IP Library Granted Patent US 10,009,721
Granted Patent B2
US 10,009,721 · App. 14/946,954 · Granted Jun 26, 2018

Monitoring system and method with signal tampering detection

Inventor: David W. LeJeune, Jr. (Conroe, TX)
Assignee: SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
H04W4/021G08B29/046H04W4/023H04W4/08
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,009,721
App. No.
14/946,954
Granted
Jun 26, 2018
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system and method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device is provided. The method includes storing a list of cellular receivers and at least one corresponding geographic characteristic; receiving, from a remote monitoring device through a cellular network, a location of the monitoring device and the identity of a particular cellular receiver that relayed the location; identifying, from the received location and the stored at least one corresponding geographic characteristic, an expected cellular receiver from the list of cellular receivers; comparing the particular cellular receiver with the expect cellular receiver; and issuing an alert based on at least a negative result of the comparing.

Claims (65)

1. A method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device, comprising:

deploying a plurality of monitoring devices to a monitored population, each of the monitoring devices configured to transmit at least location data representing its approximate location;

first receiving over time, from a group of cell receivers, the location data from the plurality of monitoring devices and information about individual cell receivers with the group;

first determining, from received content of the first receiving, at least one expected geographic characteristic of each individual cell receiver in the group;

second receiving the location data for a particular monitoring device and information about a particular cell receiver that relayed the location data from the particular monitoring device;

second determining, based at least on received content of the second receiving and result of the first determining, if the particular cell receiver is an unexpected cell receiver or an expected cell receiver for the particular monitoring device, the second determining comprising:

identifying, based on an approximate location of the particular monitoring device from the location data received during the second receiving, the expected cell receiver for the approximate location;

comparing the particular cell receiver with the expected cell receiver;

wherein the particular cell receiver is considered to be unexpected in response to at least a negative result of the comparing.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second determining comprises determining whether, based on a location of the particular monitoring device, whether it communicated with the expected cell receiver.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first determining comprises establishing an approximate map of the group of cell receivers.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first determining comprises establishing an artificial geographic marker for each cell receiver of the group, each marker representing an approximate average position of movement of the monitored population within a corresponding cell receiver.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the second determining comprises:

identifying, from a location of the particular monitoring device and proximity of at least one of the artificial geographic markers, the expected cell receiver;

comparing the particular cell receiver with the expected cell receiver.

6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising issuing an alert to authorities when the particular cell receiver is not the expected cell receiver.

7. A method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device, comprising:

deploying a plurality of monitoring devices to a monitored population, each of the monitoring devices configured to transmit at least location data representing its approximate location;

first receiving over time, from a group of cell receivers, the location data from the plurality of monitoring devices and information about individual cell receivers with the group;

first determining, from received content of the first receiving, at least one expected geographic characteristic of each individual cell receiver in the group;

second receiving the location data for a particular monitoring device and information about a particular cell receiver that relayed the location data from the particular monitoring device;

second determining, based at least on received content of the second receiving and result of the first determining, if the particular cell receiver is an unexpected cell receiver or an expected cell receiver for the particular monitoring device;

third determining at least one of the following:

whether the particular cell receiver is a base station from an authorized source;

whether a number of monitored devices using the particular cell receiver is above a predetermined number;

whether the particular cell receiver is stationary over time;

whether the particular cell receiver is a cell tower known to be near the expected cell receiver;

further comprising issuing an alert to authorities when the particular cell receiver is not the expected cell receiver and a negative or mixed result of the third determining.

8. A method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device, comprising:

storing a list of cellular receivers and at least one corresponding geographic characteristic;

receiving, from a remote monitoring device through a cellular network, a location of the monitoring device and the identity of a particular cellular receiver that relayed the location;

identifying, from the received location and the stored at least one corresponding geographic characteristic, an expected cellular receiver for the received location from the list of cellular receivers;

comparing the particular cellular receiver with the expected cellular receiver; and

issuing an alert based on at least a negative result of the comparing.

9. The method of claim 8 wherein the at least one corresponding geographic characteristics comprises an approximate map of the cell receivers.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the at least one corresponding geographic characteristics comprises an approximate map of movement of a monitored population with the cell receivers.

