IP Library Granted Patent US 8,539,229
Granted Patent B2
US 8,539,229 · App. 12/110,408 · Granted Sep 17, 2013

Techniques for secure data management in a distributed environment

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 8,539,229
App. No.
12/110,408
Granted
Sep 17, 2013
Kind
B2
Abstract

Techniques for secure data management in a distributed environment are provided. A secure server includes a modified operating system that just allows a kernel application to access a secure hard drive of the secure server. The hard drive comes prepackaged with a service public and private key pair for encryption and decryption services with other secure servers of a network. The hard drive also comes prepackaged with trust certificates to authenticate the other secure servers for secure socket layer (SSL) communications with one another, and the hard drive comes with a data encryption key, which is used to encrypt storage of the secure server. The kernel application is used during data restores, data backups, and/or data versioning operations to ensure secure data management for a distributed network of users.

Claims (30)

1. A machine-implemented method, comprising:

maintaining trust certificates for secure servers on a secure hard drive that is just accessible to a kernel of an Operating System (OS);

using a special application booted with the OS and that modifies the OS to prevent access to secure hard drive of the modified OS and without altering file permission processing associated with an existing file system, the modified OS is modified by decreasing permissions for root resources and restricting access for those root resources having root privileges on the modified OS to preventing access to the secure hard drive by those root resources, the restriction enforced by the modified OS and the root resources cannot read data from the secure hard drive and the modified OS provides access to the secure hard drive to just a kernel process of the modified OS;

maintaining a private key on the secure hard drive used to validate the trust certificates and provide decryption services to the secure servers;

maintaining a random key on the secure hard drive used to encrypt data associated with one or more storage environments, and wherein the trust certificates, the private key, and the random key are pre-installed on the secure hard drive by a manufacturer or distributor of the secure servers; and

encrypting the data with the random key for backup, version control, and restore operations against the one or more storage environments.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein maintaining the trust certificates further includes loading the trust certificates, by the kernel, in a fixed address range of memory during a boot of the modified OS so that when the kernel dumps core the address range is omitted and wherein debuggers processing within the modified OS do not have access to contents of the address range.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein maintaining the trust certificates further includes processing the modified OS during the boot to check digital signatures of every binary that is loaded to validate each of the binaries.

4. The method of claim 1 further comprising:

detecting a new storage volume connected to or in communication with the modified OS;

loading another instance of modified OS with the kernel to the new storage volume; and

establishing a secure socket layer (SSL) communication session with the new storage volume and authenticate the new storage volume with one or more of the trust certificates and further share the random key during the SSL communication session with the new storage volume.

5. The method of claim 4 further comprising:

receiving a different random encryption key that the new storage volume uses to encrypt its data from the new storage volume during the SSL communication session; and

maintaining the different random encryption key in the secure hard drive.

6. The method of claim 1 further comprising:

receiving a restore operation request from a secure destination server;

establishing a secure socket layer (SSL) communication session with the secure destination server after authenticating the secure destination server with a particular trust certificate;

providing to the secure destination server during the SSL communication session a full path of one or more encrypted files from the one or more storage environments that are associated with the restore operation request; and

providing a signature to the secure destination server, which is generated by the modified OS using one of the trust certificates.

7. The method of claim 6 further comprising:

encrypting the random key with public keys associated with the secure servers; and

delivering during the SSL communications the encrypted random key to the secure destination server for use in decrypting the one or more encrypted files associated with the full path.

8. A machine-implemented system, comprising:

a secure hard drive accessible to a server machine of a network; and

a secure server service implemented in a machine-accessible and computer-readable storage medium and to process on the server machine of the network;

wherein the secure hard drive includes prepackaged security information installed by a manufacturer or a distributor of the secure hard drive, wherein the security information includes a public key for the server machine, a private key for the server machine, trust certificates for other server machines, and a data encryption key, and wherein the secure server service is processed at a kernel level of an operating system (OS) that processes on the server machine, the secure server service restricts all access to the secure hard drive regardless of security role assigned to a user and without altering file permission processing associated with an existing file system, just the secure server service has access to the secure hard drive, and wherein the secure server service uses the security information to encrypt storage data interfaced to the server machine with the data encryption key, the secure server service also uses the public key to encrypt the data encryption key for delivery to the other server machines during secure socket layer (SSL) communications and uses the private key to decrypt other data encryption keys received from the other server machines, the secure server service uses the trust certificates to authenticate the other server machines during the SSL communications, wherein the OS is modified by decreasing permissions of root resources and restricting access for those root resources having root privileges on the modified OS to prevent access by the root resources to the secure hard drive within the modified OS, the restriction enforced by the modified OS and the root resources cannot read data from the secure hard drive and the modified OS provides access to the secure hard drive to just the secure server service that is a specific kernel process of the modified OS.

