IP Library Granted Patent US 7,370,192
Granted Patent B2
US 7,370,192 · App. 10/496,444 · Granted May 6, 2008

Method and apparatus for preventing cloning of security elements

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 7,370,192
App. No.
10/496,444
Granted
May 6, 2008
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method for preventing cloning of a genuine security element is described. The method includes associating a random number generator (RNG) in the security element with a portion of a non-volatile memory (NVM) in the security element, and activating the RNG to automatically write, during a normal operation mode of the security element, a new random number into the portion of the NVM whenever an attempt is made to write into the portion of the NVM. Any unit other than the RNG is preferably prevented from writing data into the portion of the NVM during the normal operation mode of the security element. Related apparatus and method are also described.

Claims (37)

1. A method for preventing cloning of a genuine security element, the method comprising:

associating a random number generator (RNG) in the security element with a portion of a non-volatile memory (NVM) in the security element; and

activating said RNG to automatically write, during a normal operation mode of the security element, a new random number into said portion of the NVM whenever an attempt is made to write into said portion of the NVM.

2. The method according to claim 1 and wherein said new random number is different from a random number previously written into said portion of the NVM up to a predetermined probability level.

3. The method according to claim 1 and wherein said associating comprises preventing any unit other than the RNG from writing data into said portion of the NVM during said normal operation mode of the security element.

4. A protection mechanism for preventing cloning of a genuine security element, the protection mechanism comprising:

a non-volatile memory (NVM); and

a random number generator (RNG) operatively associated with a portion of the NVM and activated to automatically write, during a normal operation mode of the security element, a new random number into said portion of the NVM whenever an attempt is made to write into said portion of the NVM.

5. The protection mechanism according to claim 4 and wherein said new random number is different from a random number previously written into said portion of the NVM up to a predetermined probability level.

6. The protection mechanism according to claim 4 and wherein said security element comprises at least one of the following: a smart card; and a security micro-controller.

7. The protection mechanism according to claim 4 and wherein said portion of the NVM comprises a field.

8. The protection mechanism according to claim 4 and wherein said portion of the NVM is accessible only by the RNG during said normal operation mode of the security element.

9. The protection mechanism according to claim 4 and also comprising a processor operative to determine a mode of operation of the security element, wherein:

if the security element is in an NVM test mode the processor is operative to perform the following:

disable usability of the security element for providing secure access to a service; and

enable testing of the NVM of the security element.

10. The protection mechanism according to claim 9 and wherein said processor is also operative to mark the security element as unusable when the security element is in the NVM test mode.

11. A security element comprising the protection mechanism of claim 4 .

12. A method for preventing cloning of a genuine security element, the method comprising:

associating a random number generator (RNG) in the security element with a portion of a non-volatile memory (NVM) in the security element;

determining a mode of operation of the security element; and

if the security element is in an NVM test mode:

disabling usability of the security element for providing secure access to a service, and

enabling testing of the NVM of the security element; and

if the security element is in a normal operation mode:

activating said RNG to write a first random number into said portion of the NVM on transition from the NVM test mode to the normal operation mode; and

activating said RNG to override said first random number written into said portion of the NVM and to write a new random number into said portion of the NVM whenever a new attempt is made to write into said portion of the NVM.

13. The method according to claim 12 and wherein said new random number is different from the first random number up to a predetermined probability level.

14. The method according to claim 12 and also comprising marking the security element as unusable when the security element is in the NVM test mode.

15. The method according to claim 12 and also comprising transmitting the first random number in a signed message to a central facility.

16. The method according to claim 15 and also comprising:

extracting the first random number from the signed message; and

checking the first random number to verify its existence in a database of random numbers of genuine security elements.

17. The method according to claim 12 and also comprising disabling usability of the security element for providing secure access to the service during the normal operation mode of the security element if a signature of a random number generated by the RNG does not match a signature of the first random number.

18. A protection mechanism for preventing cloning of a genuine security element, the protection mechanism comprising:

means for associating a random number generator (RNG) in the security element with a portion of a non-volatile memory (NVM) in the security element; and

means for activating said RNG to automatically write, during a normal operation mode of the security element, a new random number into said portion of the NVM whenever an attempt is made to write into said portion of the NVM.

Assignments (12)
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE 26 APPLICATION NUMBERS ERRONEOUSLY RECORDED AGAINST ON THE ATTACHED LIST PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 048513 FRAME: 0297. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CHANGE OF NAME. Recorded Mar 18, 2021
From: NDS LIMITED
To: SYNAMEDIA LIMITED
Reel/Frame 056623/0708 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Mar 6, 2019
From: NDS LIMITED
To: SYNAMEDIA LIMITED
Reel/Frame 048513/0297 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 5, 2018
From: BEAUMARIS NETWORKS LLC; CISCO SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL S.A.R.L.; CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC.; CISCO VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES FRANCE
To: NDS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 047420/0600 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 22, 2013
From: NDS LIMITED
To: CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Reel/Frame 030258/0465 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTERESTS Recorded Jul 31, 2012
From: J.P. MORGAN EUROPE LIMITED
To: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
Reel/Frame 028681/0827 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Mar 30, 2011
From: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
To: J.P.MORGAN EUROPE LIMITED
Reel/Frame 026065/0782 →
RELEASE OF PATENT SECURITY INTERESTS Recorded Mar 29, 2011
From: J.P.MORGAN EUROPE LIMITED
To: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
Reel/Frame 026042/0124 →
RELEASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY INTERESTS Recorded Mar 11, 2011
From: NDS HOLDCO, INC.
To: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
Reel/Frame 025940/0710 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded May 18, 2009
From: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
To: NDS HOLDCO, INC.
Reel/Frame 022703/0071 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded May 14, 2009
From: NDS LIMITED; NEWS DATACOM LIMITED
To: J.P. MORGAN EUROPE LIMITED
Reel/Frame 022678/0712 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 24, 2004
From: SUMNER, REUBEN
To: NDS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 015626/0563 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 24, 2004
From: SUMNER, REUBEN
To: NDS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 015856/0021 →