IP Library Granted Patent US 8,423,797
Granted Patent B2
US 8,423,797 · App. 10/488,002 · Granted Apr 16, 2013

Initialization of a chip card

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 8,423,797
App. No.
10/488,002
Granted
Apr 16, 2013
Kind
B2
Abstract

In a method for reading initialization data (IND) into a chip card, the chip card receives an encrypted authentication value (EAV) and decrypts it to obtain at least one release key (ENK). The release key (ENK) is checked for a match with a release key (ENK′) stored on the chip card ( 14 ). If there is a match, the initialization data (EIND, IND) are received and written to a nonvolatile memory of the chip card. A method for generating a record for initializing a chip card. a chip card and a computer-readable data carrier have corresponding features. The invention is provided in particular for initialization of chip cards by external partners of the chip card manufacturer, whereby as few possibilities of attack as possible are to be offered.

Claims (18)

1. A method for reading initialization data into a chip card, comprising:

receiving an encrypted authentication value (EAV),

decrypting the encrypted authentication value (EAV) to obtain at least one release key (ENK) and at least one load key (LDK),

checking whether the obtained release key (ENK) matches a release key (ENK') stored on the chip card, and

if the release keys (ENK, ENK') match,

receiving encrypted initialization data (EIND),

decrypting the encrypted initialization data (EIND) using the load key (LDK), and

writing the decrypted initialization data (IND) to a nonvolatile memory of the chip card.

2. A method according to claim 1 , wherein the decryption of the encrypted authentication value (EAV) further obtains at least one initialization parameter (INP) which influences at least one of further read-in, initialization process or a later functionality of the chip card ( 14 ).

3. A method according to claim 1 , characterized in that at least one of the release key (ENK), the load key (LDK) or the at least one initialization parameter (INP) are secured by a cryptographic check sum (CCS), the cryptographic check sum (CCS) being derivable from the authentication value (AV).

4. A chip card having a microcontroller, a read-only memory and a nonvolatile memory, wherein the microcontroller executes instructions to perform a method for reading initialization data into the chip card, the method comprising:

receiving an encrypted authentication value (EAV),

decrypting the encrypted authentication value (EAV) to obtain at least one release key (ENK) and at least one load key (LDK

checking whether the obtained release key (ENK) matches a release key (ENK') stored on the chip card, and

if the release keys (ENK, ENK') match,

receiving encrypted initialization data (EIND),

decrypting the encrypted initialization data (EIND) using the load key (LDK), and

writing the decrypted initialization data (IND) to the nonvolatile memory.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 30, 2017
From: GIESECKE & DEVRIENT GMBH
To: GIESECKE+DEVRIENT MOBILE SECURITY GMBH
Reel/Frame 044559/0969 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 12, 2005
From: HARTEL, KARL EGLOF; VATER, HARALD
To: GIESECKE & DEVRIENT GMBH
Reel/Frame 015587/0555 →