IP Library › Granted Patent US 12689903

Granted Patent B2

US 12689903 · App. 18/187,567 · Granted Jul 21, 2026

UWB receiver and method of operation

Inventors: Jan Dutz (Hart bei Graz, AT); Michael Rath (Graz, AT); Wolfgang Küchler (Graz, AT)

Assignee: NXP B.V.

H04W12/122 H04L7/027 H04L9/3297

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Quick Facts

Patent No.: US 12689903
App. No.: 18/187,567
Granted: Jul 21, 2026
Kind: B2

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Abstract

In accordance with a first aspect of the present disclosure, an ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver is provided, comprising: an attack mitigation unit configured to mitigate one or more attacks on a correlation function; a correlation unit configured to perform the correlation function by correlating an input signal received by the UWB receiver with a predefined sequence and to generate a correlation output based on correlating said input signal with the predefined sequence; and a first path detection unit configured to receive the correlation output and to detect a first path by evaluating the correlator output during a correlation window, said correlation window being a predefined period of time. In accordance with a second aspect of the present disclosure, a corresponding method of operating a UWB receiver is conceived. In accordance with a third aspect of the present disclosure, a computer program is provided for carrying out said method.

Claims (49)

1 . An ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver, comprising:

a correlation unit configured to perform a correlation function by correlating an input signal received by the UWB receiver with a predefined sequence and to generate a correlation output based on correlating said input signal with the predefined sequence, wherein the predefined sequence comprises a scrambled timestamp sequence (STS);

a first path detection unit configured to receive the correlation output and to detect a first path by evaluating the correlator output during a correlation window, said correlation window being a predefined period of time; and

an attack mitigation unit configured to mitigate one or more attacks on the correlation function by adding extensions to the predefined sequence before a start of the predefined sequence and after an end of the predefined sequence by padding a random sequence of bits to the STS.

2 . The UWB receiver of claim 1 , wherein a length of the extensions is equal to a length of the correlation window.

3 . The UWB receiver of claim 1 , wherein the UWB receiver is included in a vehicle.

4 . An ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver, comprising:

an attack mitigation unit configured to mitigate one or more attacks on the correlation function by detecting a maximum amplitude of the input signal provided to the correlation unit and by deriving a threshold for detecting the first path from said maximum amplitude of the input signal.

5 . The UWB receiver of claim 4 , wherein the attack mitigation unit comprises a peak detection unit configured to detect said maximum amplitude of the input signal.

6 . The UWB receiver of claim 4 , wherein the UWB receiver is included in a vehicle.

7 . An ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver, comprising:

an attack mitigation unit configured to mitigate one or more attacks on the correlation function, wherein the attack mitigation unit comprises a limiter operatively coupled to the correlation unit, and wherein the attack mitigation unit is configured to mitigate said attacks by causing the limiter to clip high peak values of the input signal.

8 . The UWB receiver of claim 7 , wherein the UWB receiver is included in a vehicle.

9 . A method of operating an ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver, the UWB receiver comprising an attack mitigation unit, a correlation unit and a first path detection unit, the method comprising:

mitigating, by the attack mitigation unit, one or more attacks on a correlation function performed by the correlation unit;

performing, by the correlation unit, the correlation function by correlating an input signal received by the UWB receiver with a predefined sequence;

generating, by said correlation unit, a correlation output based on correlating said input signal with the predefined sequence;

receiving, by the first path detection unit, the correlation output; and

detecting, by the first path detection unit, a first path by evaluating the correlator output during a correlation window, said correlation window being a predefined period of time,

wherein mitigating, by the attack mitigation unit, said one or more attacks on the correlation function comprises at least one of:

adding extensions to the predefined sequence before a start of the predefined sequence and after an end of the predefined sequence, wherein the predefined sequence comprises a scrambled timestamp sequence (STS) and the extensions comprise a random sequence of bits;

detecting a maximum amplitude of the input signal provided to the correlation unit and by deriving a threshold for detecting the first path from said maximum amplitude of the input signal; or

causing a limiter operatively coupled to the correlation unit to clip high peak values of the input signal.

10 . The method of claim 9 , wherein:

mitigating said one or more attacks on the correlation function includes adding extensions to the predefined sequence before the start of the predefined sequence and after the end of the predefined sequence, wherein the predefined sequence comprises the STS; and

the attack mitigation unit mitigates the attacks on the correlation result by padding the random sequence of bits to the STS.

11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein a length of the extensions is equal to a length of the correlation window.

12 . The method of claim 9 , wherein mitigating said one or more attacks on the correlation function includes detecting the maximum amplitude of the input signal provided to the correlation unit and by deriving the threshold for detecting the first path from said maximum amplitude of the input signal.

13 . The method of claim 12 , wherein a peak detection unit comprised in the attack mitigation unit detects said maximum amplitude of the input signal.

14 . The method of claim 12 , wherein the first path detection unit detects the first path if the correlation output is equal to or above the said threshold.

15 . The method of claim 9 , wherein mitigating said one or more attacks on the correlation function includes causing the limiter to clip high peak values of the input signal.

16 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing machine instructions which, when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:

cause an attack mitigation unit to mitigate one or more attacks on a correlation function performed by a correlation unit, wherein the attack mitigation unit and the correlation unit are included in an ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver;

cause the correlation unit to perform the correlation function by correlating an input signal received by the UWB receiver with a predefined sequence;

cause the correlation unit to generate a correlation output based on correlating said input signal with the predefined sequence;

cause a first path detection unit to receive the correlation output, wherein the first path detection unit is included in the UWB receiver; and

cause the first path detection unit to detect a first path by evaluating the correlator output during a correlation window, said correlation window being a predefined period of time,

wherein causing said attack mitigation unit to mitigate said one or more attacks on the correlation function comprises at least one of:

causing said attack mitigation unit to add extensions to the predefined sequence before a start of the predefined sequence and after an end of the predefined sequence, wherein the predefined sequence comprises a scrambled timestamp sequence (STS) and the extensions comprise a random sequence of bits;

causing said attack mitigation unit to detect a maximum amplitude of the input signal provided to the correlation unit and to derive a threshold for detecting the first path from said maximum amplitude of the input signal; or

causing a limiter of said attack mitigation unit that is operatively coupled to the correlation unit to clip high peak values of the input signal.

17 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the machine instructions to cause the attack mitigation unit to mitigate one or more attacks include machine instructions to cause the attack mitigation unit to add extensions to the predefined sequence before the start of the predefined sequence and after the end of the predefined sequence, wherein the predefined sequence comprises the STS and the extensions comprise the random sequence of bits.

18 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein a length of the extensions is equal to a length of the correlation window.

19 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the machine instructions to cause the attack mitigation unit to mitigate one or more attacks include machine instructions to cause the attack mitigation unit to detect the maximum amplitude of the input signal provided to the correlation unit and to derive the threshold for detecting the first path from said maximum amplitude of the input signal.

20 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the machine instructions to cause the attack mitigation unit to mitigate one or more attacks include machine instructions to cause the limiter of said attack mitigation unit that is operatively coupled to the correlation unit to clip high peak values of the input signal.