, or a container entry point, and withholds a call to at least one of (A) the inference engine or (B) the downstream action executor unless the execution authorization verdict is verified.

11 . The system of claim 1 , wherein recording in the EAL comprises storing a tamper-evident record that includes at least: (i) an ROHS hash, (ii) a timestamp, (iii) a CRA match result, (iv) a trust tier, (v) a signature hash comprising at least one of (A) a Triune Execution Signature (TES) hash or (B) a verdict record hash, (vi) a GEN Node approval flag, and (vii) a denial reason code when the execution request is denied.

12 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the EAL comprises a hash-chained append-only log periodically anchored to an external timestamping service or a public ledger.

13 . The system of claim 1 , further comprising a license entitlement engine configured to issue or validate an entitlement token bound to at least a CRA match result and a permitted execution scope, and wherein the system permits the execution request to reach at least one of (A) the inference engine or (B) the downstream action executor only when the entitlement token is validated in addition to the CRA match result, the ICC validation result, and the execution authorization verdict, and wherein the system records usage metering evidence associated with an authorized execution to at least one of the EAL or a Sovereign Signature Log (SSL).

14 . The system of claim 1 , wherein, in response to determining that the prohibited behavior condition exists, the instructions further cause the system to generate a signed incident receipt comprising a severity classification, a reason code, an effective time, the lockout scope of the persistent lockout state, and a cryptographic binding to at least one of an EAL record, the ICC validation result, a policy epoch identifier, or the verdict record, and to record the signed incident receipt or a hash thereof in the EAL.

15 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the system applies fail-closed handling such that any failure of ROHS authentication, ICC validation, verdict verification, or license validation results in denial before performing inference or before performing the downstream action, and wherein the system quarantines a request artifact and records a denial reason in at least one of the EAL or a Sovereign Signature Log (SSL).

16 . A computer-implemented method of controlling execution of an artificial intelligence (AI) system, comprising:

(a) receiving an execution request associated with execution of the AI system, the execution request including an origin signal from an interface;

(b) generating a Root-Origin Hash Signature (ROHS) for the origin signal to produce an ROHS digest;

(c) authenticating origin of the origin signal by validating the ROHS digest using cryptographic verification material associated with a pre-issued Covenant Root Authority (CRA) credential to produce a CRA match result;

(d) validating an execution context associated with the execution request against an Immutable Constraint Chain (ICC) to produce an ICC validation result indicating whether at least one of an unauthorized execution, an execution drift, or a logic mutation is detected;

(e) obtaining an execution authorization verdict through a GEN Node arbitration process, the execution authorization verdict including a verdict record cryptographically signed by quorum participants;

(f) controlling an execution gate to: (i) permit the execution request to reach at least one of (A) an inference engine or (B) a downstream action executor only when the CRA match result indicates success, the ICC validation result indicates no detected violation, the execution authorization verdict is verified, and the execution request does not match a lockout scope of an active persistent lockout state, wherein verifying the execution authorization verdict comprises (1) verifying cryptographic signatures of the quorum participants for the verdict record and (2) validating that the verdict record cryptographically binds to a hash of at least a portion of (A) the execution request or (B) an arbitration request packet derived from the execution request; and (ii) otherwise deny execution before the inference engine performs inference or before the downstream action executor performs a downstream action, and record an authorization or denial result in an Eternal Arbitration Ledger (EAL);

(g) determining, before permitting the execution request to reach the inference engine or the downstream action executor, whether a prohibited behavior condition exists based on at least one of (i) a denial-history entry in the EAL, (ii) an ICC validation failure, (iii) a trust tier classification, or (iv) detection of a policy rollback associated with a policy epoch bound to the ICC;

(h) in response to determining that the prohibited behavior condition exists, creating or updating, in at least one of the EAL, an Encrypted Logic Vault (ELV), or a revocation registry synchronized across linked deployments, a persistent lockout state having a lockout scope; and

(i) enforcing the persistent lockout state at the execution gate by denying the execution request and subsequent execution requests matching the lockout scope of the persistent lockout state before the inference engine performs inference or before the downstream action executor performs a downstream action.

