System and method for secure message processing

1. A method for secure message processing by a communication device to identify an email impersonation attack, the method comprising:

receiving a secure electronic message from a sender, the secure electronic message including a header, contents, and a signature of the sender, the signature comprising a message hash encrypted with a private key of the sender, the header including a sender's address;

checking local memory of the communication device for a public key of the sender;

querying a certificate server over a wireless network to retrieve the public key when the public key was not found in the local memory and to retrieve a corresponding certificate, the querying including providing one or more parameters from the header of the secure electronic message to the certificate server to identify the sender, the certificate being a public key certificate;

authenticating the public key and the corresponding certificate by comparing the sender's address provided in the header of the secure electronic message with the sender's address provided in the certificate;

when the certificate is authenticated, checking the authenticity of the secure electronic message using the sender's public key and displaying the contents of the message when the secure electronic message is authenticated; and

when the certificate fails to authenticate, providing a notification to a message recipient that the sender's address from in the secure electronic message does not match the sender's address provided in the sender's certificate indicating a possible email impersonation attack in which the sender may have used a forged public key.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the notification is one or more visual, audio or tactile indications that are provided with display of the secure electronic message to the message recipient.

3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: providing the message recipient with information regarding whether the sender's address provided in the secure electronic message is indicative of the sender's address provided in the sender's certificate,

wherein the information is provided to the message recipient if a visual indication is activated on a message recipient device.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the information comprises one or more of the following: a sender's address in the secure electronic message, a sender's address in the sender's certificate, or a sender's public-key certificate and a sender's name.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the sender's address provided in the sender's certificate is accessed utilizing only one or more of a certificate holder's first name, last name, or e-mail address.

6. A method for secure message processing by a communication device to identify an email impersonation attack, the method comprising:

receiving a secure electronic message from a sender, the secure electronic message including a header, contents, and a signature of the sender, the signature comprising a message hash encrypted with a private key of the sender, the header including a sender's address;

checking local memory of the communication device for a public key of the sender;

querying a certificate server over a wireless network to retrieve the public key when the public key was not found in the local memory and to retrieve a corresponding certificate, the querying including providing one or more parameters from the header of the secure electronic message to the certificate server to identify the sender, the certificate being a public key certificate;

authenticating the public key and the corresponding certificate by comparing the sender's address provided in the header of the secure electronic message with the sender's address provided in the certificate, the certificate being a public key certificate of the sender;

when the certificate is authenticated, checking the authenticity of the secure electronic message using the sender's public key and displaying the contents of the message when the secure electronic message is authenticated;

when the certificate fails to authenticate, providing a notification to a message recipient that the sender's address from in the secure electronic message does not match the sender's address provided in the certificate indicating a possible email impersonation attack in which the sender may have used a forged public key; and

determining a status of the certificate by checking a certificate revocation list (CRL);

when the certificate has not been revoked, authenticating the certificate, and

when the certificate has been revoked, refraining from authenticating the certificate.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein when the certificate is authenticated, the method includes:

checking the authenticity of the secure electronic message by extracting the signature from the secure electronic message and decrypting the signature using the sender's public key to determine a decrypted message hash;

generating a new hash code from the message;

comparing the new hash code with the decrypted message hash; and

displaying the contents of the message if the new hash code matches the decrypted message hash.

8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the signature is a digital signature in an S/MIME format or a PGP format.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the certificate server is implemented as a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server or as an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server.

10. A system embodied on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium for enabling electronic mail message processing by a communication device to identify an email impersonation attack, comprising instructions code configured to:

receive a secure electronic message from a sender, the secure electronic message including a header, contents, and a signature of the sender, the signature comprising a message hash encrypted with a private key of the sender, the header including a sender's address;

check local memory of the communication device for a public key of the sender;

query a certificate server over a wireless network to retrieve the public key when the public key was not found in the local memory and retrieve a corresponding certificate, the querying including providing one or more parameters from the header of the secure electronic message to the certificate server to identify the sender, the certificate being a public key certificate;

authenticate the public key and the corresponding certificate by comparing the sender's address provided in the header of the secure electronic message with the sender's address provided in the certificate; and

when the certificate is authenticated, check the authenticity of the secure electronic message using the sender's public key and to display the contents of the message when the secure electronic message is authenticated; and

when the certificate fails to authenticate, provide a notification to a message recipient that the sender's address from in the secure electronic message does not match the sender's address provided in the sender's certificate indicating a possible email impersonation attack in which the sender may have used a forged public key.

11. The system of claim 10 , wherein the instructions further configure the communication device to provide the message recipient with information regarding whether the sender's address provided in the secure electronic message is indicative of the sender's address provided in the sender's certificate, wherein the information is provided to the message recipient if a visual indication is activated on a message recipient device.

12. The system of claim 10 , wherein when the certificate is authenticated, the instructions further configure the communication device to:

check the authenticity of the secure electronic message by extracting the signature from the secure electronic message and decrypting the signature using the sender's public key to determine a decrypted message hash;

generate a new hash code from the message;

compare the new hash code with the decrypted message hash; and

display the contents of the message if the new hash code matches the decrypted message hash.

13. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium that stores instructions for enabling electronic mail message processing by a communication device to identify an email impersonation attack, wherein the instructions configure the communication device to:

receive a secure electronic message from a sender, the secure electronic message including a header, contents, and a signature of the sender, the signature comprising a message hash encrypted with a private key of the sender, the header including a sender's address;

check local memory of the communication device for a public key of the sender;

query a certificate server over a wireless network to retrieve the public key when the public key was not found in the local memory and retrieve a corresponding certificate, the querying including providing one or more parameters from the header of the secure electronic message to the certificate server to identify the sender, the certificate being a public key certificate;

authenticate the public key and the corresponding certificate by comparing the sender's address provided in the header of the secure electronic message with the sender's address provided in the certificate;

when the certificate is authenticated, check the authenticity of the secure electronic message using the sender's public key and to display the contents of the message when the secure electronic message is authenticated;

when the certificate fails to authenticate, provide a notification to a message recipient that the sender's address from in the secure electronic message does not match the sender's address provided in the certificate indicating a possible email impersonation attack in which the sender may have used a forged public key; retrieve the certificate from one or more of the local memory and the certificate server;

determine a status of the certificate by checking a certificate revocation list (CRL);

when the certificate has not been revoked, authenticate the certificate, and

when the certificate has been revoked, refrain from authenticating the certificate.

14. A communication device configured for secure message processing to identify an email impersonation attack, the communication device comprising a processor, local memory and a display, wherein the processor is configured for:

receiving a secure electronic message from a sender, the secure electronic message including a header, contents, and a signature of the sender, the signature comprising a message hash encrypted with a private key of the sender, the header including a sender's address;

checking the local memory of the communication device for a public key of the sender;

querying a certificate server over a wireless network to retrieve the public key when the public key was not found in the local memory and to retrieve a corresponding certificate, the querying including providing one or more parameters from the header of the secure electronic message to the certificate server to identify the sender, the certificate being a public key certificate;

authenticating the public key and the corresponding certificate by comparing the sender's address provided in the header of the secure electronic message with the sender's address provided in the certificate; and

checking the authenticity of the secure electronic message using the sender's public key when the certificate is authenticated;

wherein the display is configured for displaying the contents of the message when the secure electronic message is authenticated and for providing a notification to a message recipient when the certificate fails to authenticate that the sender's address from in the secure electronic message does not match the sender's address provided in the sender's certificate indicating a possible email impersonation attack in which the sender may have used a forged public key.