IP Library Granted Patent US 7,661,587
Granted Patent B1
US 7,661,587 · App. 11/321,658 · Granted Feb 16, 2010

Systems and methods for determining false MICR

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 7,661,587
App. No.
11/321,658
Granted
Feb 16, 2010
Kind
B1
Abstract

Systems and methods are disclosed, where check transaction risks can be determined based on a pattern of changes in identifier information such as MICR field information and driver license number. A MICR field on a given check includes a routing transit number and an account number. Some fraudulent check transactions involve a pattern of alterations of the MICR field, such as changing, adding, or removing of one or more digits or characters of the account number or the routing transit number. Various embodiments of systems and methods can be configured to detect such pattern of changes in the MICR field, thereby facilitating detection of fraudulent check transactions. Various techniques of the present disclosure can be used to detect fraudulent electronic check transactions such as web-based transactions, as well as paper check transactions.

Claims (69)

1. A method for detecting a fraudulent check transaction, comprising:

obtaining information about a MICR account number field associated with a current check transaction, said MICR field having a sequence of digits or characters;

searching for a pattern of change in sequences of digits or characters among the current MICR account number field and at least one existing MICR account number field associated with at least one previous check transaction, said at least one existing MICR account number field having the same number of digits or characters as the new MICR account number field; and

determining, via at least one processor, that the current check transaction is likely a fraudulent transaction if the change in sequences of digits or characters comprises a change involving a selected digit or character, and characterizing risk associated with the likely fraudulent transaction based at least in part on the change involving the selected digit or character.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the change involving the selected digit or character is the only change in sequences of digits or characters.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the change involving the selected digit or character comprises an increment or decrement of the selected digit or character.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the selected digit or character is part of an account number portion of the corresponding MICR field.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the selected digit or character is part of a routing transit number portion of the corresponding MICR field.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the selected digit or character is part of a driver license number.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein information about the new MICR field is obtained via a phone-based transaction.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein information about the at least one existing MICR field is obtained from a database.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one previous check transaction comprises a check transaction that occurred during a specified period in the past.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the specified period comprises seven days.

11. A method for processing a check transaction, comprising:

obtaining information about a new MICR field associated with a first check transaction;

obtaining a pattern of change among the new MICR field and at least one existing MICR field associated with at least one previous check transaction, said at least one existing MICR field having the same number of digits or characters as the new MICR field; and

assigning, via at least one processor, a first risk value to the first transaction if the pattern of change involves a change in selected one or more digits or characters of a selected portion of the new MICR field and the at least one existing MICR field, wherein the first risk value is based at least in part on the change in the selected one or more digits or characters.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the information about the new MICR field is obtained via a point-of-sale device.

13. The method of claim 11 , wherein information about the new MICR field is obtained via an internet-based website configured to perform check transactions.

14. The method of claim 11 , wherein information about the new MICR field is obtained via a phone-based transaction.

15. The method of claim 11 , wherein information about the selected MICR field is obtained from a database.

16. The method of claim 11 , wherein the at least one previous check transaction comprises at least one transaction that occurred during a specified period in the past.

17. The method of claim 16 , wherein the specified period comprises seven days.

18. The method of claim 11 , wherein the change in selected one or more digits or characters is the only change in change among the new MICR field and at least one existing MICR field.

19. The method of claim 11 , wherein the change in selected one or more digits or characters comprises a change in selected one digit or character.

20. The method of claim 11 , wherein the first check transaction is considered to be fraudulent if the change in selected one digit or character comprises an increment or decrement in the value of the selected one digit or character.

21. The method of claim 11 , wherein the selected portion of the new MICR field and the at least one existing MICR field comprises a routing transit number.

22. The method of claim 11 , wherein the selected portion of the new MICR field and the at least one existing MICR field comprises an account number field.

23. The method of claim 11 , further comprising determining how to proceed with the first check transaction based at least in part on the first risk value.

24. The method of claim 23 , wherein the first check transaction is authorized if the first risk value is within a range of an acceptable risk.

25. The method of claim 23 , wherein the first check transaction is declined if the first risk value is within a range of an unacceptable risk.

26. The method of claim 23 , wherein additional information about the first check transaction is requested if the first risk value is within a range of a questionable risk.

27. The method of claim 11 , further comprising providing a communication with a party requesting the first check transaction based at least in part on the first risk value.

28. The method of claim 27 , wherein the communication comprises a message transmitted to a point-of-sale device.

29. The method of claim 28 , wherein the message includes a request to inspect the check for signs of alteration of one or more digits or characters of the first MICR field.

30. The method of claim 28 , wherein the message includes a request to call a telephone number to proceed with the first check transaction.

31. The method of claim 27 , wherein the communication comprises a message transmitted to the party using an internet-based website to request the first check transaction.

32. The method of claim 31 , wherein the message includes a request to re-enter the first MICR field.

33. The method of claim 31 , wherein the message includes a request to call a telephone number to proceed with the first check transaction.

34. A system for processing a check transaction, comprising:

an interface component configured to obtain information about a new MICR field associated with a first check transaction; and

a risk component with at least one processor configured to:

obtain a pattern of change among the new MICR field and at least one existing MICR field associated with at least one previous check transaction, said at least one existing MICR field having the same number of digits or characters as the new MICR field; and

assign a first risk value to the first transaction if the pattern of change involves a change in selected one or more digits or characters of a selected portion of the new MICR field and the at least one existing MICR field, wherein the first risk value is based at least in part on the change in the selected one or more digits or characters.

35. The system of claim 34 , wherein the information about the new MICR field is obtained via a point-of-sale device.

36. The system of claim 34 , wherein information about the new MICR field is obtained via an internet-based website configured to perform check transactions.

