IP Library Granted Patent US 7,386,720
Granted Patent B2
US 7,386,720 · App. 11/055,988 · Granted Jun 10, 2008

Authentication protocol using a multi-factor asymmetric key pair

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 7,386,720
App. No.
11/055,988
Granted
Jun 10, 2008
Kind
B2
Abstract

Techniques for user authentication based upon an asymmetric key pair having a public key and a split private key are provided. A first portion of the split private key is generated based upon multiple factors under control of the user. The factors include a password. A challenge is cryptographically combined with a first one of the multiple factors, but not the user password, to form a first message. The first message is transformed with the generated first portion to form a second message, which is then sent to an authentication entity. The sent second message is transformed to authenticate the user by proving direct verification of user control of the first factor.

Claims (53)

1. A method for user authentication based upon an asymmetric key pair having a public key and a split private key, comprising:

generating a first portion of the split private key based upon multiple factors under control of the user, the multiple factors including a user password;

cryptographically combining a challenge with a first one of the multiple factors other than the user password to form a first message;

transforming the first message with the generated first portion to form a second message;

transmitting the second message to an authentication entity; and

transforming the transmitted second message to authenticate the user, the transformation of the transmitted second message providing direct verification of user control of the first factor.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the transformation of the transmitted second message provides direct verification of user control of the first factor and indirect verification of user control of the password.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein:

transforming the transmitted second message includes applying a second portion of the split private key and the public key of the asymmetric key pair to the transmitted second message to recover the first message; and

recovery of the first message provides the indirect verification of user control of the password.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

forming the first message includes cryptographically combining the challenge with each of the multiple factors other than the user password; and

the transformation of the transmitted second message provides direct verification of user control of each of the multiple factors combined with the challenge.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the asymmetric key pair having a public key and a split private key is a first asymmetric key pair, the multiple factors are the password, a first entire private key associated with a second asymmetric key pair, and a second entire private key associated with a third asymmetric key pair, and further comprising:

cryptographically signing a first hash of the challenge with the first entire private key, cryptographically signing a second hash of the challenge with the second entire private key, and combining the cryptographically signed first and second hashes with the challenge to cryptographically combine the challenge with each of the multiple factors other than the user password to form a first message.

6. The method of claim 5 , further comprising:

applying a first public key associated with the second asymmetric key pair to the signed first hash to recover the challenge to provide direct verification of user control of the first entire private key; and

applying a second public key associated with the third asymmetric key pair to the signed second hash to recover the challenge to provide direct verification of user control of the second entire private key.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

receiving the challenge from the authentication entity prior to cryptographically combining the challenge with the first factor.

8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

destroying the generated first portion after transforming the first message.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

performing multiple cryptographic operations to produce a result, at least one of the multiple cryptographic operations based upon less than all the multiple factors, and a final performed one of the multiple cryptographic operations based upon all the multiple factors, and performing a cryptographic operation based upon the produced result to generate the first portion of the split private key.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the password is not stored in a persistent state.

11. A system for user authentication based upon an asymmetric key pair having a public key and a split private key, comprising:

a first network station configured to i) generate a first portion of the split private key based upon multiple factors under control of the user, the multiple factors including a user password, ii) cryptographically combine a challenge with a first one of the multiple factors other than the user password to form a first message, iii) transform the first message with the generated first portion to form a second message, and iv) transmitting the second message; and

a second network station configured to i) receive the transmitted second message, and ii) transform the transmitted second message to authenticate the user;

wherein the transformation of the transmitted second message provides direct verification of user control of the first factor.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the transformation of the transmitted second message provides direct verification of user control of the first factor and indirect verification of user control of the password.

13. The system of claim 12 , wherein:

transforming the transmitted second message includes applying a second portion of the split private key and the public key of the asymmetric key pair to the transmitted second message to recover the first message; and

recovery of the first message provides the indirect verification of user control of the password.

14. The system of claim 11 , wherein:

the first network station is further configured to cryptographically combine the challenge with each of the multiple factors other than the user password to form the first message; and

the transformation of the transmitted second message provides direct verification of user control of each of the multiple factors combined with the challenge.

