Methods And Apparatuses For Maintaining Secure Communication Between A Group Of Users In A Social Network
Embodiments address various methods and apparatuses that attempt to minimize the time that the security communication between group members may be at risk due to a user joining or leaving. For example, embodiments include methods of minimizing the time for which a joining member receives a secure commonly shared key and other embodiments include methods of minimizing the time that a user leaving the group has access to data shared within the group through updating the secure commonly shared key.
1 . A method of maintaining security between a group of users in a social network, comprising:
identifying, by a social network host, a group of users, U 1 . . . U m of the social network who securely communicate between each other using an initial commonly derived shared key that the social network host can not derive;
adding, by the social network host, at least one additional user U m−1 to the group of users of the social network, wherein the at least one additional user cannot derive the initial shared key; and
storing shared data D 1 sent by one user in said group of users, the shared data being encrypted by an updated commonly derived shared key.
2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the updated commonly derived shared key is derived by the group of users in response to adding the at least one additional user.
3 - 5 . (canceled)
6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the updating of the at least one published parameter is performed by a user agent associated with at least one user of the group of users.
7 . The method of claim 6 , wherein the user agent is associated with user U 1 and/or U m .
8 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
sending a temporary key to users U 2 . . . U m+1 prior to the updating the at least one published parameter step.
9 . The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
sending the temporary key to users U 2 . . . U m using the initial commonly derived shared key.
10 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
sending the initial commonly derived shared key to user U m+1 prior to the at least updating parameter step.
11 . A method of maintaining security between a group of users in a social network, comprising:
identifying a group of users, U 1 . . . U m of the social network, by a social network host, who securely communicate between each other using a commonly derived shared key that the social network host can not derive;
removing a user U i from the group of users who securely communicate between each other; and
updating at least one published parameter on which the updated commonly derived shared key is to be based, wherein the group of users minus the removed user can now securely communicate between each other without the removed user being able to derive the commonly shared key without the social network host being able to derive the commonly shared key.
12 . (canceled)
13 . The method of claim 11 , wherein the at least one published parameter is either X i−1 or X i+1 corresponding to user U i−1 or U i+1 , respectively, and defined as X i =a i (a i+1 P−a i−1 P), where a i is a secret random number and P is a commonly agreed point on an elliptic curve E′.
14 . The method of claim 11 , wherein the updating the at least one published parameter is performed by a user agent corresponding to at least one user of the group of users.
15 . The method of claim 14 , wherein a user agent corresponds to user U i+1 and/or U i−1 .
16 . The method of claim 11 , further comprising:
sending a temporary key to users U 2 . . . U i−1 and U i+1 . . . U m prior to the updating the at least one published parameter step.
17 . A method of maintaining security between a group of users in a social network, comprising:
identifying a group of users, U 1 . . . U m of the social network, by a social network host, who securely communicate between each other using a initial commonly derived shared key that the social network host can not derive;
adding at least one additional user U m+1 , who can not derive the shared key, to the group of users of the social network, by the social network host;
switching users U m and U m+1 upon the expiration of a timer, wherein user U m did not update its X m value by the end of the timer; and
updating at least the X m value, now corresponding to the joining user on which an updated commonly derived shared key is to be based, wherein the group of users and the additional new user, except for switched user U m+1 , can now securely communicate between each other using the updated commonly derived shared key based on the updated X m value, without the social network host being able to derive the updated commonly shared key.
18 . (canceled)
19 . An apparatus comprising:
a memory; and
at least one processor coupled to the memory and configured to:
identify a group of users, U 1 . . . U m of the social network, by a social network host who securely, communicate between each other using an initial commonly derived shared key that the social network host can not derive;
add at least one additional user U m+1 who can not derive the shared key to the group of users of the social network, by the social network host; and
update at least one published parameter on which an updated commonly derived shared key is to be based, wherein the group of users and the additional user can now securely communicate between each other using the updated commonly derived shared key based on the updated at least one published parameter without the social network host being able to derive the updated commonly shared key.
20 . An apparatus comprising:
a memory; and
at least one processor coupled to the memory and configured to:
identify a group of users, U 1 . . . U m of the social network, by a social network host who securely, communicate between each other using a commonly derived shared key that the social network host can not derive;
remove a user U i from the group of users who securely communicate between each other; and
update at least one published parameter on which an updated commonly derived shared key is to be based, wherein the group of users minus the removed user can now securely communicate between each other without the removed user being able to derive the updated commonly shared key and without the social network host being able to derive the updated commonly shared key.
21 . A method of maintaining security between a first user and additional users in a social network, comprising:
securely communicating between members of a first group of users that includes the first user and a first number of the additional users using an initial commonly shared key derived by the first user from parameters provided by the first number of additional users;
deriving an updated commonly derived shared key by the first user from parameters provided by a second different number of additional users; and
securely communicating between members of a second group of users that includes the first user and the second number of additional users.
22 . The method of claim 21 , further comprising the first user publishing at least one parameter from which the first user and the additional users derive the updated common derived shared key.
23 . The method of claim 22 , wherein the at least one published parameter is either X 1 or X m corresponding to user U 1 or U m , respectively, and defined as X i =a i (a i+1 P−a i−1 P), where a i is a secret random number and P is a commonly agreed point on an elliptic curve E′.
24 . The method of claim 22 , further comprising:
identifying a user of the first group of users who is online most often; and
dynamically defining the identified user as user U m of the first group of users, prior to the publishing step.
25 . The method of claim 21 , wherein the second group includes the members of the first group and a new user.