IP Library Granted Patent US 8,200,982
Granted Patent B2
US 8,200,982 · App. 12/727,435 · Granted Jun 12, 2012

Semiotic system and method with privacy protection

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 8,200,982
App. No.
12/727,435
Granted
Jun 12, 2012
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method of processing semiotic data includes receiving semiotic data including at least one data set P, selecting a function h, and for at least one of each data set P to be collected, computing h(P), destroying data set P, and storing h(P) in a database, wherein data set P cannot be extracted from h(P). The method further includes selecting a private key/public key (K, k) once for all cases, one of destroying the private key K and sending the private key K to a trusted party, and choosing function h as the public encryption function corresponding to k.

Claims (54)

1. A method of processing semiotic data, comprising:

receiving semiotic data including at least one data set P;

selecting a function h, and, using a configured computer processor, for at least one of each said data set P to be collected, computing h(P);

destroying said data set P; and

storing h(P) in a database,

wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P),

the method further comprising:

selecting a private key/public key (K, k) once for all cases; and

one of destroying said private key K and sending said private key K to a trusted party; and

choosing said function h as the public encryption function corresponding to k.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P), except by the trusted party.

3. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

to determine whether some P′ is a predetermined subject, comparing said h(P′) to available h(P)s; and

determining whether there is a match.

4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the trusted party comprises a panel of members, and

wherein a secret is shared among the members so that only at least a predetermined number of panel members can reconstitute the secret in its entirety by putting together their share of the secret.

5. A system for processing semiotic data, comprising:

means for receiving semiotic data including a data set P;

means for selecting a function h, and for each said data set P to be collected, computing h(P);

means for destroying said data set P;

means for storing h(P) in a database, wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P);

means for selecting a private key/public key (K, k) once for all cases;

means for one of destroying said private key K and sending said private key K to a trusted party;

means for choosing said function h as a public encryption function corresponding to k; and

to determine whether a data set P′ is a predetermined subject, means for comparing h(P′) to available h(P)s to determine whether there is a match.

6. A system of processing semiotic data as in claim 5 , wherein said semiotic data comprises biometric data.

7. The system according to claim 5 , wherein at least one of said data set P and P′ comprises a personal data set.

8. The system of processing semiotic data as in claim 5 , wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P).

9. The system of processing semiotic data as in claim 5 , wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P), except by the trusted party.

10. The system of processing semiotic data as in claim 5 , wherein the trusted party comprises a panel of members, and

wherein a secret is shared among the members so that only at least a predetermined number of panel members can reconstitute the secret in its entirety by putting together their share of the secret.

11. A system for verifying biometric data without storing unencrypted biometric data, comprising:

means for acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P;

means for encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

means for destroying the unencrypted data set P;

means for storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database;

means for selecting a private key/public key (K, k) once for all cases;

means for one of destroying said private key K and sending said private key K to a trusted party;

means for choosing a function h as a public encryption function corresponding to k; and

means for comparing an encrypted data set of a data set P′ to said at least one encrypted data set of data set P to determine whether there is a match and to determine whether the data set P′ is a predetermined subject.

12. The system according to claim 11 , wherein at least one of said data set P and P′ comprises a personal data set.

13. A non-transistory computer-readable medium tangibly embodying a program of recordable, machine-readable instructions executable by a digital processing apparatus to perform a method for computer-implemented processing biometric data, said method comprising:

receiving biometric data including a data set P;

selecting a secure hash function h, and for each data set P to be collected, computing h(P);

destroying said data set P;

storing h(P) in a database, wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P) selecting a private key/public key (K, k) once for all cases;

one of destroying said private key K and sending said private key K to a trusted party;

choosing said function h as a public encryption function corresponding to k; and

to determine whether a data set P′ is a predetermined subject, comparing h(P′) to available h(P)s to determine whether there is a match.

14. The computer-readable medium according to claim 13 , wherein at least one of said data set P and P′ comprises a personal data set.

15. The computer-readable medium according to claim 13 , wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P).

16. The computer-readable medium according to claim 13 , wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P), except by the trusted party.

17. The computer-readable medium according to claim 13 , wherein the trusted party comprises a panel of members, and

wherein a secret is shared among the members so that only at least a predetermined number of panel members can reconstitute the secret in its entirety by putting together their share of the secret.

Assignments (6)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Dec 13, 2024
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DROPBOX, INC.
Reel/Frame 069635/0332 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Dec 12, 2024
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DROPBOX, INC.
Reel/Frame 069613/0744 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Mar 10, 2021
From: DROPBOX, INC.
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 055670/0219 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 28, 2018
From: CALIFANO, ANDREA; KAUFMAN, STEPHEN CARL; MARTENS, MARCO; PULLEYBLANK, WILLIAM ROBERT; STOLOVITZKY, GUSTAVO ALEJANDRO; TRESSER, CHARLES PHILIPPE; WU, CHAI WAH
To: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 046233/0263 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Sep 25, 2017
From: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
To: DROPBOX, INC.
Reel/Frame 043938/0489 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Apr 14, 2017
From: DROPBOX, INC.
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 042254/0001 →