IP Library Granted Patent US 9,330,259
Granted Patent B2
US 9,330,259 · App. 13/847,430 · Granted May 3, 2016

Malware discovery method and system

Inventors: Amit Klein (Herzliya, IL); Yaron Dycian (Kadima, IL); Gal Frishman (Netanya, IL); Avner Gideoni (Cfar Haoranim, IL)
Assignee: TRUSTEER, LTD.
G06F21/566G06F21/54
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,330,259
App. No.
13/847,430
Granted
May 3, 2016
Kind
B2
Abstract

A process for identifying potentially harmful malware, comprises the steps of: a) identifying an executable that is about to run; b) providing a monitoring agent that monitors all threads that are descendent of a thread initiated by the process of said executable; and c) configuring said monitoring agent to conclude that a high probability of malware presence exists, if one of said descendent threads reaches a target process in which suspicious patches are created.

Claims (21)

1. A method for identifying potentially harmful malware, comprising the steps of:

a) identifying, on a processor, an executable that is about to run;

b) providing, on the processor, a monitoring agent that monitors

a suspicious process of the executable,

a thread of a legitimate process, initiated by the suspicious process of the executable, and

a descendent thread initiated by the legitimate process,

wherein the monitoring agent

monitors creation of any threads by placing a hook on a thread creation function,

checks from which thread any of the threads originates, and

monitors any of the threads that descend from the suspicious process; and

c) determining, on the processor using the monitoring agent, that a high probability of malware presence exists if a suspicious patch is created in a target process by the descendent thread initiated by the legitimate process.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the target process is a browser process.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein when the monitoring agent identifies an executable that is about to run, the monitoring agent checks a cryptographic hash algorithm to determine whether the executable has run in the at least one processor before.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein if it appears that the executable is running for the first time, the monitoring agent continues to monitor the executable.

5. The method of claim 3 , wherein the monitoring agent monitors the executable each time the executable runs.

6. The method of claim 3 , wherein the cryptographic hash algorithm is selected from MD5, SHAT and SHA2.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the monitoring agent operates in a Windows environment.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the executable creates a thread in a legitimate system process.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the monitoring agent maintains a listing of at least one legitimate process with a suspicious behavior.

10. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

d) performing corrective action when the monitoring agent determines that a high probability of malware presence exists.

Assignments (3)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 23, 2023
From: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
To: CROWDSTRIKE, INC.
Reel/Frame 062454/0612 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 23, 2017
From: TRUSTEER, LTD.
To: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 041060/0411 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 26, 2013
From: KLEIN, AMIT; DYCIAN, YARON; FRISHMAN, GAL; GIDEONI, AVNER
To: TRUSTEER, LTD.
Reel/Frame 030688/0145 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20140289851A1 · Sep 25, 2014