Modular tamper resistant enclosure for secure systems
View Patent ↗An active membrane creates a secure area around one or more devices. The active membrane forms a physical barrier between the encased secure area and an external environment. Linked to the membrane and acting as the sole interface between the secure area and the outside environment is a boundary interface. The boundary interface tunnels data to the secure area in a secure fashion. According to one embodiment of the present invention, the boundary interface utilizes symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptographic techniques to secure the data path. The boundary interface is also coupled to the active membrane, and upon the membrane sensing a breach of the membrane (thus signifying an intrusion of the secure area), the boundary interface can be configured to sever the data paths linking the secure area with the unsecured area as well as take other active steps to ensure that data within the secure area is not compromised.
1. A system for securing an electronic environment, comprising:
an active membrane comprising a physical casing;
a secure area within the active membrane, wherein the active membrane is configured to sense a breach of the active membrane from an unsecured area to the secured area;
a boundary interface providing a sole link between the secure area and the unsecured area, wherein the boundary interface is coupled to the active membrane; and
at least one electronic device contained by the active membrane within the secure area, wherein the boundary interface is configured to sever the link to limit compromise of the at least one electronic device responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach of the membrane.
2. The system of claim 1 wherein the boundary interface is configured to destroy unsecured data of the at least one device responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach.
3. The system of claim 1 wherein the boundary interface includes a machine capable of executing instructions embodied as software, and a memory storing a plurality of portions of software, wherein one of said software portions is configured to secure the link using a cryptographic technique.
4. The system of claim 3 wherein the cryptographic technique includes symmetric cryptography.
5. The system of claim 3 wherein the cryptographic technique includes asymmetric cryptography.
6. The system of claim 3 wherein the boundary interface is configured to zero cryptographic keys of the cryptographic technique responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach.
7. The system of claim 3 wherein the memory is volatile memory and the boundary interface is configured to clear the memory responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach.
8. A method for creating a secure electronic environment, comprising:
encasing a plurality of electronic devices within an active membrane to create a secure area within the active membrane that houses the device, wherein the active membrane comprises a physical barrier between the secure area and an unsecured area, and wherein the active membrane is configured to sense a breach of the membrane; and
establishing an external link between the secure area and the unsecured area via a boundary interface, wherein the boundary interface is coupled to the active membrane, and wherein the boundary interface severs the external link responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach of the membrane.
9. The method of claim 8 wherein the boundary interface exclusively links the secure area with the unsecured area.
10. The method of claim 8 further comprising configuring the boundary interface to destroy data within the secure area responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach.
11. The method of claim 8 wherein the boundary interface secures the external link using a cryptographic technique.
12. The method of claim 11 wherein the cryptographic technique includes symmetric cryptography.
13. The method of claim 11 wherein the cryptographic technique includes asymmetric cryptography.
14. The method of claim 8 further comprising severing the external link in response to the active membrane sensing the breach.
15. The method of claim 8 wherein at least one of the devices within the secure area includes encrypted data that is encrypted using a key stored on the boundary interface, and responsive to the active membrane sensing the breach, the key is zeroed.
16. The method of claim 8 wherein the external link includes a plurality of data paths and wherein each of the data paths are cryptographically secured using a key stored in volatile memory by the boundary interface.
17. The method of claim 16 wherein responsive to the active membrane sensing breach the key stored in volatile memory is zeroed.
18. A tamper-resistant enclosure for at least one electronic device, comprising:
an active membrane, comprising:
a physical casing; and
at least one secure area within the physical casing and configured to store at least one electronic device, wherein the active membrane is configured to sense a breach of the physical casing;
a boundary interface disposed within the secure area, wherein the boundary interface is configured to encrypt and/or decrypt data traveling from and/or to the at least one electronic device; and
at least one data link that interconnects the boundary interface to an unsecured area outside of the active membrane, wherein the at least one data link traverses the active membrane, and wherein the boundary interface is configured to limit compromise of the at least one electronic device responsive to the active membrane detecting a breach of the physical casing.
19. The enclosure of claim 18 , wherein the boundary interface comprises:
a memory comprising at least one software portion that secures the at least one data link using a cryptographic technique; and
a processor that executes at least one instruction of the at least one software portion.
20. The enclosure of claim 18 , wherein the breach comprises at least one of a tear or a puncture in the physical casing.