IP Library Granted Patent US 9,277,406
Granted Patent B2
US 9,277,406 · App. 14/385,525 · Granted Mar 1, 2016

Methods and system for secure communication between an RFID tag and a reader

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,277,406
App. No.
14/385,525
Granted
Mar 1, 2016
Kind
B2
Abstract

Methods and a system involve secure communication between an RFID tag and a reader via the over-the-air interface, and to corresponding RFID tags and corresponding readers. A modification of the Rabin method is employed wherein within the framework of the encryption of a plaintext M into which an identification element of the RFID tag or of an object furnished therewith is incorporated, there is computed by the RFID tag, the Montgomery residue (Montgomery reduction) of the square of the plaintext M modulo n with respect to a Montgomery base R, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, and the resultant ciphertext C* is employed for authenticating the RFID tag. The modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, q are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n.

Claims (42)

1. A method for secure communication between a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and a reader, wherein the method comprises the following steps that are carried out in the RFID tag:

encrypting a plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag is incorporated, for computing a ciphertext C* by computing the Montgomery residue of the square of the plaintext M modulo n with respect to a Montgomery base R, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, and

sending out an authentication message to the reader, the authentication message being based on the ciphertext C*,

wherein the modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, q are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n;

wherein the RFID tag is configured such that the RFID tag can begin with encryption during read-in of a challenge in a form of a first random number RND1, and first bytes of the computed ciphertext C* can already be output to the reader while subsequent bytes of the ciphertext C* are still being computed.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the authentication message transferred from the RFID tag to the reader contains the encrypted plaintext M in a form of the ciphertext C* with C*=M 2 R −1 mod n.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein there are further incorporated into the plaintext M a first random number RND 1 generated by the reader and a second random number RND2 generated by the RFID tag, wherein the first random number RND1 is transferred to the RFID tag as a challenge within a framework of a challenge-response method.

4. The method according to claim 3 , wherein data incorporated into the plaintext M, in particular the identification element (UM) of the RFID tag, the first random number RND1 and the second random number RND2, are scrambled by means of an interleaving operation in order to distribute random data stemming from the reader and from the RFID tag randomly over the plaintext M.

5. The method according to claim 1 , wherein there is further incorporated into the plaintext M a digital signature (SIG(UII)) of the identification element (UII) of the RFID tag, which is deposited in a storage unit of the RFID tag and can be checked by the reader.

6. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the modulus n is chosen, for saving computing time, as follows: n=1(mod 2 bl·nd ), where nd is an integer with 1≦nd, bl is a word width of a processor unit of the RFID tag, and d is a length of the modulus n in word widths of the processor unit.

7. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the Montgomery base R is chosen for the given modulus n as follows: R=2 bl·(d+sd) , where bl is a word width of a processor unit of the RFID tag, d is a length of the modulus n in word widths of the processor unit, and sd is a security parameter which is so chosen that it holds that bl·sd≧1.

8. A method for secure communication between a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and a reader, wherein the method comprises the following steps that are carried out in the reader:

receiving from the RFID tag an authentication message which is based on a ciphertext, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, comprising an encrypted plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag has been incorporated, and encrypting a plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag or of an object furnished therewith is incorporated, and

decrypting the encrypted plaintext M, the decrypting step comprising multiplying the encrypted plaintext M by a Montgomery base R and subsequently carrying out the modulo operation with the modulus n,

wherein the modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, q are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n;

wherein the RFID tag is configured such that the RFID tag can begin with encryption during read-in of a challenge in a form of a first random number RND1, and first bytes of the computed ciphertext C* can already be output to the reader while subsequent bytes of the ciphertext C* are still being computed.

9. The method according to claim 8 , wherein the authentication message transferred from the RFID tag to the reader contains the encrypted plaintext M in a form of the ciphertext C* with C*=M 2 R −1 mod n.

10. The method according to claim 8 , wherein there are further incorporated into the plaintext M a first random number RND 1 generated by the reader and a second random number RND2 generated by the RFID tag, wherein the first random number RND1 is transferred to the RFID tag as a challenge within a framework of a challenge-response method.

11. The method according to claim 10 , wherein data incorporated into the plaintext M, in particular the identification element (UM) of the RFID tag, the first random number RND1 and the second random number RND2, are scrambled by means of an interleaving operation in order to distribute random data stemming from the reader and from the RFID tag randomly over the plaintext M.