37. The system of claim 34 , wherein information about the selected MICR field is obtained from a database.

38. The system of claim 34 , wherein the at least one previous check transaction comprises at least one transaction that occurred during a specified period in the past.

39. The system of claim 38 , wherein the specified period comprises seven days.

40. The system of claim 34 , wherein the change in selected one or more digits or characters is the only change in change among the new MICR field and at least one existing MICR field.

41. The system of claim 34 , wherein the change in selected one or more digits or characters comprises a change in selected one digit or character.

42. The system of claim 34 , wherein the first check transaction is considered to be fraudulent if the change in selected one or more digits or characters comprises an increment or decrement in the value of the selected one digit or character.

43. The system of claim 34 , wherein the selected portion of the new MICR field and the at least one existing MICR field comprises a routing transit number.

44. The system of claim 34 , wherein the selected portion of the new MICR field and the at least one existing MICR field comprises an account number field.

45. The system of claim 34 , further comprising a processor configured so as to determine how to proceed with the first check transaction based at least in part on the first risk value.

46. The system of claim 45 , wherein the first check transaction is authorized if the first risk value is within a range of an acceptable risk.

47. The system of claim 45 , wherein the first check transaction is declined if the first risk value is within a range of an unacceptable risk.

48. The system of claim 45 , wherein additional information about the first check transaction is requested if the first risk value is within a range of a questionable risk.

49. The system of claim 34 , further comprising an interface component configured so as to provide communication with a party requesting the first check transaction based at least in part on the first risk value.

50. The system of claim 49 , wherein the communication comprises a message transmitted to a point-of-sale device.

51. The system of claim 50 , wherein the message includes a request to inspect the check for signs of alteration of one or more digits or characters of the first MICR field.

52. The system of claim 50 , wherein the message includes a request to call a telephone number to proceed with the first check transaction.

53. The system of claim 49 , wherein the communication comprises a message transmitted to the party using an internet-based website to request the first check transaction.

54. The system of claim 53 , wherein the message includes a request to re-enter the first MICR field.

55. The system of claim 53 , wherein the message includes a request to call a telephone number to proceed with the first check transaction.

56. A method for detecting a fraudulent check transaction, comprising:

obtaining information about a current check transaction, said information having a sequence of digits or characters;

searching for a pattern of change in sequences of digits or characters among the current check transaction and one or more past check transactions; and

determining, via at least one processor, that the current check transaction is likely a fraudulent transaction if the change in sequences of digits or characters comprises a change involving a selected digit or character, and characterizing risk associated with the likely fraudulent transaction based at least in part on the change involving the selected digit or character.

Assignments (8)
TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENT RIGHTS Recorded Aug 19, 2019
From: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
To: FIRST DATA CORPORATION; DW HOLDINGS, INC.; FIRST DATA RESOURCES, INC. (K/N/A FIRST DATA RESOURCES, LLC); FUNDSXPRESS FINANCIAL NETWORKS, INC.; INTELLIGENT RESULTS, INC. (K/N/A FIRST DATA SOLUTIONS, INC.); LINKPOINT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MONEY NETWORK FINANCIAL, LLC; SIZE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; TASQ TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Reel/Frame 050090/0060 →
TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENT RIGHTS Recorded Aug 19, 2019
From: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
To: FIRST DATA CORPORATION; DW HOLDINGS, INC.; FIRST DATA RESOURCES, LLC; FUNDSXPRESS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.; FIRST DATA SOLUTIONS, INC.; LINKPOINT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MONEY NETWORK FINANCIAL, LLC; SIZE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; TASQ TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Reel/Frame 050091/0474 →
TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENT RIGHTS Recorded Aug 19, 2019
From: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
To: FIRST DATA CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 050094/0455 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 30, 2019
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH
To: CARDSERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; DW HOLDINGS INC.; FIRST DATA CORPORATION; FIRST DATA RESOURCES, LLC; FUNDSXPRESS, INC.; INTELLIGENT RESULTS, INC.; LINKPOINT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SIZE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; TASQ TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL, INC.; TELECHECK SERVICES, INC.
Reel/Frame 049902/0919 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jan 31, 2011
From: DW HOLDINGS, INC.; FIRST DATA RESOURCES, LLC; FUNDSXPRESS FINANCIAL NETWORKS, INC.; FIRST DATA SOLUTIONS, INC.; LINKPOINT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MONEY NETWORK FINANCIAL, LLC; SIZE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; TASQ TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL, INC
To: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 025719/0590 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 17, 2010
From: DW HOLDINGS, INC.; FIRST DATA RESOURCES, INC. (K/N/A FIRST DATA RESOURCES, LLC); FUNDSXPRESS FINANCIAL NETWORKS, INC.; INTELLIGENT RESULTS, INC. (K/N/A FIRST DATA SOLUTIONS, INC.); LINKPOINT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MONEY NETWORK FINANCIAL, LLC; SIZE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; TASQ TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL, INC.
To: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 025368/0183 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Oct 31, 2007
From: FIRST DATA CORPORATION; CARDSERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; FUNDSXPRESS, INC.; LINKPOINT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; TASQ TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TELECHECK SERVICES, INC.; DW HOLDINGS, INC.; FIRST DATA RESOURCES, INC.; INTELLIGENT RESULTS, INC.; SIZE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL, INC.
To: CREDIT SUISSE, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 020045/0165 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 13, 2006
From: MOK, WAISUM; BOUDOUSQUIE, ANDRE
To: FIRST DATA CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 017332/0512 →