Workspace orchestration with ephemeral hardware attestation
Systems and methods for workspace orchestration with ephemeral hardware attestation are described. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the processor, cause the IHS to: transmit measurement data from a local management agent to a workspace orchestration service; receive, at the local management agent in response to attestation of the measurement data by the workspace orchestration service, a workspace definition configured to enable the local management agent to instantiate a workspace; and instantiate the workspace.
1 . An Information Handling System (IHS) that comprises:
a processor; and
a memory coupled to the processor, the memory configured with program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the processor, cause the IHS to perform operations that comprise:
transmit, from a local management agent to a workspace orchestration service, measurement data comprising class-based evidence that does not disclose unique properties of the IHS, wherein the class-based evidence comprises at least one of: a firmware measurement or hash, a software measurement or hash, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), or a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote, wherein the measurement data is encrypted with an ephemeral credential created by the local management agent, wherein the ephemeral credential comprises a unique attestation key pair that is newly generated each time a workspace is instantiated, and wherein prior ephemeral credentials are not usable to identify the IHS and/or any user of the IHS;
receive, at the local management agent in response to attestation of the measurement data by the workspace orchestration service, a workspace definition configured to enable the local management agent to instantiate a workspace;
instantiate the workspace with a workspace lifetime that is not longer than a lifetime of the ephemeral credential;
perform continuous attestation operations of the workspace based at least in part on the ephemeral credential; and
in response to a failure of the continuous attestation operations, tear down the workspace and erase the ephemeral credential.
2 . The IHS of claim 1 , wherein the ephemeral credential further comprises a private key paired to a public key, and wherein the program instructions further cause the IHS to transmit the public key to the workspace orchestration service.
3 . The IHS of claim 2 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the local management agent to produce the private and public keys in response to a request for the measurement data by the workspace orchestration service.
4 . The IHS of claim 1 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the local management agent to transmit the measurement data in response to a determination, by the workspace orchestration service, that a security score of the IHS is below a selected value.
5 . The IHS of claim 4 , wherein the security score is calculated, at least in part, based upon at least one of: a risk metric associated with a locale of the IHS, a risk metric associated with a network of the IHS, a risk metric associated with hardware of the IHS, a risk metric associated with a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metric.
6 . The IHS of claim 1 , wherein to attest the measurement data, the workspace orchestration service is configured to compare the measurement data against golden measurement data.
7 . The IHS of claim 2 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS to transmit additional measurement data from the local management agent to the workspace orchestration service after the instantiation of the workspace, and wherein the additional measurement data is encrypted with the private key.
8 . The IHS of claim 7 , wherein the workspace orchestration service is configured to request the local management agent to tear down the workspace in response to a determination that the additional measurement data is not a match to golden measurement data.
9 . The IHS of claim 7 , wherein the workspace orchestration service is configured to request the local management agent to erase the private key in response to a determination that the additional measurement data is not a match to golden measurement data.
10 . A memory storage device configured with program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by one or more processors of an Information Handling System (IHS) configured to execute a workspace orchestration service, cause the IHS to:
in response to a request from a client IHS to instantiate a workspace, request encrypted measurement data from the client IHS, wherein the measurement data does not identify the client IHS or a user of the client IHS, wherein the measurement data is to be encrypted with an ephemeral credential created by a local management agent of the client IHS, wherein the measurement data comprises class-based evidence that does not disclose unique properties of the client IHS, wherein the class-based evidence comprises at least one of: a firmware measurement or hash, a software measurement or hash, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), or a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote, wherein the ephemeral credential comprises a unique attestation key pair that is newly generated each time the workspace is instantiated, and wherein prior ephemeral credentials are not usable to identify the client IHS and/or any user of the client IHS;
transmit, to the local management agent of the client IHS in response to attestation of the encrypted measurement data, a workspace definition configured to enable the local management agent to instantiate the workspace with a workspace lifetime that is not longer than a lifetime of the ephemeral credential;
perform continuous attestation operations based at least in part on the ephemeral credential after instantiation of the workspace; and
in response to a failure of the continuous attestation operations, transmit a command to the local management agent to tear down the workspace and erase the ephemeral credential.
11 . The memory storage device of claim 10 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, cause the IHS to decrypt the measurement data with a temporary public key provided by the client IHS.
12 . The memory storage device of claim 10 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS to request the measurement data in response to a determination, by the workspace orchestration service, that a security score of the client IHS is below a selected value.
13 . The memory storage device of claim 12 , wherein the security score is calculated, at least in part, based upon at least one of: a risk metric associated with a locale of the client IHS, a risk metric associated with a network of the client IHS, a risk metric associated with hardware of the client IHS, a risk metric associated with a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metric.
14 . The memory storage device of claim 10 , wherein to attest the measurement data, the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS to compare the measurement data against golden measurement data.
15 . The memory storage device of claim 10 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS to request additional measurement data from the local management agent after the instantiation of the workspace.
16 . The memory storage device of claim 15 , wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS to transmit a command to the local management agent to tear down the workspace in response to a determination that the additional measurement data is not a match to golden measurement data.
17 . A method, comprising:
creating a workspace definition based upon encrypted measurement data received from a local management agent of an Information Handling System (IHS) in an absence of any identification of the IHS or any user of the IHS, wherein the measurement data is encrypted with an ephemeral credential created by the local management agent of the IHS, wherein the measurement data comprises class-based evidence that does not disclose unique properties of the IHS, wherein the class-based evidence comprises at least one of: a firmware measurement or hash, a software measurement or hash, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), or a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) quote, wherein the ephemeral credential comprises a unique attestation key pair that is newly generated each time a workspace is instantiated, and wherein prior ephemeral credentials are not usable to identify the IHS and/or any user of the IHS;
transmitting one or more files to the IHS, wherein the one or more files are configured to enable the local management agent to instantiate a workspace based upon the workspace definition, wherein the workspace has a workspace lifetime that is not longer than a lifetime of the ephemeral credential;
performing continuous attestation operations of the workspace using the ephemeral credential; and
in response to a failure of the continuous attestation operations, tearing down the workspace and erasing the ephemeral credential.