Methods and apparatus for private certificates in public key cryptography

1. A method of generating a certificate for use in cryptographic applications, the method comprising the steps of:

receiving a first certificate on a first public key, the first public key having a corresponding first secret key;

receiving additional cryptographic information other than the first public key, the additional cryptographic information being generated at least in part using at least a portion of at least one of the first secret key and a second secret key: and

generating based on the additional cryptographic information a second certificate on a second public key, the second public key having the second secret key as its corresponding secret key;

wherein the second certificate comprises certified cryptographic information that makes it computationally feasible for one in possession of a given one of the first and second secret keys to derive from that secret key the other of the first and second secret keys, such that a first user rightfully in possession of the first and second secret keys and the respective first and second certificates cannot lend the given secret key and its corresponding certificate to a second user without also making the other secret key accessible to the second user; and

wherein it is computationally infeasible for an attacker knowing the certified cryptographic information to correlate the first and second public keys.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein at least one of the certificates comprises a data part including in plaintext format the corresponding public key and a subject entity identifier, and a signature part comprising a digital signature by a certification authority on the data part.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein a first key pair comprising the first public key and the first secret key is generated using a public key cryptography technique, and a second key pair comprising the second public key and the second secret key is generated using the public key cryptography technique.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the public key cryptography technique comprises a discrete logarithm based public key cryptography technique.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the discrete logarithm based public key cryptography technique comprises a generalized ElGamal public key cryptography technique.

6. The method of claim 3 , wherein the public key cryptography technique comprises a factoring-based public key cryptography technique.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the factoring-based public key cryptography technique comprises an RSA public key cryptography technique.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein a first key pair comprising the first public key and the first secret key is generated using a first public key cryptography technique, and a second key pair comprising the second public key and the second secret key is generated using a second public key cryptography technique different than the first public key cryptography technique.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the first public key cryptography technique comprises one of a discrete logarithmic based public key cryptography technique and a factoring-based public key cryptography technique, and the second public key cryptography technique comprises one of a discrete logarithmic based public key cryptography technique and a factoring-based public key cryptography technique.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the seesfid generating step comprises generating n- 1 certificates, each having a corresponding secret key associated therewith, such that given a secret key associated with any one of the n certificates, the secret keys associated with the remaining ones of the n certificates are recoverable from the given secret key in polynomial time.

11. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating step comprises generating n- 1 certificates, each having a corresponding secret key associated therewith, such that given a set of secret keys each associated with a corresponding certificate in a designated subset of the n certificates, the secret keys associated with another subset of the n certificates are recoverable from the given set of secret keys in polynomial time.

12. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating step is implemented using an asymmetric certificate generation protocol such that the second secret key can be determined from the first secret key but the first secret key cannot be determined from the second secret key.

13. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating step is implemented using a symmetric certificate generation protocol such that the second secret key can be determined from the first secret key and the first secret key can be determined from the second secret key.

14. A method of generating a certificate for use in cryptographic applications, the method comprising the steps of:

receiving a first certificate on a first public key, the first public key having a corresponding first secret key; and

generating a second certificate on a second public key, the second public key having a corresponding second secret key;

wherein the second certificate comprises certified cryptographic information that makes it computationally feasible for one in possession of a given one of the first and second secret keys to derive from that secret key the other of the first and second secret keys, such that a first user rightfully in possession of the first and second secret keys and the respective first and second certificates cannot lend the given secret key and its corresnonding certificate to a second user without also making the other secret key accessible to the second user; and

wherein it is computationally infeasible for an attacker knowing the certified cryptographic information to correlate the first and second public keys.

15. An apparatus for generating a certificate for use in cryptographic applications, the apparatus comprising:

a processor-based client device adapted for connection via a network to one or more servers of an information processing system, the client device being operative:

to transmit to a certification authority a first certificate on a first public key, the first public key having a corresponding first secret key:

to transmit to the authentication authority additional cryptographic information other than the first public key. the additional cryptographic information being generated at least inpart using at least a portion of at least one of the first secret key and a second secret key; and

to receive from the authentication authority a second certificate on a second public key, the second public key having the second secret key as its corresponding secret key, the second certificate being generated based on the additional cryptographic information;

wherein the second certificate comprises certified cryptographic information that makes it computationally feasible for one in possession of a given one of the first and second secret keys to derive from that secret key the other of the first and second secret keys, such that a first user rightfully in possession of the first and second secret keys and the respective first and second certificates cannot lend the given secret key and its corresponding certificate to a second user without also making the other secret key accessible to the second user; and

wherein it is computationally infeasible for an attacker knowing the certified cryptographic information to correlate the first and second public keys.

16. An apparatus for generating a certificate for use in cryptographic applications, the apparatus comprising:

a set of one or more servers adapted for connection via a network to one or more client devices of an information processing system, the one or more servers being operative:

to receive a first certificate on a first public key, the first public key having a corresponding first secret key;

to receive additional ervoto graphic information other than the first public key, the additional cryptographic information being generated at least in pad using at least a portion of at least one of the first secret key and a second secret key;

to generate based on the additional cryptographic information a second certificate on a second public key, the second public key having the second secret key as its corresponding secret key;

wherein the second certificate comprises certified cryptographic information that makes it computationally feasible for one in possession of a given one of the first and second secret keys to derive from that secret key the other of the first and second secret keys, such that a first user rightfully in possession of the first and second secret keys and the respective first and second certificates cannot lend the given secret key and its corresponding certificate to a second user without also making the other secret key accessible to the second user; and

wherein it is computationally infeasible for an attacker knowing the certified cryptographic information to correlate the first and second public keys.

17. An article of manufacture comprising one or more software programs for generating a certificate for use in cryptographic applications, wherein the one or more software programs when executed by one or more processor-based devices of an information processing system implement the steps of:

receiving a first certificate on a first public key, the first public key having a corresponding first secret key;

receiving additional cryptographic information other than the first public key, the additional cryptographic information being generated at least in part using at least a portion of at least one of the first secret key and a second secret key;

generating based on the additional cryptographic information a second certificate on a second public key. the second public key having the second secret key as its corresponding secret key;

wherein the second certificate comprises certified cryptographic information that makes it computationally feasible for one in possession ofKgiven one of the first and second secret keys to derive from that secret key the other of the first and second secret keys, such that a first user rightfully in possession of the first and second secret keys and the respective first and second certificates cannot lend the given secret key and its corresponding certificate to a second user without also making the other secret key accessible to the second user; and

wherein it is computationally infeasible for an attacker knowing the certified cryptographic information to correlate the first and second public keys.