11. A method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device, comprising:

storing a list of cellular receivers and at least one corresponding geographic characteristic, the at least one corresponding geographic characteristics comprises an artificial geographic marker for each cell receiver of the list, each marker representing an approximate average position of movement of a monitored population within a corresponding cell receiver;

receiving, from a remote monitoring device through a cellular network, a location of the monitoring device and the identity of a particular cellular receiver that relayed the location;

identifying, from the received location and the stored at least one corresponding geographic characteristic, an expected cellular receiver for the received location from the list of cellular receivers;

comparing the particular cellular receiver with the expected cellular receiver; and

issuing an alert based on at least a negative result of the comparing.

12. A method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device, comprising:

storing a list of cellular receivers and at least one corresponding geographic characteristic;

receiving, from a remote monitoring device through a cellular network, a location of the monitoring device and the identity of a particular cellular receiver that relayed the location;

identifying, from the received location and the stored at least one corresponding geographic characteristic, an expected cellular receiver for the received location from the list of cellular receivers;

comparing the particular cellular receiver with the expected cellular receiver; and

issuing an alert based on at least a negative result of the comparing;

determining at least one of the following:

whether the particular cell receiver is a base station from an authorized source;

whether a number of monitored devices using the particular cell receiver is above a predetermined number;

whether the particular cell receiver is stationary over time;

whether the particular cell receiver is a cell tower known to be near the expected cell receiver;

said issuing an alert is based on at least a negative or mixed result of the determining.

13. The method of claim 12 , further comprising bypass said issuing an alert based on at least a positive result of the determining.

14. The method of claim 1 , wherein the identifying the expected cell receiver comprises identifying the individual cell receiver in the group whose corresponding at least one expected geographic characteristic is consistent with the approximate location.

15. A method for detecting potential tampering with a data stream from a monitoring device, comprising:

deploying a plurality of monitoring devices to a monitored population, each of the monitoring devices configured to transmit at least location data representing its approximate location;

first receiving over time, from a group of cell receivers, the location data from the plurality of monitoring devices and information about individual cell receivers with the group;

establishing an artificial geographic marker for each cell receiver of the group, each marker representing an approximate average position of movement of the monitored population within a corresponding cell receiver;

second receiving the location data for a particular monitoring device and information about a particular cell receiver that relayed the location data from the particular monitoring device;

second determining, based at least on received content of the second receiving and result of the establishing, if the particular cell receiver is an unexpected cell receiver or an expected cell receiver for the particular monitoring device.

16. The method of claim 15 , wherein the second determining further comprises:

identifying the expected cell receiver by cross referencing the approximate location of the particular monitoring device as indicted in the location data received during the second receiving with the artificial geographic marker of at least one of the cell receivers of the group;

wherein the particular cell receiver is unexpected if it is different from the identified expected cell receiver.

Assignments (16)
ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS Recorded Apr 21, 2025
From: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, AS EXISTING COLLATERAL AGENT
To: WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS SUCCESSOR COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 070903/0303 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 29, 2024
From: ALTER DOMUS (US) LLC
To: AVENTIV TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
Reel/Frame 066952/0914 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 29, 2024
From: AVENTIV TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
To: WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB
Reel/Frame 066951/0054 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 29, 2024
From: ALTER DOMUS (US) LLC
To: AVENTIV TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
Reel/Frame 066951/0561 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 29, 2024
From: ALTER DOMUS (US) LLC
To: AVENTIV TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
Reel/Frame 066951/0514 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 29, 2024
From: ALTER DOMUS (US) LLC
To: AVENTIV TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
Reel/Frame 066951/0385 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 29, 2024
From: ALTER DOMUS (US) LLC
To: AVENTIV TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
Reel/Frame 066951/0630 →
SUPER-PRIORITY FIRST LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Mar 28, 2024
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 066945/0310 →
PRIORITY SECOND LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Feb 1, 2024
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC; ALLPAID, INC.
To: WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 066436/0420 →
PRIORITY FIRST LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jan 2, 2024
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; ALLPAID, INC.; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 066567/0620 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 24, 2023
From: ALLPAID, INC.; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
To: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.
Reel/Frame 064699/0842 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 15, 2023
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH
Reel/Frame 064600/0235 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 15, 2023
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH
Reel/Frame 064600/0451 →
SECOND LIEN SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 6, 2017
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS, INC.; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 044368/0969 →
FIRST LIEN SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 3, 2017
From: SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS, INC.; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 044779/0573 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 20, 2015
From: LEJEUNE, DAVID W., JR.
To: SATELLITE TRACKING OF PEOPLE LLC
Reel/Frame 037097/0411 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20170150306A1 · May 25, 2017