IP Library Granted Patent US 9,069,952
Granted Patent B1
US 9,069,952 · App. 13/898,435 · Granted Jun 30, 2015

Method for enabling hardware assisted operating system region for safe execution of untrusted code using trusted transitional memory

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,069,952
App. No.
13/898,435
Granted
Jun 30, 2015
Kind
B1
Abstract

An electronic device. The device comprises an anti-trusted-security-zone in the trusted security zone that, when installed and managed by the trusted security zone manager, places non-trusted applications into the anti-trusted-security-zone for execution, restricts access of the non-trusted applications to at least some resources of the electronic device outside the anti-trusted-security-zone, alerts the user when the non-trusted application inside the anti-trusted-security-zone desires access to any restricted resource of the electronic device outside the anti-trusted-security-zone, asks the user for permission to access the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone, grants access for the non-trusted application to requested resources outside the anti-trusted-security-zone upon the permission by the user, moves the applications from the anti-trusted-security-zone to the normal zone that are determined not to be malicious, keeps the applications within the anti-trusted-security-zone that do not need to execute outside the anti-trusted-security-zone, and deletes the applications that are determined to be malicious.

Claims (48)

1. An electronic device, comprising:

a processor;

an operating system;

a memory;

a trusted security zone manager to manage a trusted security zone; and

an anti-trusted-security-zone in the trusted security zone that, when installed and managed by the trusted security zone manager

places non-trusted applications into the anti-trusted-security-zone for execution,

restricts access of the non-trusted applications to at least some resources of the electronic device outside the anti-trusted-security-zone,

alerts a user when a non-trusted application of the non-trusted applications inside the anti-trusted-security-zone desires access to any restricted resource of the electronic device outside the anti-trusted-security-zone,

asks the user for permission to access the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone,

grants access for the non-trusted application to the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone upon the permission by the user,

moves any of the non-trusted applications from the anti-trusted-security-zone to a normal zone that are determined not to be malicious,

keeps any of the non-trusted applications within the anti-trusted-security-zone that do not need to execute outside the anti-trusted-security-zone, and

deletes any of the non-trusted applications that are determined to be malicious,

whereby the risk that the non-trusted applications can cause harm to the electronic device is reduced.

2. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the non-trusted application is JavaScript code.

3. The electronic device of claim 2 , wherein a just in time (JIT) compiler is exploited in a JavaScript engine, or JavaScript interpreter, to compile the JavaScript code.

4. The electronic device claim 2 , wherein a web browser that is developed based upon Hypertext Markup Language 5 (HTML5) technology utilizes the JavaScript code that is walled off from access to any of the rest of the electronic device.

5. The electronic device of claim 2 , wherein a web application that is developed based upon HTML5 technology different from a web browser utilizes the JavaScript code.

6. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the non-trusted application within the anti-trusted-security-zone is determined to be “not malicious” when the application is from a trusted source or did not try to access restricted resources outside the anti-trusted-security-zone without permission or after a request had been denied within a predefined time period.

7. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the electronic device is one of a server computer, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a media player, a game console, an Internet digital media streaming device, or another network/communications capable device.

8. A method of reducing the risk of a JavaScript injection harming a computing device, comprising:

installing an anti-trusted-security-zone into a memory of a computing device;

placing dynamically downloaded JavaScript that is part of a web browser into the anti-trusted-security-zone for execution;

restricting access of the JavaScript to at least part of the rest of the computing device, wherein when the JavaScript stored in the anti-trusted-security zone is executed, the JavaScript is allowed to write to a screen of the computing device but not to read from the screen of the computing device;

alerting a user when the JavaScript inside the anti-trusted-security-zone desires access to any restricted resource of the computing device outside the anti-trusted-security-zone;

asking the user for permission to access the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone;

granting access for the JavaScript to the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone upon the user's permission; and

moving the JavaScript from the anti-trusted-security-zone to a normal zone that is determined not to be malicious.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the JavaScript can run freely in the anti-trusted-security-zone to accomplish its task as long as the JavaScript does not need to access any restricted computer resource.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the reducing the risk of the JavaScript injection harming the computing computer device is transparent to the browser experience of the user.

