IP Library Granted Patent US 9,673,920
Granted Patent B2
US 9,673,920 · App. 14/109,928 · Granted Jun 6, 2017

Intrusion detection and radio fingerprint tracking

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,673,920
App. No.
14/109,928
Granted
Jun 6, 2017
Kind
B2
Abstract

A transmitter is configured to change its unique radio signature enough to defeat radio fingerprinting identification without destroying the content of the transmissions. The transmitter may be configured for defeating both transient-signal fingerprinting and steady-state fingerprinting. The transmitter may be configured to obfuscate transient detection. The transmitter may continuously vary spectral, amplitude, and/or phase characteristics of its transmissions to defeat radio fingerprinting. The transmitter may pair radio fingerprints with subscriber terminal identification codes (e.g., MAC addresses or SMSIs) for generating different radio identities. The transmitter may measure another transmitter's radio fingerprint, and, compensating for its own radio fingerprint, spoof the measured radio fingerprint.

Claims (18)

1. In a wireless transmitter having a unique radio frequency (RF) fingerprint, a method for obfuscating its unique RF fingerprint, comprising:

determining a threshold of signal distortion that impedes tracking the wireless transmitter based on its RF fingerprint while providing an acceptable amount of degradation to data transmissions;

synthesizing a distortion of the unique RF fingerprint that is based on the threshold in order to impede radio signature tracking by an unintended wireless receiver while providing at least the acceptable amount of degradation to the data transmissions,

wherein synthesizing comprises employing a discrete Fourier transform to impart a predetermined spectral signature to transmitted steady-state signals, and

wherein synthesizing comprises distorting the unique RF fingerprint in a pattern corresponding to a code shared with an intended receiver configured for analyzing the pattern to authenticate the wireless transmitter; and

selecting a radio identity for each of a plurality of RF fingerprints by pairing a different one of a set of selectable subscriber terminal identification codes with each RF fingerprint.

2. The method recited in claim 1 , wherein determining the threshold comprises determining link quality of an RF channel.

3. The method recited in claim 1 , wherein synthesizing the distortion comprises at least one of synthesizing a plurality of unique RF fingerprints and continuously randomizing the distortion.

4. The method recited in claim 1 , wherein synthesizing the distortion employs at least one of a set of transmitter components, the set comprising a signal mapper, an inverse fast Fourier transform circuit, a phase-locked loop, a voltage-controlled oscillator, a pulse-shaping filter, a transmit filter, and a variable-gain amplifier.

5. A method for configuring a first wireless device to mimic at least a second wireless device, comprising:

transmitting a subscriber terminal identification code corresponding to the at least second wireless device;

mimicking protocol behavior of the at least second wireless device;

synthesizing a radio frequency (RF) fingerprint to shape steady-state transmissions associated with the subscriber terminal identification code and the protocol behavior,

wherein synthesizing comprises employing a discrete Fourier transform to impart a predetermined spectral signature to the steady-state transmissions, and

wherein synthesizing comprises distorting a unique RF fingerprint in a pattern corresponding to a code shared with an intended receiver configured for analyzing the pattern to authenticate a wireless transmitter; and

selecting a radio identity for each of a plurality of RF fingerprints by pairing a different one of a set of selectable subscriber terminal identification codes with each RF fingerprint.

6. The method recited in claim 5 , wherein the subscriber terminal identification code comprises a MAC address that indicates at least one of a client device having a different model number than the first wireless device and a client device having a different vendor number than the first wireless device.

7. The method recited in claim 5 , wherein mimicking protocol behavior comprises at least one of employing device-specific behavior, transmitting vendor-specific data, transmitting meta-data corresponding to a particular operating system that is consistent with the at least second wireless device, and employing active scanning behavior that is typical of the at least second wireless device.

Assignments (7)
NUNC PRO TUNC ASSIGNMENT Recorded Mar 8, 2022
From: DEPARTMENT 13, LLC
To: DEPARTMENT 13, INC.
Reel/Frame 059198/0425 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 14, 2020
From: SARGON CT PTY LTD
To: DEPARTMENT 13, INC. C/O RESAGENT, INC.
Reel/Frame 051825/0715 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 14, 2020
From: DOMAZET FT3 PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DOMAZET FAMILY TRUST NO. 3
To: DEPARTMENT 13, INC. C/O RESAGENT, INC.
Reel/Frame 051825/0729 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 14, 2019
From: DEPARTMENT 13, INC.
To: DOMAZET FT3 PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DOMAZET FAMILY TRUST NO. 3
Reel/Frame 049166/0607 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 20, 2018
From: DEPARTMENT 13, INC.
To: AET CORPORATE TRUST PTY LIMITED ACN 106 424 088
Reel/Frame 045284/0587 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 11, 2015
From: SEN, ROBI
To: DEPARTMENT 13, LLC
Reel/Frame 037010/0406 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 4, 2015
From: SHATTIL, STEVEN J
To: DEPARTMENT 13, LLC
Reel/Frame 036957/0894 →