Generation of cryptographic keys

1. A method for cryptographically processing a message in a cryptographic system using encryption and/or digital signature mechanisms, the method comprising the following steps performed by an electronic cryptographic device comprising a processor of a cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

generating a pair of public and private cryptographic keys in the additive group of integers modulo n, where n is the product of two prime numbers p and q, and

encrypting and/or digitally signing the message using the generated cryptographic keys, wherein generating the pair of public and private cryptographic keys comprises the following steps, performed by a processor of a cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

calculating ( 209 ) a public exponent e for said public key, and

calculating ( 210 ) a private exponent d for said private key from said public exponent and said public modulus, where d·e= 1 mod λ(n), λ(n) the least common multiple between p-1 and q-1,

checking ( 207 ) that λ(n)=0 mod (p-1) and λ(n)=0 mod (q-1), before generating, in case of positive check, the public and private cryptographic keys from the calculated public and private exponents.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein electronic cryptographic device carrying out the method is portable.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the electronic cryptographic device carrying out the method is portable.

4. A method for cryptographically processing a message in a cryptographic system using encryption and/or digital signature mechanisms, the method comprising the following steps performed by an electronic cryptographic device comprising a processor of a cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

generating, by a processor of an electronic cryptographic device in the cryptographic system, a public cryptographic key e and a private cryptographic key d in the additive group of integers modulo n, such that:

n=p·q, where p and q are prime numbers,

1<e<Φ(n), where e and Φ(n) are prime numbers among themselves and Φ(n)=(p-1)·(q-1), and

d·e=1 mod λ(n), λ(n) being the least common multiple between p-1 and q-1,

testing the security of the electronic cryptographic device against an attack, and

encrypting and/or digitally signing the message using the generated cryptographic keys,

wherein testing the security of the electronic cryptographic device against an attack includes a step of disrupting the calculation, by the processor of the electronic cryptographic device, of the value λ(n), in such a way as to obtain, instead and in place of the value λ(n), a value λ′(n)=λ(n)/α, where α divides λ(n), said disruption resulting in the calculation of a private key d′, instead and in place of the private key d such that d′·e=1 mod λ(n)/α.

5. A non-transitory storage medium containing a computer program comprising instructions that when loaded in and executed by a processor of an electronic cryptography device in a cryptographic system, causes the electronic cryptography device in the cryptographic system to carry out a method for cryptographically processing a message in the cryptographic system using encryption and/or digital signature mechanisms, the method comprising the following steps performed by the cryptographic device:

generating a pair of public and private cryptographic keys in the additive group of integers modulo n, where n is the product of two prime numbers p and q, and

encrypting and/or digitally signing the message using the generated cryptographic keys, wherein generating the pair of public and private cryptographic keys comprises the following steps, performed by a processor of a cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

calculating ( 209 ) a public exponent e for said public key, and

calculating ( 210 ) a private exponent d for said private key from said public exponent and said public modulus, where d·e=1 mod λ(n), λ(n) the least common multiple between p-1 and q-1,

checking ( 207 ) that λ(n)=0 mod (p-1) and λ(n)=0 mod (q-1), before generating, in case of positive check, the public and private cryptographic keys from the calculated public and private exponents.

6. An electronic cryptographic device comprising a processor of a cryptographic device in a cryptographic system configured to carry out a method for cryptographically processing a message in the cryptographic system using encryption and/or digital signature mechanisms, the method comprising the following steps performed by the electronic cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

generating a pair of public and private cryptographic keys in the additive group of integers modulo n, where n is the product of two prime numbers p and q, and

encrypting and/or digitally signing the message using the generated cryptographic keys, wherein generating the pair of public and private cryptographic keys comprises the following steps, performed by a processor of a cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

calculating ( 209 ) a public exponent e for said public key, and

calculating ( 210 ) a private exponent d for said private key from said public exponent and said public modulus, where d·e=1 mod λ(n), λ(n) the least common multiple between p-1 and q-1,

checking ( 207 ) that λ(n)=0 mod (p-1) and λ(n)=0 mod (q-1), before generating, in case of positive check, the public and private cryptographic keys from the calculated public and private exponents.

7. A non-transitory storage medium containing a computer program comprising instructions that when loaded in and executed by a processor of an electronic cryptography device in a cryptographic system, causes the electronic cryptography device in the cryptographic system to carry out a method for cryptographically processing a message in the cryptographic system using encryption and/or digital signature mechanisms, the method comprising the following steps performed by the cryptographic device:

generating, by a processor of an electronic cryptographic device in the cryptographic system, a public cryptographic key e and a private cryptographic key d in the additive group of integers modulo n, such that:

n=p·q, where p and q are prime numbers,

1<e<Φ(n), where e and Φ(n) are prime numbers among themselves and Φ(n)=(p-1)·(q-1), and

d·e=1 mod λ(n), λ(n) being the least common multiple between p-1 and q-1,

testing the security of the electronic cryptographic device against an attack, and

encrypting and/or digitally signing the message using the generated cryptographic keys,

wherein testing the security of the electronic cryptographic device against an attack includes a step of disrupting the calculation, by the processor of the electronic cryptographic device, of the value λ(n), in such a way as to obtain, instead and in place of the value λ(n), a value λ′(n)=λ(n)/α, where α divides λ(n), said disruption resulting in the calculation of a private key d′, instead and in place of the private key d such that d′·e=1 mod λ(n)/α.

8. An electronic cryptographic device comprising a processor of a cryptographic device in a cryptographic system configured to carry out a method for cryptographically processing a message in the cryptographic system using encryption and/or digital signature mechanisms, the method comprising the following steps performed by the electronic cryptographic device in the cryptographic system:

generating, by a processor of an electronic cryptographic device in the cryptographic system, a public cryptographic key e and a private cryptographic key d in the additive group of integers modulo n, such that:

n=p·q, where p and q are prime numbers,

1<e<Φ(n), where e and Φ(n) are prime numbers among themselves and Φ(n)=(p-1)·(q-1), and

d·e=1 mod λ(n), λ(n) being the least common multiple between p-1 and q-1,

testing the security of the electronic cryptographic device against an attack, and

encrypting and/or digitally signing the message using the generated cryptographic keys,

wherein testing the security of the electronic cryptographic device against an attack includes a step of disrupting the calculation, by the processor of the electronic cryptographic device, of the value λ(n), in such a way as to obtain, instead and in place of the value λ(n), a value λ′(n)=λ(n)/α, where α divides λ(n), said disruption resulting in the calculation of a private key d′, instead and in place of the private key d such that d′·e=1 mod λ(n)/α.