Hardware assisted branch transfer self-check mechanism
View Patent ↗Embodiments of the present disclosure are directed to a self-check application to determine whether an indirect branch execution is permissible for an executable application. The self-check application uses one or more parameters received from an execution profiling module to determine whether the indirect branch execution is permitted by one or more self-check policies.
1. A computer program product tangibly embodied on non-transient computer readable media, the computer program product comprising instructions operable when executed to:
receive, from an execution profiler implemented at least partially in hardware, execution control of an indirect branch for a function call in an executable application;
execute a callback to a self-check policy associated with the executable application for the indirect branch, wherein the self-check policy comprises at least one of a defense to a control-flow attack and a white list of authorized memory address locations for the indirect branch; and
determine, by a self-check application module implemented at least partially in hardware, whether to execute the indirect branch based on the self-check policy associated with the executable application, by:
evaluating one or more parameters for the indirect branch provided to the self-check application module by the execution profiler; and
determining whether the one or more parameters are permitted for execution based on the self-check policy;
wherein:
the parameters comprise one or both of a source register location from which the indirect call originated or a destination register location for the indirect branch call; and
the self-check application module determines whether the self-check policy permits an indirect branch from the source register to the destination register.
2. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the indirect branch comprises one of a near indirect call, a near indirect jump, or a near return.
3. A system comprising:
a processor implemented at least partially in hardware;
a memory;
an execution profiler module implemented at least partially in hardware to:
receive, from an execution profiler implemented at least partially in hardware, execution control of an indirect branch for a function call in an executable application; and
determine, by a self-check handler module, whether to execute the indirect branch based on a self-check policy associated with the executable application, wherein the self-check police comprises at least one of a defense to a control-flow attack and a white list of authorized memory address locations for the indirect branch, by:
evaluating one or more parameters for the indirect branch provided to a self-check handler by the execution profiler; and
determining whether the one or more parameters are permitted for execution based on the self-check policy;
wherein:
the parameters comprise one or both of a source register location from which the indirect call originated or a destination register location for the indirect call; and
the self-check handler module determines whether the self-check policies permits an indirect branch from the source register to the destination register.
4. The system of claim 3 , wherein the indirect branch comprises one of a near indirect call, a near indirect jump, or a near return.
5. A system for control flow protection, the system comprising:
a processor implemented at least partially in hardware;
a memory;
an execution profiler module implemented at least partially in hardware to:
assemble an execution profile of a executable application execution;
monitor the executable application execution for an indirect branch instruction; and
identify one or more parameters associated with the indirect branch instruction; and
a self-check application module implemented at least partially in hardware to determine whether the indirect branch is permitted by performing a self-check using the parameters identified by the execution profiler module, by:
evaluating one or more parameters for the indirect branch provided to a self-check handler by the execution profiler; and
determining whether the one or more parameters are permitted for execution based on a self-check policy, wherein the self-check policy comprises at least one of a defense to a control-flow attack and a white list of authorized memory address locations for the indirect branch;
wherein:
the parameters comprise one or both of a source register location from which the indirect call originated or a destination register location for the indirect call; and
the self-check application module determines whether the self-check policies permits an indirect branch from the source register to the destination register.