IP Library Granted Patent US 9,832,276
Granted Patent B2
US 9,832,276 · App. 14/754,669 · Granted Nov 28, 2017

Dynamic disabling of multi-step transport layer handshake spoofing in performance enhancing proxies (PEPs) in broadband networks

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,832,276
App. No.
14/754,669
Granted
Nov 28, 2017
Kind
B2
Abstract

An approach for selective dynamic disabling of transport layer handshake spoofing is provided. A local proxy node of a communications network receives request message from a respective local host for establishing a network connection with a remote host. A destination address for the network connection is determined. It is determined whether the destination address is included in a handshake spoofing bypass list. If it is determined that the destination address is included in the spoofing bypass list, a corresponding un-spoofed connection request message is transmitted to a remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshaking protocol for the connection establishment. If it is determined that the destination address is not included in the spoofing bypass list, a corresponding spoofed connection request message is transmitted to the remote proxy node, in accordance with a respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

Claims (29)

1. A method comprising:

receiving, by a local proxy node of a communications network, a request message from a respective local host for establishing a network connection with a remote host;

determining a destination address for the network connection;

determining whether the destination address is included in a handshake spoofing bypass list; and

if it is determined that the destination address is included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmitting a corresponding un-spoofed connection request message to a remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshaking protocol for the connection establishment; and

if it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmitting a corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

2. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, in addition to the transmission of the corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node, transmitting a corresponding acknowledgment message to the local host, in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

3. The method according to claim 1 , when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, the method further comprises:

determining whether an error message has been received from the remote proxy node; and

if it is determined that the error message has been received from the remote proxy node, adding the destination address to the handshake spoofing bypass list; and

if it is determined that the error message has not been received from the remote proxy node, continuing with the connection establishment in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the connection comprises a transmission control protocol (TCP) connection, and the handshake spoofing protocol comprises eliminating multi-step handshake messaging over a network path between the local proxy node and the remote proxy node by generating local acknowledgments to spoof handshake messages to respective client applications.

5. An apparatus, comprising:

at least one processor; and

at least one memory including computer program code for one or more programs,

the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to perform at least the following,

receive a request message from a respective local host for establishing a network connection with a remote host;

determine a destination address for the network connection;

determine whether the destination address is included in a handshake spoofing bypass list; and

if it is determined that the destination address is included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmit a corresponding un-spoofed connection request message to a remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshaking protocol for the connection establishment; and

if it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmit a corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

6. The apparatus according to claim 5 , wherein the apparatus is further caused to:

when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, in addition to the transmission of the corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node, transmit a corresponding acknowledgment message to the local host, in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

7. The apparatus according to claim 5 , wherein, when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, the apparatus is further caused to:

determine whether an error message has been received from the remote proxy node; and

if it is determined that the error message has been received from the remote proxy node, add the destination address to the handshake spoofing bypass list; and

if it is determined that the error message has not been received from the remote proxy node, continue with the connection establishment in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.

8. The apparatus according to claim 5 , wherein the connection comprises a transmission control protocol (TCP) connection, and the handshake spoofing protocol comprises eliminating multi-step handshake messaging over a network path between the local proxy node and the remote proxy node by generating local acknowledgments to spoof handshake messages to respective client applications.

Assignments (5)
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE APPLICATION NUMBER 15649418 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 050600 FRAME 0314. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT OF PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENTS. Recorded Sep 3, 2020
From: WELLS FARGO, NATIONAL BANK ASSOCIATION
To: U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 053703/0367 →
ASSIGNMENT OF PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENTS Recorded Oct 1, 2019
From: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
To: U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 050600/0314 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 19, 2018
From: HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS, LLC
To: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 044966/0156 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 18, 2016
From: HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS LLC
To: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION - AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 037847/0440 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 10, 2015
From: TORRES, ROBERT; JAVALI, NAGESH; BORDER, JOHN; GANESAN, VENKAT
To: HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS, LLC
Reel/Frame 036289/0060 →