11. The method of claim 8 , wherein a trusted security zone manager launches and manages the anti-trusted-security-zone.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the trusted security zone manager operates within a secure partition of the memory called a trusted security zone in the computing device.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein a hardware partition of the trusted security zone and a software installation of the trusted security zone enable a trusted execution environment (TEE) on the computing device.

14. The method of claim 13 , wherein the trusted execution environment is included/integrated within a processor chip on the computing device at the chip manufacturer.

15. The method of claim 8 , wherein access of the JavaScript within the anti-trusted-security-zone is restricted to at least some of a plurality of peripherals, a non-trusted memory, a network, and other resources outside the anti-trusted-security-zone of the computing device.

16. A method of managing untrusted applications on an electronic device to reduce the risk that the untrusted applications can cause harm to the electronic device, comprising:

placing non-trusted applications into an anti-trusted-security-zone for execution;

restricting access of the non-trusted applications to at least some resources outside the anti-trusted-security-zone;

alerting a user when a non-trusted application of the non-trusted applications inside the anti-trusted-security-zone desires access to any restricted resource of the electronic device outside the anti-trusted-security-zone;

asking the user for permission to access the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security zone;

granting access for the non-trusted application to the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone upon the permission by the user;

moving one or more of the non-trusted applications from the anti-trusted-security-zone to a normal zone that are determined not to be malicious;

keeping any of the non-trusted application within the anti-trusted-security-zone that do not need to execute outside the anti-trusted-security-zone; and

deleting any of the non-trusted applications that are determined to be malicious.

17. The method of claim 16 , wherein the electronic device is one of a server computer, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, or a mobile phone.

18. The method of claim 16 , wherein the one or more of the non-trusted applications are moved from the anti-trusted-security-zone to the normal zone in response to a determination that permission is granted by the user and that the one or more of the non-trusted applications are from a trusted source.

19. The method of claim 16 , wherein the desired resource outside the anti-trusted-security-zone that the non-trusted application desires access to is data, network, or a hardware component of the electronic device.

Assignments (5)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 23, 2022
From: DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS
To: IBSV LLC; LAYER3 TV, LLC; PUSHSPRING, LLC; T-MOBILE CENTRAL LLC; T-MOBILE USA, INC.; ASSURANCE WIRELESS USA, L.P.; BOOST WORLDWIDE, LLC; CLEARWIRE COMMUNICATIONS LLC; CLEARWIRE IP HOLDINGS LLC; SPRINTCOM LLC; SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P.; SPRINT INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED; SPRINT SPECTRUM LLC
Reel/Frame 062595/0001 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 4, 2021
From: SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P.
To: T-MOBILE INNOVATIONS LLC
Reel/Frame 055604/0001 →
TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF FIRST PRIORITY AND JUNIOR PRIORITY SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENT RIGHTS Recorded Apr 2, 2020
From: DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS
To: SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P.
Reel/Frame 052969/0475 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Apr 2, 2020
From: T-MOBILE USA, INC.; ISBV LLC; T-MOBILE CENTRAL LLC; LAYER3 TV, INC.; PUSHSPRING, INC.; BOOST WORLDWIDE, LLC; CLEARWIRE COMMUNICATIONS LLC; CLEARWIRE IP HOLDINGS LLC; CLEARWIRE LEGACY LLC; SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P.; SPRINT INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED; SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P.; ASSURANCE WIRELESS USA, L.P.
To: DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS
Reel/Frame 053182/0001 →
GRANT OF FIRST PRIORITY AND JUNIOR PRIORITY SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENT RIGHTS Recorded Mar 6, 2017
From: SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P.
To: DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS
Reel/Frame 041895/0210 →