IP Library Granted Patent US 9,712,324
Granted Patent B2
US 9,712,324 · App. 13/846,977 · Granted Jul 18, 2017

Methods and apparatuses for reducing or eliminating unauthorized access to tethered data

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,712,324
App. No.
13/846,977
Granted
Jul 18, 2017
Kind
B2
Abstract

Embodiments of a method and apparatus for reducing or eliminating unauthorized access to secured files are generally described herein. In some embodiments, the method includes establishing a connection between a communication portion of the secured file and an authentication agent. The method may include requesting a decryption key from the authentication agent for accessing the secured file on a first computing device. The decryption key may be based on device information retrieved from devices in an authenticated environment of devices. The authenticated environment may be an environment in which the secured the was encrypted. The method may include destroying the secured file subsequent to receiving a message indicating that the requesting has failed.

Claims (56)

1. A method for reducing or eliminating unauthorized access to a secured file, the method comprising:

adding a communication portion, comprised of executable code, to the secured file;

establishing a connection between the communication portion of the secured file and an authentication agent, the secured file further including an encrypted portion;

requesting a decryption key, using the communication portion, from the authentication agent for accessing the secured file on a first computing device, the decryption key being based on identification information other than user information, the identification information being retrieved from at least a second computing device and a third computing device in an authenticated environment of devices including the first computing device, the authenticated environment being an environment in which the secured file was encrypted;

determining, by the authentication agent, whether the first computing device is in the authenticated environment by reading a plurality of hash values of the secured file, the hash values represent the environment in which the secured file was created;

converting the hash values to network locations within the authentication environment;

retrieving key segments from the network locations including the second and third computing devices;

determining the first computing device is not in the authenticated environment in response to determining a hash value of the hash values does not correspond to a location within the authenticated environment; and

destroying the secured file, using the communication portion, subsequent to receiving a message indicating that the requesting has failed, including encrypting, using the communication portion, the secured file a plurality of times with an encryption key, the encryption key being based on data stored on the first computing device.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the message indicates that the decryption key could not be created.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the message indicates that the decryption key could not be created because the first computing device has left the authenticated environment.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the message indicates that communication with the authentication agent has failed.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the requesting comprises:

obtaining a value of an indicator within a non-encrypted portion of the secured file, the value indicating whether the secured file was saved locally on the first computing device; and

querying the authentication agent for a local key or a remote key based on the value, the local key being based on identification information of the first computing device, and the remote key being based on information of the second computing device.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the data for creating the encryption key is not identification information of the first computing device.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

receiving the decryption key; and

destroying the secured file upon determining that the decryption key is a spoofed key, the determining including decrypting the secured file using the decryption key, and determining whether metadata of the decrypted secured file matches expected metadata of the decrypted secured file.

8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

querying the authentication agent for an encryption key for encrypting the secured file; and

saving the secured file to a remote server, saving the secured file to the first computing device, or saving the secured file to both the remote server and the first computing device based on a value of an indicator within metadata of the secured file.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions that, when executed on a first machine, cause the first machine to:

receive a request for access to a file, the file being stored on the first machine, on a remote machine, or on both the first machine and the remote machine, wherein the file includes a communication portion comprised of executable code;

establish a connection, through the communication portion of the file for which access is requested, to an authentication agent on the first machine, the file further including an encrypted data portion;

request a decryption key, using the communication portion, from the authentication agent for decrypting the file, the decryption key being based on identification information retrieved from at least a second machine and a third machine in an authenticated environment of devices that includes the first machine, the authenticated environment of devices being an environment in which the file was encrypted;

determine whether the first machine is in the authenticated environment by reading a plurality of hash values of the file, the hash values represent the environment in which the file was created;

convert the hash values to respective network locations within the authentication environment;

retrieve key segments from the network locations including the second and third machines;

determine the first machine is not in the authenticated environment in response to determining a hash value of the hash values does not correspond to a location within the authenticated environment; and

destroy the file, using the communication portion, subsequent to determining that the request has failed, including encrypting, using the communication portion, the file a plurality of times with an encryption key, the encryption key being based on data stored on the first computing device.

