IP Library Granted Patent US 6,880,752
Granted Patent B2
US 6,880,752 · App. 10/414,298 · Granted Apr 19, 2005

System for testing, verifying legitimacy of smart card in-situ and for storing data therein

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 6,880,752
App. No.
10/414,298
Granted
Apr 19, 2005
Kind
B2
Abstract

A hand-held battery-operated device for interrogating and/or programming ISO7816 smart cards by means of an ISO7816 compliant card slot, in conjunction with a display, a keypad and barcode reader for data entry, a battery backup RAM for temporary storage of collected data, flash memory for storage of proprietary information provided by a smart card issuer, a RS232 port and RF link for communication with a host computer, in-system programming port for updating the flash program, all connected operatively to an internal microprocessor which perform clock or power glitching to access internal information of a smart card to determine whether the card has been tampered, compromised, and functionality.

Claims (31)

1. A smart card authenticating device, comprising:

a hand-held sized housing;

a slot for inserting a to-be-interrogated smart card;

a storage medium stored with clock or power glitching timing information provided by a smart card issuer; and

means for glitching clock or power in the smart card based upon said timing information, independent of any collaborating or communicating with any external computer system or equipment, to bypass authentication by a processor of the smart card via generating malfunction or confusion in the processor of the smart card to provide additional access thereinto;

means for interrogating the glitched smart card to compare a response from the glitched smart card to interrogation so as to determine whether the smart card is issued by the issuer,

wherein said device operates in a hand-held, in-situ, and free-standing manner.

2. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising a display for displaying menus or instructions.

3. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising a key pad.

4. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising a smart card receiving slot.

5. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising an antenna for wireless communication between the device with an external host PC.

6. The device according to claim 5 , wherein in the external device is a in-situ computer.

7. The device according to claim 1 , wherein the storage medium is one of a RAM, ROM, PROM, FLASH, EPROM, and EEPROM.

8. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising a housing case.

9. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising a microprocessor for executing current or power glitching on the smart card thereby determining whether a smart card has been tampered with.

10. The device according to claim 1 , further comprising an in-system programming port.

11. The device according to claim 1 , wherein said information includes at least one of an answer to reset, a communications protocol, an entry point, and current profile.

12. The device according to claim 1 , wherein the storage medium is one of a battery backed-up RAM.

13. A method for conducting smart card authentication in a hand-held, in-situ, and free-standing manner, comprising:

providing a hand-held smart card authenticating device with a hand-held sized housing, a storage medium and a smart card receiving slot;

storing current or power glitching timing information provided by a smart card issuer in the storage medium;

inserting the smart cart into the smart card receiving slot;

executing clock or power glitching on the smart card via the device based upon said timing information, independent of any collaborating or communicating with any external computer system or equipment, to bypass authentication by a processor of the smart card via generating malfunction or confusion in the processor of the smart card to provide additional access thereinto; and

interrogating the glitched smart card to compare a response from the glitched smart card to interrogation so as to determine whether the smart card is issued by the issuer or whether the smart card has been tampered with.

14. The method according to claim 13 , further comprising steps of retrieving an internal ID stored in the smart card; and determining whether the retrieved internal ID is identical with an ID printed on the smart card thereby determining whether the smart card has been tampered with.

15. The method according to claim 14 , wherein the retrieving step occurs after the glitching step or a normal communications query.

16. The method according to claim 13 , further comprising a step of measuring an operational current of the smart card; and determining whether the current is within normal operating range of a corresponding current value provided by a smart card issuer thereby determining whether the smart card is functional, defective, or tampered with.

17. The method according to claim 14 , further comprising a step of storing the retrieved internal ID of the smart card under test in the storage medium.

18. The method according to claim 14 , further comprising a step of storing information of the smart card and uploading the information to an external apparatus.

19. The method according to claim 13 , further comprising a step of re-programming the smart card.

20. The method according to claim 13 , further comprising a step of glitching a power or clock of the smart card at a specified point to gain access to the smart card.

Assignments (8)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 5, 2018
From: BEAUMARIS NETWORKS LLC; CISCO SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL S.A.R.L.; CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC.; CISCO VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES FRANCE
To: NDS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 047420/0600 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 22, 2013
From: NDS LIMITED
To: CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Reel/Frame 030258/0465 →
RELEASE OF PATENT SECURITY INTERESTS Recorded Mar 29, 2011
From: J.P.MORGAN EUROPE LIMITED
To: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
Reel/Frame 026042/0124 →
RELEASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY INTERESTS Recorded Mar 11, 2011
From: NDS HOLDCO, INC.
To: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
Reel/Frame 025940/0710 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded May 18, 2009
From: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
To: NDS HOLDCO, INC.
Reel/Frame 022703/0071 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded May 14, 2009
From: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
To: J.P. MORGAN EUROPE LIMITED
Reel/Frame 022678/0712 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 16, 2006
From: TARNOVSKY, GEORGE V.; TARNOVSKY, CHRISTOPHER G.; NORRIS, JOHN C.
To: NDS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 017663/0980 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 27, 2005
From: TARNOVSKY, GEORGE V.; TARNOVSKY, CHRISTOPHER G.
To: NDS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 016712/0808 →