IP Library Granted Patent US 12696087
Granted Patent B2
US 12696087 · App. 18/935,311 · Granted Jul 28, 2026

Synchronizing devices based on a temporary ID mismatch

Inventors: Andreas Kunz (Ladenburg, DE); Sheeba Backia Mary Baskaran (Friedrichsdorf, DE)
Assignee: Lenovo (United States) Inc.
H04W12/06H04L9/3218H04L9/3242
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12696087
App. No.
18/935,311
Granted
Jul 28, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Various aspects of the present disclosure relate to transmitting a first request message comprising a first set of parameters. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to receiving a first response message comprising an indication that a device is unreachable. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to resetting a sequence number (SQN) and a device profile for the device in response to the first response message. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to transmitting a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises a default identifier (ID) of the device, a nonce, and the SQN. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to receiving a second response message from the device comprising a result based on the default ID.

Claims (59)

1 . An apparatus in a wireless communication network entity, comprising:

at least one memory; and

at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to:

transmit a first request message comprising a first set of parameters;

receive a first response message comprising an indication that a device is unreachable;

reset a sequence number (SQN) and a device profile for the device in response to the first response message;

transmit a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises a default identifier (ID) of the device, a nonce, and the SQN;

receive a second response message from the device comprising a result based on the default ID, wherein the second response message further comprises a second nonce and an incremented SQN; and

authenticate the device based at least in part on the result and the second nonce.

2 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the result comprises a security context proof based on the default ID, wherein the default ID is stored at the wireless communication network entity, and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to verify the security context proof based on a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) function, using the default ID, the second nonce, and a shared secret parameter as inputs to the HMAC function.

3 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to:

generate an encryption key and a temporary ID based on the nonce, the SQN, and a shared secret parameter; and

activate the encryption key and the temporary ID in response to a verification of the second response message.

4 . The apparatus of claim 3 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to transmit a third request message comprising a third set of parameters in response to the second response message, wherein the third set of parameters comprises a third nonce encrypted using the encryption key, a set of command parameters, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I).

5 . The apparatus of claim 3 , wherein the temporary ID comprises a paging identity of an internet-of-things (IOT) device.

6 . The apparatus of claim 4 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to:

receive a third response message comprising an encrypted command result based on the set of command parameters; and

decipher the encrypted command result using the encryption key.

7 . A method performed by a wireless communication network entity, the method comprising:

transmitting a first request message comprising a first set of parameters;

receiving a first response message comprising an indication that a device is unreachable;

resetting a sequence number (SQN) and a device profile for the device in response to the first response message;

transmitting a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises a default identifier (ID) of the device, a nonce, and the SQN; receiving a second response message from the device comprising a result based on a default ID, wherein the second response message further comprises a second nonce and an incremented SQN; and

authenticating the device based at least in part on the result and the second nonce.

8 . The method of claim 7 , wherein the result comprises a security context proof based on the default ID, wherein the default ID is stored at the wireless communication network entity, and wherein the method further comprises verifying the security context proof based on a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) function, using the default ID, the second nonce, and a shared secret parameter as inputs to the HMAC function.

9 . The method of claim 7 , further comprising:

generating an encryption key and a temporary ID based on the nonce, the SQN, and a shared secret parameter; and

activating the encryption key and the temporary ID in response to a verification of the second response message.

10 . The method of claim 9 , further comprising transmitting a third request message comprising a third set of parameters in response to the second response message, wherein the third set of parameters comprises a third nonce encrypted using the encryption key, a set of command parameters encrypted using the encryption key, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I).

11 . The method of claim 10 , further comprising:

receiving a third response message comprising an encrypted command result based on the set of command parameters; and

deciphering the encrypted command result using the encryption key.

12 . An internet-of-things (IOT) device for wireless communication, comprising:

at least one memory; and

at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the IoT device to:

receive a first request message comprising a first set of parameters;

determine that the first set of parameters comprises a default identifier (ID) of the IoT device, a reset sequence number (SQN), and a nonce;

generate a temporary ID based at least in part on the first set of parameters and a shared secret parameter;

generate an encryption key based on the nonce, the reset SQN, and the shared secret parameter;

transmit a response message comprising at least an expected result based on the default ID; and

receive a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises the temporary ID and a set of command parameters.

13 . The IOT device of claim 12 , wherein the expected result comprises a security context proof based on the default ID, and wherein to generate the expected result, the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to generate the security context proof based on a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) function, using the default ID, the nonce, and the shared secret parameter as inputs to the HMAC function.

14 . The IoT device of claim 12 , wherein the second set of parameters further comprises an encrypted nonce, a set of encrypted command parameters, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to:

validate the MAC-I and the temporary ID;

decipher the encrypted nonce and the set of encrypted command parameters using the encryption key;

perform one or more actions corresponding to the command parameters; and

transmit a second response message comprising a command result based on the one or more actions, wherein the command result is encrypted using the encryption key.

15 . The IoT device of claim 12 , wherein the first set of parameters comprises the default ID, the reset SQN, the nonce, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to:

validate the MAC-I; and

determine an ID mismatch profile reset based on the default ID and the reset SQN.

16 . The IoT device of claim 12 , wherein the temporary ID comprises a paging identity of the IoT device, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to register with a service provider using the default ID.

17 . A processor for wireless communication, comprising:

at least one controller coupled with at least one memory and configured to cause the processor to:

receive a first request message comprising a first set of parameters;

determine that the first set of parameters comprises a default identifier (ID) of an internet-of-things device, a reset sequence number (SQN), and a nonce;

generate a temporary ID based at least in part on the first set of parameters and a shared secret parameter;

generate an encryption key based on the nonce, the reset SQN, and the shared secret parameter;

transmit a response message comprising at least an expected result based on the default ID; and

receive a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises the temporary ID and a set of command parameters.