Secure environment for subscriber device
View Patent ↗A secure operating environment for a telecommunication device is disclosed, where a trusted execution environment (TEE) can establish both first secure communication (SC) channel between the TEE and a security-enabled SIM card, and a second SC between a service provider entity and Trustlet application, which is a component of the TEE of the telecommunication device. The telecommunication device may include a processor(s), an identification module, and a memory including the TEE and a normal operating environment (NOE). The TEE can be operated by the one or more processors to establish the first SC channel, authenticate a service identifier of the identification module, and establish the second SC channel, prior to an execution of the NOE.
1. A telecommunication device comprising:
one or more processors;
an identification module storing a service identifier; and
a memory coupled to the one or more processors, and having at least a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a normal operating environment (NOE), wherein the TEE is configured to be operated by the one or more processors to:
establish a first secure communication channel between the TEE and the identification module;
authenticate the service identifier of the identification module after the first secure communication channel has been established; and
establish a second secure communication channel between the telecommunication device and a provisioning server of a service provider,
wherein the first secure communication channel or the second secure communication channel is established prior to an execution of the NOE.
2. The telecommunication device of claim 1 , wherein the TEE comprises a security agent, wherein the identification module comprises a security client, and wherein the TEE is operable by the one or more processors to establish the first secure communication channel via a cryptographic authentication process.
3. The telecommunication device of claim 2 , wherein the cryptographic authentication process is an asymmetric authentication process, whereby the security client communicates with the security agent to validate one or more security keys of the identification module.
4. The telecommunication device of claim 1 , wherein the TEE is operable by the one or more processors to establish the second secure communication channel, at least in part, in response to the
i) establishment of the first secure communication channel, or
ii) authentication of the service identifier.
5. The telecommunication device of claim 1 , wherein the TEE is operable by the one or more processors to establish the second secure communication channel via a cryptographic authentication process between the service provider and at least one Trustlet application stored in a secure random access memory (RAM) of the TEE.
6. The telecommunication device of claim 1 , wherein the either the first secure communication channel or the second secure communication channel is established during a boot sequence of a security-enabled boot application that is stored in a secure read only memory (ROM) of the TEE.
7. A method comprising:
establishing, by a trusted execution environment (TEE) of a telecommunication device, a first secure communication channel between the TEE and an identification module, wherein the identification module is a component of the telecommunication device and the establishing is based on a cryptographic identifier received from the identification module;
authenticating a service identifier of the identification module after the first secure communication channel has been established; and
establishing a second secure communication channel between the telecommunication device and a provisioning server of a service provider,
wherein the first secure communication channel or the second secure communication channel is established prior to an execution of a high level operating system of the telecommunication device.
8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the TEE is associated with a secure partition in a memory of the telecommunication device.
9. The method of claim 7 , further comprising, prior to establishing the first secure communication channel, authenticating the cryptographic identifier via an asymmetric authentication process that includes validating, at the security client of the TEE, one or more security keys of the identification module.
10. The method of claim 7 , wherein the first secure communication channel is established during a secure boot sequence of a secure boot application that is stored in a secure read only memory (ROM) of the TEE.
11. A method comprising:
receiving, at a provisioning server, a cryptographic identifier from a trusted execution environment (TEE) of a telecommunication device, the telecommunication device having established a first secure communication channel between the TEE and an identification module that is a component of the telecommunication device and authenticated a service identifier of the identification module, the service identifier being associated with an operator of the provisioning server;
authenticating the cryptographic identifier received from TEE of the telecommunication device; and
establishing a second secure communication channel between the provisioning server and the telecommunication device, in response to received cryptographic identifier being determined to be valid,
wherein the first secure communication channel or the second secure communication channel is established prior to an execution of a high level operating system of the telecommunication device.
12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the cryptographic identifier is associated with at least one Trustlet application that is stored in a secure random access memory (RAM) of the TEE.
13. The method of claim 11 , wherein the secure communication channel is established during a secure boot sequence of a secure boot application that is stored in a secure read only memory (ROM) of the TEE.
14. The method of claim 11 , wherein the TEE is associated with a secure partition in a memory of the telecommunication device.
15. A non-transitory computer storage device with a stored computer-executable program for execution in a trusted execution environment (TEE) of a telecommunication device by one or more processors of the telecommunication device, which when executed in the TEE by the one or more processors, performs operations, comprising:
establishing a first secure communication channel between the TEE and an identification module, wherein the identification module is a component of the telecommunication device;
authenticating the service identifier of the identification module after the first secure communication channel has been established; and
establishing a second secure communication channel between the telecommunication device and a provisioning server of a service provider,
wherein the first secure communication channel or the second secure communication channel is established prior to an execution of a high level operating system of the telecommunication device.
16. The non-transitory computer storage device of claim 15 , wherein the TEE comprises a security agent, wherein the identification module comprises a security client, and wherein the first secure communication channel is established via a cryptographic authentication process.
17. The non-transitory computer storage device of claim 16 , wherein the cryptographic authentication process is an asymmetric authentication process, whereby the security client communicates with the security agent to validate one or more security keys of the identification module.
18. The non-transitory computer storage device of claim 15 , wherein the second secure communication channel is established, at least in part, in response to the
i) establishment of the first secure communication channel, or
ii) authentication of the service identifier.
19. The non-transitory computer storage device of claim 15 , wherein the operations performed by the execution of the computer-executable program, further comprise establishing the second secure communication channel via a cryptographic authentication process between the service provider and at least one Trustlet application stored in a secure random access memory (RAM) of the TEE.
20. The non-transitory computer storage device of claim 15 , wherein the operations performed by the execution of the computer-executable program, further comprise establishing either the first secure communication channel or the second secure communication channel during a boot sequence of a security-enabled boot application that is stored in a secure read only memory (ROM) of the TEE.