15. The system of claim 14 , wherein:

the asymmetric key pair having a public key and a split private key is a first asymmetric key pair;

the multiple factors are the password, a first entire private key associated with a second asymmetric key pair, and a second entire private key associated with a third asymmetric key pair;

the first network station is further configured to form the first message by i) cryptographically signing a first hash of the challenge with the first entire private key, cryptographically signing a second hash of the challenge with the second entire private key, and combining the cryptographically singed first and second hashes with the challenge.

16. The system of claim 15 , wherein the second network station is further configured to i) apply a first public key associated with the second asymmetric key pair to the signed first hash to recover the challenge to provide direct verification of user control of the first entire private key, and ii) apply a second public key associated with the third asymmetric key pair to the signed second hash to recover the challenge to provide direct verification of user control of the second entire private key.

17. The system of claim 11 , wherein:

the second network station is further configured to transmit the challenge to the first network station; and

the first network station is further configured to receive the transmitted challenge prior to cryptographically combining the challenge with the first factor.

18. The system of claim 11 , wherein the first network station is further configured to destroy the generated first portion after transforming the first message.

19. The system of claim 11 , wherein the first network station is further configure to i) perform multiple cryptographic operations to produce a result, at least one of the multiple cryptographic operations based upon less than all the multiple factors, and a final performed one of the multiple cryptographic operations based upon all the multiple factors, and ii) perform a cryptographic operation based upon the produced result to generate the first portion of the split private key.

20. The system of claim 11 , wherein the password is not stored in a persistent state.

21. An apparatus for user authentication based upon an asymmetric key pair having a first key and a second key, with the first key split into multiple portions, with a first of the multiple portions of the split first key being based on multiple factors, including a user password, the apparatus comprising:

a communications port configured to receive a message transformed with the first portion of the split first key, wherein the message includes a challenge and a first of the multiple factors, other than the user password, cryptographically combined; and

a processor configured with logic that is executable to further transform the received transformed message to authenticate the user and directly verify user control of the first factor.

22. The apparatus of claim 21 , wherein:

the further transforming is performed by applying a second portion of the split first key and the second key of the asymmetric key pair to the received transformed message to recover the message; and

recovery of the message also indirectly verifies user control of the password.

Assignments (8)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Apr 15, 2024
From: VMWARE, INC.
To: VMWARE LLC
Reel/Frame 067102/0242 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 30, 2010
From: TRICIPHER, INC.
To: VMWARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 025402/0645 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 16, 2010
From: COMERICA BANK
To: TRICIPHER, INC.
Reel/Frame 025000/0047 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Apr 21, 2008
From: TRICIPHER, INC.
To: COMERICA BANK
Reel/Frame 020828/0804 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH ASSIGNORS' EXECUTION DATES PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 017253, FRAME 0232. ASSIGNORS HEREBY CONFIRM THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTEREST. Recorded Oct 31, 2006
From: SANDHU, RAVINDERPAL SINGH; SCHOPPERT, BRETT JASON; GANESAN, RAVI; BELLARE, MIHIR; DESA, COLIN JOSEPH
To: TRICIPHER, INC.
Reel/Frame 018479/0495 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL 016568 FRAME 0573 OF THE 5TH CONVEYING PARTY AND THE EXECUTION DATE. ASSIGNORS HEREBY CONFIRM THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTEREST. Recorded Nov 18, 2005
From: SANDHU, RAVINDERPAL SINGH; SCHOPPERT, BRETT JASON; GANESAN, RAVI; BELLARE, MIHIR; DESA, COLLIN JOSEPH
To: TRICIPHER, INC.
Reel/Frame 017253/0232 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 16, 2005
From: SANDHU, RAVINDERPAL SINGH; SCHOPPERT, BRETT JASON; GANESAN, RAVI; BELLARE, MIHIR; DESA, COLIN JOSEPH
To: TRICIPHER, INC.
Reel/Frame 016568/0573 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Feb 14, 2005
From: SANDHU, RAVINDERPAL SINGH; SCHOPPERT, BRETT JASON; GANESAN, RAVI; BELLARE, MIHIR; DESA, COLIN JOSEPH
To: TRICIPHER, INC.
Reel/Frame 016908/0200 →