IP Library Granted Patent US 10,298,549
Granted Patent B2
US 10,298,549 · App. 15/199,924 · Granted May 21, 2019

Stateless access stratum security for cellular internet of things

Inventors: Soo Bum Lee (San Diego, CA); Anand Palanigounder (San Diego, CA); Adrian Edward Escott (Reading, GB)
Assignee: QUALCOMM Incorporated
H04L63/0428H04L9/0822H04L9/14H04L41/08H04L63/062H04L63/123H04L63/16H04L63/205H04L67/12H04W4/70H04W12/04H04W12/10H04W88/16G06F2221/2151H04L63/1458Y04S40/18
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,298,549
App. No.
15/199,924
Granted
May 21, 2019
Kind
B2
Abstract

Aspects of security schemes (e.g., integrity protection, encryption, or both) are described. A measure of access stratum security can be realized without overhead associated with establishing and/or maintaining the per-cellular-device access stratum security context at a Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) base station (C-BS). A gateway (e.g., a CIoT Serving Gateway Node (C-SGN)) may derive a first key. The first key may be only known to the C-SGN. The C-SGN may derive a second key from the first key and a parameter unique to the C-BS. The C-SGN may also derive a third key from the second key and an identity of a cellular device. The C-SGN may send the second and third keys to the C-BS and cellular device, respectively. Small data messages encrypted and/or integrity protected by the cellular device may be decrypted and/or verified by the C-BS.

Claims (128)

1. An apparatus, comprising:

a communication interface to communicate with a node of a communication network;

a processing circuit coupled to the communication interface, the processing circuit adapted to:

obtain a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

obtain a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

obtain a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

obtain a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

compare the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

discard the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

send the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value are obtained using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp, and the processing circuit is further adapted to:

provision a first nonce and/or the time stamp to a device identified by the device identity; and/or

obtain a second nonce from the device.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to: provision the first nonce and/or the time stamp and obtain the second nonce during a random access procedure.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the small data message is encrypted with the third key, and the processing circuit is further adapted to:

decrypt the small data message using the third key.

4. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

monitor a traffic load value;

detect that the traffic load value exceeds a predetermined threshold value; and

send a message, to a device that is identified by the device identity, that requests the device to include the first integrity protection value in a next one or more messages sent to the apparatus, in response to detecting that the traffic load value exceeds the predetermined threshold value.

5. The apparatus of claim 4 , wherein a network configures the predetermined threshold value.

6. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

obtain the second key from the gateway.

7. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the gateway is Cellular Internet of Things serving gateway node (C-SGN).

8. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the apparatus is a Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) base station (C-BS) or an Evolved Node B (eNodeB), and wherein the parameter unique to apparatus is a C-BS Identity or an eNodeB Identity.

9. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

obtain the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp.

10. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

negotiate an access stratum security configuration during an initial attach procedure with a device, wherein the access stratum security configuration specifies whether small data messages are sent from the device without security, with integrity protection, with encryption, with integrity protection and encryption, and/or with on-demand integrity protection, wherein integrity protection and encryption are performed using the third key.

11. An apparatus, comprising:

a communication interface to communicate with a node of a communication network;

a processing circuit coupled to the communication interface, the processing circuit adapted to:

obtain a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

obtain a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

obtain a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

obtain a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

compare the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

discard the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value; and

send the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

monitor a traffic load value;

detect that the traffic load value exceeds a predetermined threshold value; and

send a message, to a device that is identified by the device identity, that requests the device to include the first integrity protection value in a next one or more messages sent to the apparatus, in response to detecting that the traffic load value exceeds the predetermined threshold value.

12. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value are obtained using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp, and the processing circuit is further adapted to:

provision a first nonce and/or the time stamp to a device identified by the device identity; and/or

obtain a second nonce from the device.

13. The apparatus of claim 12 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

provision the first nonce and/or the time stamp and obtain the second nonce during a random access procedure.

14. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the small data message is encrypted with the third key, and the processing circuit is further adapted to:

decrypt the small data message using the third key.

15. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein a network configures the predetermined threshold value.

16. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

obtain the second key from the gateway.