12. The method according to claim 8 , wherein there is further incorporated into the plaintext M a digital signature (SIG(UII)) of the identification element (UII) of the RFID tag, which is deposited in a storage unit of the RFID tag and can be checked by the reader.

13. The method according to claim 8 , wherein the modulus n is chosen, for saving computing time, as follows: n=1(mod 2 bl·nd ), where nd is an integer with 1≦nd, bl is a word width of a processor unit of the RFID tag, and d is a length of the modulus n in word widths of the processor unit.

14. The method according to claim 8 , wherein the Montgomery base R is chosen for the given modulus n as follows: R=2 bl·(d+sd) , where bl is a word width of a processor unit of the RFID tag, d is a length of the modulus n in word widths of the processor unit, and sd is a security parameter which is so chosen that it holds that bl·sd≧1.

15. A radio frequency identification (RFID) tag for secure communication with a reader;

wherein the RFID tag comprises a processor and memory in which an identification element (UII) is deposited, and wherein the processor is configured for encrypting a plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag is incorporated, for computing a ciphertext C* by computing the Montgomery residue of the square of the plaintext M modulo n with respect to a Montgomery base R, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, and

transmitting an authentication message to the reader, the authentication message being based on the ciphertext C*, and

wherein the modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, q are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n;

wherein the RFID tag is configured such that the RFID tag can begin with encryption during read-in of a challenge in a form of a first random number RND1, and first bytes of the computed ciphertext C* can already be output to the reader while subsequent bytes of the ciphertext C* are still being computed.

16. A reader for secure communication with a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag:

wherein the reader comprises memory and a processor which is configured for receiving from the RFID tag an authentication message which is based on a ciphertext, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, comprising an encrypted plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag has been incorporated, and encrypting a plaintext M into which an identification element (UM) of the RFID tag or of an object furnished therewith is incorporated, and

decrypting the encrypted plaintext M, wherein upon the decryption the encrypted plaintext M is multiplied by a Montgomery base R and subsequently the modulo operation with the modulus n is carried out,

wherein the modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, q are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n;

wherein the RFID tag is configured such that the RFID tag can begin with encryption during read-in of a challenge in a form of a first random number RND1, and first bytes of the computed ciphertext C* can already be output to the reader while subsequent bytes of the ciphertext C* are still being computed.

17. A system for secure communication with at least a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag:

wherein the RFID tag comprises a processor and memory in which an identification element (UII) is deposited, and wherein the processor is configured for encrypting a plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag is incorporated, for computing a ciphertext C* by computing the Montgomery residue of the square of the plaintext M modulo n with respect to a Montgomery base R, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, and

transmitting an authentication message to the reader, the authentication message being based on the ciphertext C*, and

wherein the modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, a are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n;

wherein the RFID tag is configured such that the RFID tag can begin with encryption during read-in of a challenge in a form of a first random number RND1, and first bytes of the computed ciphertext C* can already be output to the reader while subsequent bytes of the ciphertext C* are still being computed.

18. A system for secure communication with at least one reader and a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag:

wherein the reader comprises memory and a processor which is configured for receiving from the RFID tag an authentication message which is based on a ciphertext, i.e. C*=M 2 R −1 mod n, comprising an encrypted plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag has been incorporated, and encrypting a plaintext M into which an identification element (UII) of the RFID tag or of an object furnished therewith is incorporated, and

decrypting the encrypted plaintext M, wherein upon the decryption the encrypted plaintext M is multiplied by a Montgomery base R and subsequently the modulo operation with the modulus n is carried out,

wherein the modulus n=p·q is the public key of the reader, the prime numbers p, a are the private key of the reader, and the Montgomery base R is an integer that is larger than the modulus n;

wherein the RFID tag is configured such that the RFID tag can begin with encryption during read-in of a challenge in a form of a first random number RND1, and first bytes of the computed ciphertext C* can already be output to the reader while subsequent bytes of the ciphertext C* are still being computed.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 30, 2017
From: GIESECKE & DEVRIENT GMBH
To: GIESECKE+DEVRIENT MOBILE SECURITY GMBH
Reel/Frame 044559/0969 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 20, 2014
From: HINZ, WALTER; FINKENZELLER, KLAUS; SEYSEN, MARTIN
To: GIESECKE & DEVRIENT GMBH
Reel/Frame 034395/0709 →