IP Library Granted Patent US 8,660,264
Granted Patent B2
US 8,660,264 · App. 13/621,021 · Granted Feb 25, 2014

Method and apparatus for minimizing differential power attacks on processors

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 8,660,264
App. No.
13/621,021
Filed
Sep 15, 2012
Granted
Feb 25, 2014
Kind
B2
Art Unit
2434
USPC
380/28
Abstract

A method of masking a cryptographic operation using a secret value, comprising the steps of dividing the secret value into a plurality of parts; combining with each part a random value to derive a new part such that the new parts when combined are equivalent to the original secret value; and utilizing each of the individual parts in the operation.

Claims (23)

1. A computer-implemented elliptic curve digital signature method comprising:

generating multiple signature components by combining each of multiple private values with a hash of a message, a sum of the private values, modulo a specified integer, being equal to an elliptic curve private key; and

generating, by one or more processors, a digital signature of the message by combining the signature components.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising updating at least two of the private values based on one or more random values before generating the signature components.

3. The method of claim 1 , comprising generating a digital signature of the message using the private values instead of the elliptic curve private key, wherein the digital signature can be verified using an elliptic curve public key corresponding to the elliptic curve private key.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein combining each of multiple private values with a hash of a message includes multiplying each individual private value by the hash, and combining the signature components includes summing the signature components.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising sending the digital signature and the message to a correspondent.

6. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, perform operations comprising:

generating multiple signature components by combining each of multiple private values with a hash of a message, a sum of the private values, modulo a specified integer, being equal to an elliptic curve private key; and

generating a digital signature of the message by combining the signature components.

7. The computer-readable medium of claim 6 , the operations further comprising updating at least two of the private values based on one or more random values before generating the signature components.

8. The computer-readable medium of claim 6 , the operations comprising generating a digital signature of the message using the private values instead of the elliptic curve private key, wherein the digital signature can be verified using an elliptic curve public key corresponding to the elliptic curve private key.

9. The computer-readable medium of claim 6 , wherein combining each of multiple private values with a hash of a message includes multiplying each individual private value by the hash, and combining the signature components includes summing the signature components.

10. The computer-readable medium of claim 6 , the operations further comprising sending the digital signature and the message to a correspondent.

11. A device comprising:

memory; and

one or more processors operable to:

generate multiple signature components by combining each of multiple private values with a hash of a message, a sum of the private values, modulo a specified integer, being equal to an elliptic curve private key; and

generate a digital signature of the message by combining the signature components.

12. The device of claim 11 , the one or more processors further operable to update at least two of the private values based on one or more random values before generating the signature components.

13. The device of claim 11 , the one or more processors operable to generate a digital signature of the message using the private values instead of the elliptic curve private key, wherein the digital signature can be verified using an elliptic curve public key corresponding to the elliptic curve private key.

14. The device of claim 11 , wherein combining each of multiple private values with a hash of a message includes multiplying each individual private value by the hash, and combining the signature components includes summing the signature components.

15. The device of claim 11 , the one or more processors further operable to send the digital signature and the message to a correspondent.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 16, 2023
From: BLACKBERRY LIMITED
To: MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 064104/0103 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 2, 2019
From: CERTICOM CORP.
To: BLACKBERRY LIMITED
Reel/Frame 050610/0937 →