IP Library Granted Patent US 10,148,440
Granted Patent B2
US 10,148,440 · App. 15/104,938 · Granted Dec 4, 2018

Binary code authentication

Inventors: Cyrille Pepin (Issy les Moulineaux, FR); Johann Urvoy (Issy les Moulineaux, FR)
Assignee: MORPHO
H04L9/3239G06F21/44G06F21/64
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,148,440
App. No.
15/104,938
Granted
Dec 4, 2018
Kind
B2
Abstract

The description particularly relates to methods for authenticating binary code stored in a smart card. The description also relates to systems and a computer program capable of implementing said methods, as well as to storage media containing such a computer program.

Claims (39)

1. A method for secure storage of a binary code in a smart card comprising:

/a/ computing, by a secure storage system, a first hash based on a source code, said source code corresponding to the binary code;

/b/ storing, by the secure storage system, the first hash and the binary code in the smart card; and

/c/ transmitting, by the secure storage system to an authentication system, a random number and a third hash, the third hash being computed on the basis of a concatenation of the first hash, a second hash and the random number, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code.

2. The secure storage method according to claim 1 , comprising storing, by the secure storage system, the random number in the smart card.

3. The secure storage method according to claim 1 , comprising storing in the smart card, by the secure storage system, at least one among the second hash and the third hash.

4. A method for authenticating a binary code stored in a smart card, comprising:

/d/ acquiring, by an authentication system, a reference third hash;

/e/ acquiring, by the authentication system, an effective third hash on the basis of a concatenation of a first hash, of a second hash and of a random number, the first hash being stored in the smart card, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code to be authenticated; and

/f/ authenticating, by the authentication system, the binary code on the basis of a comparison of a reference third hash and the effective third hash.

5. The authentication method according to claim 4 , comprising transmitting the random number by the authentication system to the smart card.

6. The authentication method according to claim 4 , the random number being a predetermined random number received by the authentication system, acquiring, by the authentication system, the reference third hash comprising receiving, by the authentication system, the reference third hash.

7. The authentication method according to claim 4 , comprising choosing the random number by the authentication system and reading the first hash stored in the smart card by the authentication system, acquiring, by the authentication system, the reference third hash comprising computing the reference third hash by the authentication system.

8. A method for protecting a smart card, comprising a method for secure storage of a binary code in a smart card, and a method for authenticating a binary code stored in the smart card,

wherein the method for secure storage comprises:

/a/ computing, by a secure storage system, a first hash based on a source code, said source code corresponding to the binary code;

/b/ storing, by the secure storage system, the first hash and the binary code in the smart card; and

/c/ transmitting, by the secure storage system to an authentication system, a random number and a third hash, the third hash being computed on the basis of a concatenation of the first hash, a second hash and the random number, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code; and

wherein the method for authenticating comprises:

/d/ acquiring, by an authentication system, a reference third hash;

/e/ acquiring, by the authentication system, an effective third hash on the basis of a concatenation of a first hash, of a second hash and of a random number, the first hash being stored in the smart card, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code to be authenticated; and

/f/ authenticating, by the authentication system, the binary code on the basis of a comparison of a reference third hash and the effective third hash.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage media comprising a computer program comprising sequences of instructions implementing the steps of the method according to claim 1 when they are executed by processors.

10. A secure storage system comprising one or more hardware processors,

the secure storage system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors, instructions to compute a first hash on the basis of a source code, said source code corresponding to a binary code;

the secure storage system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors, instructions to store the first hash and the binary code in a smart card;

the secure storage system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors, instructions to transmit to an authentication system a random number and a third hash, the third hash being computed on the basis of a concatenation of the first hash, of a second hash and of the random number, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code.

11. An authentication system for the authentication of a binary code stored in a smart card, the authentication system comprising

one or more hardware processors,

the authentication system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors, instructions to obtain a reference third hash;

the authentication system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors, instructions to obtain an effective third hash on the basis of a concatenation of a first hash, of a second hash and of a random number, the first hash being stored in the smart card, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code to be authenticated;

the authentication system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors, instructions to authenticate the binary code on the basis of a comparison of a reference third hash and the effective third hash.

12. A system for protecting a smart card comprising a secure storage system comprising one or more processors and an authentication system comprising

one or more hardware processors,

the secure storage system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors of the storage system, instructions to compute a first hash on the basis of a source code, said source code corresponding to a binary code;

the secure storage system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors of the storage system, instructions to store the first hash and the binary code in a smart card;

the secure storage system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors of the storage system, instructions to transmit to an authentication system a random number and a third hash, the third hash being computed on the basis of a concatenation of the first hash, of a second hash and of the random number, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code;

the authentication system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors of the authentication system, instructions to obtain a reference third hash; the authentication system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors of the authentication system, instructions to obtain an effective third hash on the basis of a concatenation of a first hash, of a second hash and of a random number, the first hash being stored in the smart card, the second hash being computed on the basis of the binary code to be authenticated;

the authentication system being programmed to execute, by the one or more processors of the authentication system, instructions to authenticate the binary code on the basis of a comparison of a reference third hash and the effective third hash.

Assignments (10)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 26, 2025
From: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE
To: IDEMIA FRANCE
Reel/Frame 070632/0157 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE ERRONEOUSLY NAMED PROPERTIES 14/366,087 AND 15/001,534 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 048039 FRAME 0605. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CHANGE OF NAME. Recorded Jan 17, 2024
From: MORPHO
To: SAFRAN IDENTITY & SECURITY
Reel/Frame 066343/0143 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE ERRONEOUSLY NAMED PROPERTIES 14/366,087 AND 15/001,534 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 047529 FRAME 0948. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CHANGE OF NAME. Recorded Jan 17, 2024
From: SAFRAN IDENTITY & SECURITY
To: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY
Reel/Frame 066343/0232 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE ERRONEOUSLY NAME PROPERTIES/APPLICATION NUMBERS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 055108 FRAME: 0009. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT. Recorded Jan 17, 2024
From: SAFRAN IDENTITY & SECURITY
To: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE
Reel/Frame 066365/0151 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE THE REMOVE PROPERTY NUMBER 15001534 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 055314 FRAME: 0930. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT. Recorded Jan 17, 2024
From: SAFRAN IDENTITY & SECURITY
To: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE
Reel/Frame 066629/0638 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE APPLICATION NUMBER PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 055108 FRAME: 0009. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CHANGE OF NAME. Recorded Feb 17, 2021
From: SAFRAN IDENTITY AND SECURITY
To: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE
Reel/Frame 055314/0930 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE THE RECEIVING PARTY DATA PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 047529 FRAME 0948. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE CHANGE OF NAME. Recorded Oct 29, 2020
From: SAFRAN IDENTITY AND SECURITY
To: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE
Reel/Frame 055108/0009 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Jan 9, 2019
From: MORPHO
To: SAFRAN IDENTITY & SECURITY
Reel/Frame 048039/0605 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Aug 30, 2018
From: SAFRAN IDENTITY & SECURITY
To: IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY
Reel/Frame 047529/0948 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 24, 2017
From: PEPIN, CYRILLE; URVOY, JOHANN
To: MORPHO
Reel/Frame 041059/0201 →
Priority Claims (1)
FR 13 62677 · Dec 16, 2013 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20160380771A1 · Dec 29, 2016