17. The apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the gateway is Cellular Internet of Things serving gateway node (C-SGN).

18. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the apparatus is a Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) base station (C-BS) or an Evolved Node B (eNodeB), and wherein the parameter unique to apparatus is a C-BS Identity or an eNodeB Identity.

19. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

obtain the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp.

20. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the processing circuit is further adapted to:

negotiate an access stratum security configuration during an initial attach procedure with a device, wherein the access stratum security configuration specifies whether small data messages are sent from the device without security, with integrity protection, with encryption, with integrity protection and encryption, and/or with on-demand integrity protection, wherein integrity protection and encryption are performed using the third key.

21. A method of communication of an apparatus, comprising:

obtaining a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

obtaining a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

obtaining a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

obtaining a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

comparing the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

discarding the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

sending the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value are obtained using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp, and the method further comprises:

provisioning a first nonce and/or the time stamp to a device identified by the device identity; and/or

obtaining a second nonce from the device.

22. An apparatus, comprising:

means for obtaining a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

means for obtaining a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

means for obtaining a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

means for obtaining a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

means for comparing the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

means for discarding the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

means for sending the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value are obtained using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp, and the apparatus further comprises:

means for provisioning a first nonce and/or the time stamp to a device identified by the device identity; and/or

means for obtaining a second nonce from the device.

23. A non-transitory processor-readable medium storing processor-executable code, comprising code for causing a processor of an apparatus to:

obtain a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

obtain a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

obtain a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

obtain a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

compare the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

discard the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

send the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the first integrity protection value and the second integrity protection value are obtained using at least one nonce and/or a time stamp, and further comprising code for causing the processor of the apparatus to:

provision a first nonce and/or the time stamp to a device identified by the device identity; and/or

obtain a second nonce from the device.

24. A method of communication of an apparatus, comprising:

obtaining a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

obtaining a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

obtaining a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

obtaining a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

comparing the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

discarding the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

sending the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the method further comprises:

monitoring a traffic load value;

detecting that the traffic load value exceeds a predetermined threshold value; and

sending a message, to a device that is identified by the device identity, that requests the device to include the first integrity protection value in a next one or more messages sent to the apparatus, in response to detecting that the traffic load value exceeds the predetermined threshold value.

25. An apparatus, comprising:

means for obtaining a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

means for obtaining a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

means for obtaining a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

means for obtaining a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

means for comparing the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

means for discarding the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

means for sending the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the apparatus further comprises:

means for monitoring a traffic load value;

means for detecting that the traffic load value exceeds a predetermined threshold value; and

means for sending a message, to a device that is identified by the device identity, that requests the device to include the first integrity protection value in a next one or more messages sent to the apparatus, in response to detecting that the traffic load value exceeds the predetermined threshold value.

26. A non-transitory processor-readable medium storing processor-executable code, comprising code for causing a processor of an apparatus to:

obtain a second key that is based on a first key and a parameter unique to the apparatus, wherein the first key is unknown to the apparatus and known to a gateway;

obtain a small data message including a device identity and a first integrity protection value;

obtain a third key that is based on the second key and the device identity;

obtain a second integrity protection value that is based on the third key;

compare the first integrity protection value to the second integrity protection value;

discard the small data message if a comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is not equal to the second integrity protection value;

send the small data message to the gateway if the comparison result indicates that the first integrity protection value is equal to the second integrity protection value; and

wherein the non-transitory processor-readable medium storing processor-executable code, further comprises code for causing the processor of the apparatus to:

monitor a traffic load value;

detect that the traffic load value exceeds a predetermined threshold value; and

send a message, to a device that is identified by the device identity, that requests the device to include the first integrity protection value in a next one or more messages sent to the apparatus, in response to detecting that the traffic load value exceeds the predetermined threshold value.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Sep 12, 2016
From: LEE, SOO BUM; PALANIGOUNDER, ANAND; ESCOTT, ADRIAN EDWARD
To: QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
Reel/Frame 039702/0688 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 62387499 · Dec 23, 2015
Related Publication 20170187691A1 · Jun 29, 2017