Method and system for enforcing trusted computing policies in a hypervisor security module architecture

1. A computer-implemented method for extending security enforcement by a hypervisor to include enforcing trusted computing (TC) policies, comprising the steps of:

receiving a request from a subject for access to an object;

obtaining TC-related attribute values for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM) with the vTMP virtualizing TC functions of a trusted platform module (TMP) including TPM hardware such that, each virtual machine has an instance of a vTPM as its root of trust wherein obtaining TC-related attribute values includes obtaining integrity values for the TC-related attributes of the subject and the object; and

making access control decisions based at least on the integrity values and TC-related policies using XSM hook functions wherein the hypervisor is a Xen hypervisor and a Xen Security Module (XSM) integrated with the vTPM is used to provide secure virtual machine inter-communication permitting access when a TC policy condition is satisfied for at least one of the obtained integrity values.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the hypervisor provides virtualized resources for virtual machines (VMs); and

the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a software resource.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the hypervisor provides virtualized resources for virtual machines (VMs); and

the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a hardware resource object.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the hypervisor provides virtualized resources for virtual machines (VMs); and

the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a process in an object VM.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the Xen Security Module (XSM) comprises a trusted computing (TC) policy module and a MAC policy module, wherein the XSM enforces security requirements for virtual machine intercommunication based at least on the TC policy module.

6. An apparatus extending security enforcement by a hypervisor to include comprising:

a processing system including a processor;

a non-transitory machine accessible medium;

and instructions encoded in the machine accessible medium, wherein the instructions, when executed by the processing system, integrate a XEN Security Module with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) including TPM hardware to cause the processing system to enforce trusted computing (TC) policies for a hypervisor providing virtualized resources for virtual machines (VMs), the processing system obtaining TC-related attribute values for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM) of the TC functions of the Trusted Platform Module wherein obtaining TC-related attribute values includes obtaining integrity values for the TC-related attributes of the subject and the object,

wherein each virtual machine has an instance of a vTPM as its root of trust and making access control decisions based at least on the integrity values and TC-related policies using XSM hook functions wherein the hypervisor is a Xen hypervisor and a Xen Security Module (XSM) is used to provide secure virtual machine inter-communication permitting access when a TC policy condition is satisfied for at least one of the obtained integrity values.

7. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the instructions, when executed, perform further operations comprising:

enforce trusted computing (TC) policies in a security module architecture for a hypervisor providing virtualized resources for virtual machines.

8. The apparatus of claim 7 , wherein the security module architecture comprises a Xen Security Module (XSM).

9. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a software resource.

10. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a hardware resource object.

11. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a process in an object VM.

12. A system for extending a hypervisor for enforcing trusted computing (TC) policies in a security module architecture for a hypervisor providing virtualized resources for virtual machines (VMs), comprising:

a trusted platform module (TPM) including TPM hardware;

an interface function configured for receiving a request from a subject for access to an object;

a manager to virtualize the trusted platform module and provide TC functions to the VMs, the manager configured for obtaining TC-related attribute values for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM), wherein each virtual machine has an instance of a vTPM as its root of trust and at least one of the TC-related attribute values includes an integrity value; and

the system a security module configured for making access control decisions to allow access based at least on the obtained TC-related attribute values and TC-related policies using XSM hook functions wherein the hypervisor is a Xen hypervisor and a Xen Security Module (XSM) integrated with the vTPM is used to provide secure virtual machine inter-communication permitting access when a TC policy condition is satisfied associated with at least one integrity value of at least one of the subject and the object.

13. The system of claim 12 , wherein the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a software resource.

14. The system of claim 12 , wherein the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a hardware resource object.

15. The system of claim 12 , wherein the subject comprises a process in a subject VM requesting access to an object comprising a process in an object VM.

16. The system of claim 12 further including a vTPM configured for maintaining TC-related attribute values for computing resources.

17. The system of claim 16 , wherein the computing resources include software resources in a computing system.

18. The system of claim 16 , wherein the computing resources include hardware resources in a computing system.

19. A program product stored on a non-transitory computer useable medium for enforcing trusted computing (TC) policies in a security module architecture for a hypervisor, the program product comprising program code for causing a computer system to perform the following steps:

receiving a request from a subject for access to an object; obtaining TC-related attribute values including integrity values for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM), wherein each virtual machine has an instance of a vTPM as its root of trust; and making access control decisions based at least on the TC-related attribute values and TC-related policies using XSM hook functions wherein the hypervisor is a Xen hypervisor and a Xen Security Module (XSM) is integrated with the vTPM and is used to provide secure virtual machine inter-communication permitting access when a TC policy condition is satisfied for at least one of the obtained integrity values.

20. A computer-implemented method for enforcing trusted computing

(TC) policies in a security module architecture for a hypervisor, comprising: receiving a request from a subject for access to an object; obtaining TC-related attribute values including integrity values for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM), wherein each virtual machine has an instance of a vTPM as its root of trust; and

making access control decisions based at least on the TC-related attribute values and TC-related policies using XSM hook functions wherein the hypervisor is a Xen hypervisor and a Xen Security Module (XSM) is integrated with the vTPM and is used to provide secure virtual machine inter-communication permitting access when a TC policy condition is satisfied for at least one of the obtained integrity values.