9. The system of claim 8 , wherein the security information also includes an initial prepackaged hierarchy of users that can access the encrypted storage data.

10. The system of claim 9 , wherein the hierarchy includes access rights for each of the users, wherein a user that is identified with a higher level of the hierarchy has access rights to data associated with a different user that is identified at a lower level within the hierarchy.

11. The system of claim 8 , wherein the secure server service restricts where and how files are restored on the server machine during a restore operation initiated by an authorized resource.

Assignments (15)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST REEL/FRAME 035656/0251 Recorded Feb 2, 2023
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
To: BORLAND SOFTWARE CORPORATION; ATTACHMATE CORPORATION; NETIQ CORPORATION; MICRO FOCUS (US), INC.; MICRO FOCUS SOFTWARE INC. (F/K/A NOVELL, INC.)
Reel/Frame 062623/0009 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST REEL/FRAME 044183/0718 Recorded Feb 2, 2023
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
To: MICRO FOCUS LLC (F/K/A ENTIT SOFTWARE LLC); BORLAND SOFTWARE CORPORATION; MICRO FOCUS (US), INC.; SERENA SOFTWARE, INC; ATTACHMATE CORPORATION; MICRO FOCUS SOFTWARE INC. (F/K/A NOVELL, INC.); NETIQ CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 062746/0399 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE TO CORRECT TYPO IN APPLICATION NUMBER 10708121 WHICH SHOULD BE 10708021 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 042388 FRAME 0386. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE NOTICE OF SUCCESSION OF AGENCY. Recorded Jul 26, 2018
From: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS PRIOR AGENT
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS SUCCESSOR AGENT
Reel/Frame 048793/0832 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Oct 11, 2017
From: ATTACHMATE CORPORATION; BORLAND SOFTWARE CORPORATION; NETIQ CORPORATION; MICRO FOCUS (US), INC.; MICRO FOCUS SOFTWARE, INC.; ENTIT SOFTWARE LLC; ARCSIGHT, LLC; SERENA SOFTWARE, INC.
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
Reel/Frame 044183/0718 →
NOTICE OF SUCCESSION OF AGENCY Recorded May 2, 2017
From: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS PRIOR AGENT
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS SUCCESSOR AGENT
Reel/Frame 042388/0386 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Sep 13, 2016
From: NOVELL, INC.
To: MICRO FOCUS SOFTWARE INC.
Reel/Frame 040020/0703 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 13, 2015
From: MICRO FOCUS (US), INC.; BORLAND SOFTWARE CORPORATION; ATTACHMATE CORPORATION; NETIQ CORPORATION; NOVELL, INC.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
Reel/Frame 035656/0251 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME 028252/0316 Recorded Nov 24, 2014
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG
To: NOVELL, INC.
Reel/Frame 034469/0057 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME 028252/0216 Recorded Nov 24, 2014
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG
To: NOVELL, INC.
Reel/Frame 034470/0680 →
GRANT OF PATENT SECURITY INTEREST FIRST LIEN Recorded May 23, 2012
From: NOVELL, INC.
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 028252/0216 →
GRANT OF PATENT SECURITY INTEREST SECOND LIEN Recorded May 23, 2012
From: NOVELL, INC.
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 028252/0316 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS FIRST LIEN (RELEASES RF 026270/0001 AND 027289/0727) Recorded May 22, 2012
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: NOVELL, INC.
Reel/Frame 028252/0077 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY IN PATENTS SECOND LIEN (RELEASES RF 026275/0018 AND 027290/0983) Recorded May 22, 2012
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: NOVELL, INC.
Reel/Frame 028252/0154 →
GRANT OF PATENT SECURITY INTEREST (SECOND LIEN) Recorded May 13, 2011
From: NOVELL, INC.
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH
Reel/Frame 026275/0018 →
GRANT OF PATENT SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 12, 2011
From: NOVELL, INC.
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH
Reel/Frame 026270/0001 →