17 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising detecting a replay attempt or origin signal re-use using a Recursive Consent Suppression Layer (RCSL), and denying the execution request before performing inference or before performing the downstream action upon detecting the replay attempt or origin signal re-use.

18 . The method of claim 17 , further comprising recording a replay indicator and a denial reason in the EAL.

19 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising, upon repeated denials satisfying a severity condition, issuing a revocation, suspension, or quarantine update to a registry synchronization module to propagate a suspension state across linked deployments.

20 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising computing a compliance entropy score from at least EAL history and ICC drift telemetry, and including the compliance entropy score in an arbitration request packet evaluated by quorum participants.

21 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising intercepting the execution request at one or more of an inference API boundary, a model runtime wrapper, a tool-invocation boundary, a privileged action gate, or a container entry point, and withholding a call to at least one of (A) the inference engine or (B) the downstream action executor unless the execution authorization verdict is verified.

22 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising generating a Triune Execution Signature (TES) and committing the TES to a Sovereign Signature Log (SSL) including a timestamp and a licensing match key identifying an entitlement record or license state associated with the authorized execution.

23 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising validating an entitlement token bound to a permitted execution scope and recording usage metering evidence associated with an authorized execution to at least one of the EAL or a Sovereign Signature Log (SSL).

24 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising applying fail-closed handling such that: (i) when ROHS authentication fails, the execution request is denied and flagged; (ii) when a license is expired or revoked, the execution request is quarantined; and (iii) when verification of at least one cryptographic signature associated with the execution authorization verdict fails, re-arbitration is triggered.

25 . The method of claim 16 , wherein verifying the execution authorization verdict comprises validating a triad of keys comprising an interface-associated agent credential, a Covenant Root Authority (CRA) credential record, and a GEN Node signature.

26 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising generating a machine-verifiable evidence pack from at least (i) a record stored in the EAL and (ii) the verdict record after an authorization or denial outcome, cryptographically signing the evidence pack, and enabling verification of the evidence pack by an independent verifier computing system that operates without access to the execution compliance system, wherein the evidence pack includes at least an ROHS hash, a CRA match result, an ICC root binding value, and a verdict binding value associated with the verdict record, and wherein the evidence pack further includes (i) a schema version identifier and (ii) at least one algorithm identifier indicating at least one of (A) a canonicalization procedure identifier, (B) a hash function identifier, or (C) a signature scheme identifier used for generating or verifying the evidence pack.

27 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising binding the ICC to a policy epoch identifier, including the policy epoch identifier in at least one of an arbitration request packet or the verdict record, detecting a policy rollback based on a non-monotonic policy epoch identifier, and denying the execution request before performing inference or before performing the downstream action upon detecting the policy rollback.

28 . The method of claim 16 , further comprising generating a privacy-preserving compliance proof, verifiable by a third-party verifier, that the execution request satisfied authorization conditions based on one or more disclosed commitments derived from at least one of the EAL or the verdict record, without revealing at least one of (i) content of the origin signal, (ii) content of the execution context, or (iii) content of the ICC, wherein the privacy-preserving compliance proof comprises at least one of a zero-knowledge proof or a selective-disclosure signature.

29 . The method of claim 26 , wherein the evidence pack further includes at least one of: (i) a key identifier associated with an evidence-pack signing key; (ii) a certificate chain reference or a certificate_chain_hash value; (iii) revocation status evidence comprising at least one of an OCSP response snapshot hash, a certificate revocation list snapshot hash, or a revocation registry checkpoint hash; or (iv) an anchoring checkpoint reference derived from anchoring of the EAL, such that the independent verifier computing system verifies authenticity and integrity of the evidence pack across a key rotation event or credential revocation.

30 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operations comprising the method of claim 16 .