IP Library Granted Patent US 7,996,024
Granted Patent B2
US 7,996,024 · App. 11/578,482 · Granted Aug 9, 2011

Method for preventing the delivery of short message service message spam

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 7,996,024
App. No.
11/578,482
Granted
Aug 9, 2011
Kind
B2
Abstract

Methods, systems, and computer program products for delivery of SMS messages are disclosed. According to one method, first routing data for delivery of an SMS message to a mobile terminal is received at a network element. Second routing data is transmitted from the network element in response to receiving the first routing data. An SMS message having the second routing data is received at the network element. The second routing data is converted at the network element to the first routing data for delivery of the SMS message to a mobile terminal. The network element uses the first and second routing data to correlate a request for the first routing data with receipt of the SMS message. The network element compares an SMSC address in the request for the first routing data with an SMSC address in the SMS message to detect the presence of address spoofing.

Claims (52)

1. A method for delivery of a short message service (SMS) message in an SMS-network comprising a network element to at least one mobile terminal, said method comprising:

receiving first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal at said network element;

transmitting second routing data (imsi 2 ) from said network element in response to receiving said first routing data (imsi 1 );

receiving at said network element said SMS-message comprising said second routing data (imsi 2 );

converting at said network element said second routing data (imsi 2 ) to said first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal; and

at the network element:

using said first and second routing data to correlate a request for said first routing data with receipt of said SMS message; and

comparing an SMSC address in said request for said first routing data with an SMSC address in said SMS message to detect the presence of address spoofing.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein said first routing data comprises the international mobile station identifier (IMSI) (imsi 1 ) of the mobile terminal and said second routing data comprises a different (imsi 2 ).

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein said SMS-network further has access to a short message service centre (SMSC) and said method further comprises:

receiving at said network element said request (SRI_SM) from said SMSC for said first routing data (imsi 1 );

transmitting a response message (SRI_SM_RESP) to said SMSC comprising said second routing data (imsi 2 ).

4. The method of claim 3 , further comprising the step of comparing the address of said SMSC in said request (SRI_SM) and the address of said SMSC in said SMS-message for detecting unauthorized delivery of said SMS-message.

5. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising determining the time interval (ΔT) between transmitting said second routing data (imsi 2 ) and receiving said SMS-message.

6. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the validity of said second routing data (imis 2 ) expires after a predetermined time interval.

7. The method according to claim 1 , wherein said transmitted second routing data (imsi 2 ) are different from said received first routing data (imsi 1 ).

8. A method for delivery of a short message service (SMS) message in an SMS-network comprising a network element to at least one mobile terminal, said method comprising:

receiving first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal at said network element;

transmitting second routing data (imsi 2 ) from said network element in response to receiving said first routing data (imsi 1 ); and

at the network element:

using said first and second routing data to correlate a request for said first routing data with receipt of an SMS message including said second routing data; and

comparing an SMSC address in said request for said first routing data with an SMSC address in said SMS message to detect the presence of address spoofing.

9. A non-transitory computer program product for delivery of a short message service (SMS) message in an SMS-network comprising a network element to at least one mobile terminal at least including computer executable code portions for:

receiving first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal at said network element;

transmitting second routing data (imsi 2 ) from said network element in response to receiving said first routing data (imsi 1 );

receiving at said network element said SMS-message comprising said second routing data (imsi 2 );

converting at said network element said second routing data (imsi 2 ) to said first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal; and

at the network element:

using said first and second routing data to correlate a request for said first routing data with receipt of said SMS message; and

comparing an SMSC address in said request for said first routing data with an SMSC address in said SMS message to detect the presence of address spoofing.

10. The non-transitory computer program product according to claim 9 , further comprising computer executable code portions configured such that said first routing data comprises the international mobile station identifier (IMSI) (imsi 1 ) of the mobile terminal and wherein said second routing data comprises a different IMSI (imsi 2 ).

11. An SMS-network comprising a network element for delivery of a short message service (SMS) message to at least one mobile terminal, said network element being adapted for:

receiving first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal;

transmitting second routing data (imsi 2 ) in response to receiving said first routing data (imsi 1 );

receiving said SMS-message comprising said second routing data (imsi 2 );

converting said second routing data (imsi 2 ) to said first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS- message to said mobile terminal; and

at the network element:

using said first and second routing data to correlate a request for said first routing data with receipt of said SMS message; and

comparing an SMSC address in said request for said first routing data with an SMSC address in said SMS message to detect the presence of address spoofing.

12. The SMS-network according to claim 11 , wherein said network element is further adapted such that said first routing data comprises the international mobile station identifier (IMSI) (imsi 1 ) of the mobile terminal and said second routing data comprises a different IMSI (imsi 2 ).

13. A network element for use in an SMS-network for delivery of a short message service (SMS) message to at least one mobile terminal, said network element being adapted for:

receiving first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal ( 2 );

transmitting second routing data (imsi 2 ) in response to receiving said first routing data (imsi 1 );

receiving said SMS-message comprising said second routing data (imsi 2 ),

converting said second routing data (imsi 2 ) to said first routing data (imsi 1 ) for delivery of said SMS-message to said mobile terminal ( 2 );

at the network element:

using said first and second routing data to correlate a request for said first routing data with receipt of said SMS message; and

comparing an SMSC address in said request for said first routing data with an SMSC address in said SMS message to detect the presence of address spoofing.

14. The network element according to claim 13 , wherein said network element is further adapted such that said first routing data comprises the international mobile station identifier (IMSI) (imsi 1 ) of the mobile terminal and said second routing data comprises a different IMSI (imsi 2 ).

15. The method of claim 2 , wherein said SMS-network further has access to a short message service centre (SMSC) and said method further comprises the steps of:

receiving at said network element a request (SRI SM) from said SMSC for said first routing data (imsi 1 ); and

transmitting a response message (SRI_SM_RESP) to said SMSC comprising said second routing data (imsi 2 ).

Assignments (10)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded May 13, 2020
From: MBALANCE GROUP B.V.
To: TEKELEC NETHERLANDS GROUP B.V.
Reel/Frame 052654/0084 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded May 13, 2020
From: TEKELEC NETHERLANDS GROUP B.V.
To: NEWNET COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES B.V.
Reel/Frame 052654/0368 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 13, 2020
From: NEWNET COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES B.V.
To: ZEPHYRTEL, INC.
Reel/Frame 052654/0519 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 27, 2012
From: TEKELEC INTERNATIONAL SPRL
To: TEKELEC NETHERLANDS GROUP, B.V.
Reel/Frame 028853/0469 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 27, 2012
From: TEKELEC GLOBAL, INC.
To: TEKELEC INTERNATIONAL SPRL
Reel/Frame 028853/0324 →
TERMINATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS Recorded Aug 27, 2012
From: WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
To: TEKELEC AND CAMIANT, INC.
Reel/Frame 028856/0396 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Aug 13, 2012
From: TEKELEC
To: TEKELEC GLOBAL, INC.
Reel/Frame 028775/0373 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 24, 2012
From: TEKELEC; CAMIANT, INC.
To: WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 028035/0659 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 20, 2011
From: NOOREN CONSULTING B. V.
To: TEKELEC
Reel/Frame 025670/0628 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 20, 2007
From: NOOREN, ELOY JOHAN LAMBERTUS
To: NOOREN CONSULTING B.V.
Reel/Frame 019454/0489 →