Key management using attribute certificates (KXAC)
The present disclosure is directed to systems, methods, and non-transitory computer-readable media including providing an attribute certificate to a Key Receiving Device (KRD). The attribute certificate indicates that the KRD is bound to a Key Distribution Host (KDH) for key distribution. A whitelist is provided to the KDH. The whitelist includes a list of at least one KRD bound to the KDH.
1 . A method, comprising:
providing a first attribute certificate to a Key Receiving Device (KRD), wherein the first attribute certificate indicates that the KRD is bound to a first Key Distribution Host (KDH) for key distribution, wherein the key distribution comprises the first KDH distributing at least one symmetric key to the KRD;
providing a whitelist to the first KDH, wherein the whitelist comprises a list of at least one KRD bound to the first KDH for the key distribution, the at least one KRD comprising the KRD; and
providing a second attribute certificate to the KRD indicating that the KRD is bound to a second KDH for the key distribution, wherein, in response to receiving the second attribute certificate, the KRD can communicate with the first KDH and the second KDH for a period of time before removing the first attribute certificate, and, wherein, at completion of the period of time, the KRD removes the first attribute certificate and all attribute certificates associated with the first KDH such that the KRD cannot communicate with the first KDH.
2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein providing the first attribute certificate comprises requesting an Attribute Authority (AA) to issue the first attribute certificate.
3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein providing the first attribute certificate to the KRD comprises injecting the first attribute certificate into the KRD.
4 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising providing a public key certificate to the KRD, wherein the public key certificate comprises a public key of the KRD, and the first attribute certificate corresponds to the public key certificate or the public key of the KRD.
5 . The method of claim 4 , wherein providing the public key certificate to the KRD comprises requesting a Certificate Authority (CA) to issue the public key certificate.
6 . The method of claim 5 , wherein the CA is associated with an Attribute Authority (AA) from which the first attribute certificate is issued.
7 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the whitelist comprises a list of attribute certificates, each attribute certificate of the list of attribute certificates corresponding to a respective one of the at least one KRD.
8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the whitelist comprises, for each KRD of the at least one KRD, at least one of a Machine Address Code (MAC) or a hardware serial number.
9 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the whitelist comprises, for each KRD of the at least one KRD, at least one of a network address or a location.
10 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
providing an updated whitelist to the first KDH, the updated whitelist comprising a new KRD bound to the first KDH, the whitelist excludes the at least one KRD previously bound to the first KDH;
providing a new attribute certificate to the new KRD; and
transmitting a notification to the KDR indicating the KDR is unbound to the first KDH and notifying the KDR to remove the attribute certificate.
11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the updated whitelist comprises the new attribute certificate.
12 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising providing an updated whitelist to the first KDH, wherein the updated whitelist excludes the KRD previously bound to the first KDH.
13 . The method of claim 12 , wherein the updated whitelist excludes an identifier of the KRD previously bound to the first KDH.
14 . A method, comprising:
receiving, by a first Key Distribution Host (KDH), a whitelist comprising a list of at least one Key Receiving Device (KRD) bound to the first KDH for key distribution, wherein the key distribution comprises the first KDH distributing at least one symmetric key to the KRD; and
communicating with each of the at least one KRD for the key distribution based on the whitelist, wherein each of at least one KRD communicates with the first KDH based on a first attribute certificate indicating that each of the at least one KRD is bound to the first KDH for the key distribution;
wherein the at least one KRD receives a second attribute certificate indicating that the at least one KRD is bound to a second KDH for the key distribution, wherein, in response to receiving the second attribute certificate, the at least one KRD can communicate with the first KDH and the second KDH for a period of time before removing the first attribute certificate, and, wherein, at completion of the period of time, the KRD removes the first attribute certificate and all attribute certificates associated with the first KDH such that the KRD cannot communicate with the first KDH.
15 . The method of claim 14 , further comprising, in response to receiving the whitelist;
verifying the whitelist using a signature of a manufacturer;
storing in a memory information for the at least one KRD included in the whitelist in response to verifying the whitelist; and
adding to the memory additional information for the at least one KRD, the additional information comprising a network address of each of the at least one KRD, a location of each of the at least one KRD, and a phone number of each of the at least one KRD.
16 . The method of claim 14 , wherein the whitelist comprises:
a list of attribute certificates, wherein each attribute certificate of the list of attribute certificates corresponds to a respective one of the at least one KRD; and
for each KRD of the at least one KRD, at least one of a Machine Address Code (MAC) of each KRD, a hardware serial number, a network address, or a location.
17 . The method of claim 14 , further comprising one of:
receiving, by the first KDH, a first updated whitelist, wherein the first updated whitelist comprises a new KRD bound to the first KDH and providing, by the first KDH, a new attribute certificate to the new KRD; or
receiving, by the first KDH, a second updated whitelist, wherein the second updated whitelist excludes the KRD previously bound to the first KDH and determines, by the KDH, that the KRD is unbound from the first KDH.
18 . A method, comprising:
receiving, by a Key Receiving Device (KRD), a first attribute certificate indicating that the KRD is bound to a first Key Distribution Host (KDH) for key distribution, wherein the key distribution comprises the first KDH distributing at least one symmetric key to the KRD;
communicating by the KRD with the first KDH for the key distribution based on the first attribute certificate, wherein the first KDH communicates with the KRD based on a whitelist comprising a list of at least one KRD bound to the first KDH for the key distribution, and wherein the at least one KRD comprises the KRD;
receiving, by the KRD, a second attribute certificate indicating that the KRD is bound to a second KDH for the key distribution;
in response to receiving the second attribute certificate, communicating, by the KRD, with the first KDH and the second KDH for a period of time before removing the first attribute certificate; and
at completion of the period of time, removing, by the KRD, the first attribute certificate and all attribute certificates associated with the first KDH such that the KRD cannot communicate with the first KDH.
19 . The method of claim 18 , wherein:
the first attribute certificate is issued and signed by an Attribute Authority (AA);
the first attribute certificate is injected into each of the at least one KRD by a manufacturer;
a public key certificate issued and signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) is provided to each of the at least one KRD; and
the CA is associated with the AA.