Granted Patent B2

US 8,910,865 · App. 13/092,599 · Granted Dec 16, 2014

Abstract

Claims (32)

1. A method of validating and authenticating a voter-marked paper ballot, the method comprising:

calculating a unique authentication value based on election information provided on the voter-marked paper ballot;

printing the authentication value on the voter-marked paper ballot as an encrypted security code in a printed security feature, the authentication value encrypted using a private-public key pair;

associating the authentication value with a scanner that is configured to receive and scan ballots having been completed by voters;

scanning each voter-completed ballot to obtain the encrypted security code from the voter-marked paper ballot;

decrypting the encrypted security code using the private-public key pair to obtain the authentication value;

comparing the authentication value obtained from the ballot with the authentication value associated with the scanner; and

physically marking the voter-marked paper ballot as invalid when the ballot-obtained authentication value does not match the authentication value associated with the scanner.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the calculating a unique authentication value comprises performing a hash calculation of one or more candidate identifications and associated target locations on the ballot face.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the hash calculation is performed using a concatenated list of data points representing coordinates of the one or more candidate identifications and associated target locations.

4. A method for authenticating ballots used in an election having multiple precincts, the method comprising:

providing a plurality of ballots on which election-choice-information is printed, the ballots having a plurality of security features, wherein the plurality of security features printed on the ballot during the process of printing official ballots include pre-assigned security codes from a pre-assigned set of codes and a pre-assigned ballot serial number from a pre-assigned set of serial numbers;

providing, from among the plurality of ballots, a first set of ballots having a first set of the plurality of security features associated with each ballot, the first set of security features including at least a first encrypted security code, the first encrypted security code comprising a first security code that is encrypted using a private-public key pair;

assigning the first set of ballots to a first precinct;

providing, from among the plurality of ballots, a second set of ballots having a second set of the plurality of security features associated with each ballot, the second set of security features being different from the first set of security features and including at least a second encrypted security code, the second encrypted security code comprising a second security code that is encrypted using the private-public key pair;

assigning the second set of ballots to a second precinct that is different from the first precinct;

determining, after a vote has been cast, whether a particular ballot has the first set of security features and first security code or the second set of security features and second security code and whether the particular ballot was cast in the first precinct or the second precinct; and

physically marking the particular ballot as invalid when the particular ballot does not have the security features and security code from the precinct in which the particular ballot was cast.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the first security code comprises a hash calculation of one or more candidate identifications and associated target location(s) on a first ballot face of ballots of the first set of ballots, and

wherein the second security code comprises a hash calculation of one or more candidate identifications and associated target locations on a second ballot face of ballots of the second set of ballots.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the hash calculations are based on concatenated list of data points representing coordinates of the one or more candidate identifications and associated target locations of the associated ballot faces.

7. A voting unit, comprising:

a memory;

a processor in communication with the memory, the processor controlling operations of the voting unit to:

scan a voter-marked paper ballot used in an election, the voter-marked paper ballot comprising a first and second security features, wherein the first security feature is embedded in the voter-marked paper ballot, and the second security feature includes an encrypted security code printed on the voter-marked paper ballot;

verify the first security feature by utilizing an electronic sensor to detect the first embedded security feature;

decrypt the second security feature by processing the encrypted security code with a private-public key; and

authenticate the voter-marked paper ballot by comparing the verified first security feature and the decrypted second security feature with a set of pre-assigned first and second security features stored in the memory of the voting unit, wherein the voter-marked paper ballot is physically marked as invalid when the first and second security features do not match the set of pre-assigned first and second security features stored in the memory.

8. The voting unit of claim 7 , wherein the pre-assigned first and second security features are assigned to the voter-marked paper ballots of each precinct, jurisdiction, or election.

9. The voting unit of claim 7 , wherein the first security feature comprises a static feature, wherein verifying the first security feature comprises detecting the presence or absence of the first security feature.

10. The voting unit of claim 7 , wherein the second security feature comprises an encrypted barcode.

11. The voting unit of claim 7 , wherein at least some of the first and second security features overlap each other on the ballot.

Assignments (8)