IP Library Granted Patent US 8,884,757
Granted Patent B2
US 8,884,757 · App. 13/180,123 · Granted Nov 11, 2014

Anti-tampering protection assembly

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 8,884,757
App. No.
13/180,123
Granted
Nov 11, 2014
Kind
B2
Abstract

An anti-tampering protection assembly for sensing tampering with at least one conductor, the anti-tampering protection assembly including unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry, connected to the at least one conductor, for providing unpredictably varying signals on the at least conductor and tampering sensing circuitry for sensing tampering with the at least one conductor.

Claims (91)

1. An anti-tampering protection assembly for sensing tampering with at least one conductor, said anti-tampering protection assembly comprising:

unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry, connected to said at least one conductor, for providing unpredictably varying signals, which are unpredictable in the sense that a potential tamperer could not ascertain what they are in sufficient time to enable him to emulate them, on said at least one conductor; and

tampering sensing circuitry for sensing tampering with said at least one conductor,

said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry comprising:

signal generating circuitry; and

topography generation circuitry operative to vary the configuration of an effective circuit through which said signals pass, such that the Bode plot characteristics of said signals vary unpredictably, said topography generation circuitry including at least one of:

applied signal location selector (ASLS) circuitry, which selects one or more locations at which one or more selected signals from a selected signal generator are applied;

component selector (CS) circuitry, which selects one or more components to be placed in circuit with said one or more selected signals;

component value selector (CVS) circuitry, which selects one or more component values of the selected components to be placed in circuit with said one or more selected signals;

voltage level/location selector (VLLS) circuitry, which selects one or more voltage level for one or more ground, power line, and voltage clamp in circuit with said one or more selected signals;

unpredictable signal origin location selector (USOLS) circuitry, which selects one or more locations from which one or more unpredictable signals are supplied to conductors;

unpredictable signal supply location selector (USSLS) circuitry, which selects one or more locations at which one or more unpredictable signals are supplied; and

received signal location selector (RSLS) circuitry, which selects one or more locations at which one or more received signals are received.

2. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry applies said unpredictably varying signals at various locations along said at least one conductor.

3. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signals include analog signals.

4. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said tampering sensing circuitry senses tampering with said at least one conductor by sensing changes in said unpredictably varying signals resulting from said tampering.

5. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry operates by at least one of changing the topology of said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry and changing at least one applied signal applied thereto.

6. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 5 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry includes circuitry wherein at least one of the following is supplied to said tampering sensing circuitry:

circuit components;

circuit component values;

ground connections;

locations at which said at least one applied signal is applied;

locations from which an unpredictable signal is supplied to said at least one conductor;

locations at which an unpredictable signal is supplied to said at least one conductor; and

locations from which at least one received signal is received.

7. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry comprises signal generation circuitry having unpredictable input signal generation functionality.

8. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 7 and wherein said signal generation circuitry includes circuitry wherein selection of at least one of a signal generator and at least one specific signal to be generated are unpredictably variable.

9. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 7 and wherein:

said signal generation circuitry includes circuitry wherein selection of at least one specific signal to be generated is unpredictably variable; and

at least one of signal shape, amplitude, frequency and phase of said at least one specific signal is variable.

10. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 9 and wherein said at least one specific signal comprises at least a first signal and a second signal, wherein said first signal is different from said second signal and wherein said first signal is applied at a first location and said second signal is applied at a second location.

11. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 9 and wherein said at least one specific signal comprises consecutive plural different signals at consecutive different times.

12. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said at least one conductor comprises multiple disparate grids located at various locations in said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry.

13. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said at least one conductor comprises a multiplicity of closely spaced conductors.

14. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein at least part of said at least one conductor forms part of at least one of a protective circuit, data line and control line.

15. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein at least part of said at least one conductor forms part of at least one of an integrated circuit and a printed circuit board.

16. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said tampering sensing circuitry comprises a library of stored expected received signals.

17. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said tampering sensing circuitry comprises calculation functionality for calculating expected received signals.

18. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 17 and wherein said calculation functionality employs Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis (SPICE) functionality.

19. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said tampering sensing circuitry includes a comparator which ascertains a difference between an expected received signal and an actual received signal.

20. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 19 and wherein said difference is applied to a threshold which represents a difference which is indicative of tampering.

21. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 20 and wherein said assembly is operative in response to exceedance of said threshold to generate a tampering alarm.

22. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said at least one conductor is physically arranged to at least partially surround an object to be protected and to impede physical access thereto.

23. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said at least one conductor is connected to said tampering sensing circuitry.

24. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said at least one conductor is arranged on a protective enclosure in which or on which are located at least one of security-sensitive components storing sensitive data and data lines carrying security-sensitive information.

25. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry is embodied in circuitry which includes discrete active components.

26. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry is embodied in circuitry which includes discrete passive components.

27. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry is embodied in circuitry which includes analog components.

28. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry is embodied in circuitry which includes digital components.

29. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry is embodied in a secure keypad device.

30. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 29 and wherein at least part of said unpredictably varying signal generating circuitry is embodied in circuitry which is incorporated in a controller which controls the operation of said secure keypad device.

31. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said topography generation circuitry includes at least two of said ASLS circuitry, said CS circuitry, said CVS circuitry, said VLLS circuitry, said USOLS circuitry, said USSLS circuitry and said RSLS circuitry.

32. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said topography generation circuitry includes at least three of said ASLS circuitry, said CS circuitry, said CVS circuitry, said VLLS circuitry, said USOLS circuitry, said USSLS circuitry and said RSLS circuitry.

33. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said topography generation circuitry includes at least four of said ASLS circuitry, said CS circuitry, said CVS circuitry, said VLLS circuitry, said USOLS circuitry, said USSLS circuitry and said RSLS circuitry.

34. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said topography generation circuitry includes at least five of said ASLS circuitry, said CS circuitry, said CVS circuitry, said VLLS circuitry, said USOLS circuitry, said USSLS circuitry and said RSLS circuitry.

35. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said topography generation circuitry includes at least six of said ASLS circuitry, said CS circuitry, said CVS circuitry, said VLLS circuitry, said USOLS circuitry, said USSLS circuitry and said RSLS circuitry.

36. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein said topography generation circuitry includes said ASLS circuitry, said CS circuitry, said CVS circuitry, said VLLS circuitry, said USOLS circuitry, said USSLS circuitry and said RSLS circuitry.

37. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said ASLS circuitry; and

said ASLS circuitry provides an applied signal location selection output to at least one applied signal selection switch.

38. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 37 and wherein said at least one applied signal selection switch includes a demultiplexer.

39. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said CS circuitry; and

said CS circuitry provides a component selection output to at least one component selection switch.

40. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 39 and wherein said at least one component selection switch includes at least one of a Field-Effect Transistors (FETs), a multiplexer and a demultiplexer.

41. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said CVS circuitry; and

said CVS circuitry provides a component value selection output to at least one component value selection switch.

42. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 41 and wherein said at least one component value selection switch includes at least one of a multiplexer and a demultiplexer.

43. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said VLLS circuitry; and

said CVS circuitry provides a voltage level/location selection output to at least one voltage level/location selection switch.

44. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 43 and wherein said at least one voltage level/location selection switch includes at least one of an FET and a demultiplexer.

45. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said USOLS circuitry; and

said one or more locations include one or more grid elements.

46. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said USOLS circuitry; and

said USOLS circuitry provides an unpredictable signal origin location selection output to at least one unpredictable signal origin selection switch.

47. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 46 and wherein said at least one unpredictable signal origin selection switch includes a multiplexer.

48. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said USSLS circuitry; and

said one or more locations include at least one of one or more data lines and one or more grid elements.

49. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said USSLS circuitry; and

said USSLS circuitry provides an unpredictable signal supply location selection output to at least one unpredictable signal supply selection switch.

50. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 49 and wherein said at least one unpredictable signal supply selection switch includes a multiplexer.

51. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 1 and wherein:

said topography generation circuitry includes said RSLS circuitry; and

said RSLS circuitry provides a received signal location selection output to at least one received signal selection switch.

52. The anti-tampering protection assembly according to claim 51 and wherein said at least one received signal selection switch includes a multiplexer.

Assignments (10)
ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENT COLLATERAL RECORDED AT R/F 046920-0784 Recorded Apr 28, 2025
From: UBS AG, STAMFORD BRANCH, AS SUCCESSOR TO CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH, AS ASSIGNOR
To: BARCLAYS BANK PLC, AS ASSIGNEE
Reel/Frame 071095/0667 →
AFFIDAVIT TO AFFIRM THE RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS EFFECTIVE AUGUST 20, 2018 Recorded Apr 14, 2025
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
To: VERIFONE, INC.
Reel/Frame 072942/0674 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME 46920/0817 Recorded May 10, 2019
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH
To: VERIFONE SYSTEMS, INC.; VERIFONE, INC.; HYPERCOM CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 049150/0190 →
FIRST LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Aug 23, 2018
From: VERIFONE, INC.; HYPERCOM CORPORATION
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 046920/0784 →
SECOND LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Aug 23, 2018
From: VERIFONE, INC.; HYPERCOM CORPORATION
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 046920/0817 →
RELEASE (R033282F0757) Recorded Aug 21, 2018
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
To: VERIFONE, INC.; HYPERCOM CORPORATION; GLOBAL BAY MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Reel/Frame 046864/0909 →
CHANGE OF ADDRESS Recorded May 30, 2016
From: VERIFONE, INC.
To: VERIFONE, INC.
Reel/Frame 038845/0718 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 9, 2014
From: VERIFONE, INC.; HYPERCOM CORPORATION; GLOBAL BAY MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 033282/0757 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jan 24, 2012
From: VERIFONE, INC.
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 027580/0337 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 23, 2011
From: SASSON, EFI; BEN-ZION, YUVAL; ITSHAKEY, OFER
To: VERIFONE, INC.
Reel/Frame 026790/0069 →