Method of secure comparative processing
View Patent ↗Method of secure comparative processing of the type in which a processor of an electronic component compares proof data (EPR, AUTH) that it receives as input with main secret data (CTRL, PIN) stored in said electronic component, characterized in that the processor implements, in addition to the comparison with the secret data (CTRL, PIN), complementary operations on the proof data (EPR, AUTH) which generate on the electronic component a variation of behavior which is dependent on the proof data (EPR, AUTH) which it receives as input and which is compounded with the behavioral variation related to the comparison with the main secret data (CTRL, PIN).
1. A secure comparative treatment method performed by an electronic component including a processor and a memory which stores secret control data and additional secret data different from the secret control data, the method comprising the steps of:
initializing a counter at a positive value N,
the processor comparing test data it receives as an input to said secret control data stored in said memory, and
at the same time, the processor comparing the test data with said additional secret data,
wherein in case of correspondence of the test data with the secret control data, the processor executes a first program, generating on the electronic component a first variation in performance, and
in case of correspondence of the test data with any of the additional secret data, the processor executes a second program specific to said additional secret data, said second program generating on the electronic component a second variation in performance,
wherein each variation in performance comprises a variation in electric energy consumption of the electronic component, and
wherein said processor comparing includes,
after each said comparing, decrementing the counter by one unit at each lack of correspondence,
checking said counter for its current value,
when said current value reaches zero, inhibiting said comparing.
2. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising the processor performing at least one wait time function of test data at an input of the electronic component.
3. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising performing at least one wait time function of test data at an input of the electronic component, and at least one complementary wait time operation following a comparison operation, in case of correspondence between test data provided at an input of the electronic component and the secret control or additional secret data.
4. The method according to claim 1 , in which the number of codes constituting additional secret data is strictly greater than N.
5. An electronic authentication component comprising a memory in which a secret control data and additional secret data are stored, and a processor, wherein the processor is programmed to execute instructions which:
initialize a counter at a positive value N,
compare test data received at an input to said secret control data stored in said memory, and in case of correspondence of the test data with the secret control data, run a first program, said program generating on the electronic component a first variation in performance, and
at the same time as said comparison with the secret control data, compare said test data received at an input to said additional secret data, and in case of correspondence of the test data with any of the additional secret data, run a second program specific to said additional secret data, said second program generating on the electronic component a second variation in performance,
wherein each variation in performance comprises a variation in electrical energy consumption of the electronic component, and
wherein the instructions which compare include:
after each said test data compare, decrementing the counter by one unit at each lack of correspondence,
checking said counter for its current value,
when said current value reaches zero, inhibiting said test data compare.
6. The method defined by claim 1 wherein said additional secret data corresponds to a plurality of codes, and N is selected to be at least the number of codes corresponding to the additional secret data.