10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the connection is a transmission control protocol (TCP) socket or a universal datagram protocol (UDP) socket.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , further comprising instructions that, when executed on the first machine, cause the first machine to:

receive a notification message from the authentication agent that that the decryption key could not be created because the first machine has left the authenticated environment.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11 , further comprising instructions that, when executed on the first machine, cause the first machine to:

destroy the file upon determining that the authentication agent is not executing on the first machine.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , further comprising instructions that, when executed on the first machine, cause the first machine to:

obtain a value of an indicator within a non-encrypted portion of the file, the value indicating whether the file was saved locally on the first machine;

query the authentication agent for a local key or a remote key based on the value, the local key being based on identification information of the first machine, and the remote key being based on information of the second machine in the authenticated environment, the second machine being a different machine from the first machine;

perform an editing operation on the file subsequent to opening the file using the local key or the remote key; and

save the file locally or remotely, using a second local key or a second remote key retrieved using the authentication agent, based on the value of the indicator.

14. An apparatus comprising:

a communication interface to communicate with a remote file storage;

an authentication agent configured to:

communicate with the remote file storage over the communication interface;

communicate with a secured file through a communication portion of the secured file, the secured file further including an encrypted portion, wherein the communication portion is comprised of executable code;

receive a request, from the communication portion, for a decryption key for accessing the secured file, the decryption key being based on identification information retrieved from at least a second device and a third device in an authenticated environment, the authenticated environment being an environment in which the secured file was encrypted, wherein the identification information includes information of other devices that are not components of the apparatus;

determine whether the apparatus is in the authenticated environment by reading a plurality of hash values of the secured file, the hash values represent the environment in which the secured file was created;

convert the hash values to respective network locations within the authentication environment;

retrieve key segments from the network locations including the second and third devices;

determine the apparatus is not in the authenticated environment in response to determining a hash value of the hash values does not correspond to a location within the authenticated environment; and

generate either the decryption key or an error message, based on whether the request is received from within the authenticated environment;

wherein the communication portion is configured to destroy the secured file subsequent to determining that the request has failed, including encrypting, using the communication portion, the secured file a plurality of times with an encryption key, the encryption key being based on data stored on the first computing device.

15. The apparatus of claim 14 , further comprising a memory for local file storage of the secured file.

16. The apparatus of claim 14 , further comprising:

a credentials agent to authenticate the apparatus to the remote file storage.

Assignments (12)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Mar 21, 2025
From: FORCEPOINT FEDERAL HOLDINGS LLC
To: EVERFOX HOLDINGS LLC
Reel/Frame 070585/0524 →
PARTIAL PATENT RELEASE AND REASSIGNMENT AT REEL/FRAME 055052/0302 Recorded Oct 3, 2023
From: CREDIT SUISSE, AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: FORCEPOINT FEDERAL HOLDINGS LLC (F/K/A FORCEPOINT LLC)
Reel/Frame 065103/0147 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 29, 2023
From: FORCEPOINT FEDERAL HOLDINGS LLC
To: APOLLO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LLC, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 065086/0822 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded May 12, 2021
From: FORCEPOINT LLC
To: FORCEPOINT FEDERAL HOLDINGS LLC
Reel/Frame 056216/0309 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jan 20, 2021
From: REDOWL ANALYTICS, INC.; FORCEPOINT LLC
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 055052/0302 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS Recorded Jan 8, 2021
From: RAYTHEON COMPANY
To: WEBSENSE, INC.; PORTAUTHORITY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC (FKA PORTAUTHORITY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.); RAYTHEON OAKLEY SYSTEMS, LLC; FORCEPOINT FEDERAL LLC (FKA RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, LLC, FKA RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, INC.)
Reel/Frame 055492/0146 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 1, 2017
From: FORCEPOINT FEDERAL LLC
To: FORCEPOINT LLC
Reel/Frame 043397/0460 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 16, 2016
From: RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, LLC
To: FORCEPOINT FEDERAL LLC
Reel/Frame 037821/0818 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jun 9, 2015
From: WEBSENSE, INC.; RAYTHEON OAKLEY SYSTEMS, LLC; RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, LLC (FORMERLY KNOWN AS RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, INC.); PORT AUTHORITY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
To: RAYTHEON COMPANY
Reel/Frame 035859/0282 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Jun 2, 2015
From: RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, INC.
To: RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, LLC
Reel/Frame 035806/0367 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 28, 2015
From: RAYTHEON COMPANY
To: RAYTHEON CYBER PRODUCTS, INC.
Reel/Frame 035774/0322 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 29, 2013
From: NEUMANN, MATTHEW D.; SMITH, MICHAEL W.
To: RAYTHEON COMPANY
Reel/Frame 030509/0234 →