IP Library Granted Patent US 10,848,465
Granted Patent B2
US 10,848,465 · App. 15/283,903 · Granted Nov 24, 2020

Dynamic firewalls and forensic gateways

Inventors: Shalini Yajnik (Berkeley Heights, NJ); Anjur S. Krishnakumar (Princeton, NJ); Venkatesh Krishnaswamy (San Ramon, CA); Laurent Philonenko (San Francisco, CA)
Assignee: Extreme Networks, Inc.
H04L63/0272H04L63/1416H04L63/1425
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,848,465
App. No.
15/283,903
Granted
Nov 24, 2020
Kind
B2
Abstract

A security event that is associated with one or more communication devices is detected. For example, the security event may be an unexpected change in data being sent from a communication device outside an enterprise. In response to detecting the security event, a Virtual Service Network (VSN) is created that isolates one or more communication devices that may pose a security risk. A corrective action to mitigate the security event is then implemented. For example, the corrective action may be to dynamically instantiate a firewall on the VSN that blocks the transfer of data from the communication device outside the enterprise. This allows an administrator to review the security event and take further action if necessary. Because the VSN with the firewall is created dynamically, the network remains secure while the security event is investigated.

Claims (54)

1. A system, comprising:

a memory; and

at least one processor coupled to the memory and configured to:

detect a security event associated with one or more communication devices in a first virtual service network (VSN);

automatically create a second VSN in response to detecting the security event;

insert a forensic gateway between the first VSN and the second VSN in response to creating the second VSN;

move the one or more communication devices from the first VSN to the second VSN in response to detecting the security event, wherein the second VSN isolates the one or more communication devices from the first VSN;

implement a corrective action that mitigates the security event; and

in response to implementing the corrective action that mitigates the security event:

move the one or more communication devices back to the first VSN; and

remove the second VSN that isolates the one or more communication devices from the first VSN.

2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor is further configured to:

determine a region of communication devices affected by the security event.

3. The system of claim 2 , wherein to determine the region of communication devices affected by the security event, the at least one processor is configured to:

determine the region of communication devices affected by the security event based on one of: a sub-net of a network address, a group of a user, a range of addresses, a list of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), or other communication devices that have communicated with the one or more communication devices within a time period.

4. The system of claim 2 , wherein to create the second VSN, the at least one processor further is configured to:

create the second VSN based at least in part on the determined region of communication devices affected by the security event.

5. The system of claim 1 , wherein the security event is one of: an access of a defined Uniform Resource Locator (URL), an access of an Internet Protocol (IP) address, an attempt to use a defined port, a change in amount of traffic, a pattern in network traffic, an amount of telephone calls greater than a threshold value, an unexpected communication session, an unexpected type of network traffic, or a denial of service attack.

6. The system of claim 1 , wherein the corrective action is one of: performing a virus scan on the one or more communication devices, disabling a port on a firewall, removing software from the one or more communication devices, sending traffic to a designated device, blocking traffic to a communication device, blocking traffic from a communication device, or determining a group associated with a user and scanning communication devices associated with the group.

7. The system of claim 1 , wherein the forensic gateway determines a classification of the security event based at least in part on a communication session between the first VSN and the second VSN.

8. A method, comprising:

detecting, by at least one processor, a security event associated with one or more communication devices in a first virtual service network (VSN);

automatically creating, by the at least one processor, a second VSN in response to detecting the security event;

inserting, by the at least one processor, a forensic gateway between the first VSN and the second VSN in response to creating the second VSN;

moving, by the at least one processor, the one or more communication devices from the first VSN to the second VSN in response to detecting the security event;

implementing, by the at least one processor, a corrective action that mitigates the security event; and

in response to implementing the corrective action that mitigates the security event:

moving, by the at least one processor, the one or more communication devices back to the first VSN; and

removing, by the at least one processor, the second VSN that isolates the one or more communication devices from the first VSN.

9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

determining, by the at least one processor, a region of communication devices affected by the security event.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the creating the second VSN comprises:

creating the second VSN based at least in part on the determined region of communication devices affected by the security event.

11. The method of claim 9 , wherein the determining further comprises:

determining, by the at least one processor, the region of communication devices affected by the security event based on one of: a sub-net of a network address, a group of a user, a range of addresses, a list of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), or other communication devices that have communicated with the one or more communication devices within a time period.

12. The method of claim 8 , wherein the security event is one of: an access of a defined Uniform Resource Locator (URL), an access of an Internet Protocol (IP) address, an attempt to use a defined port, a change in amount of traffic, a pattern in network traffic, an amount of telephone calls greater than a threshold value, an unexpected communication session, an unexpected type of network traffic, or a denial of service attack.

13. The method of claim 8 , wherein the corrective action is one of: performing a virus scan on the one or more communication devices, disabling a port on a firewall, removing software from the one or more communication devices, sending traffic to a designated device, blocking traffic to a communication device, blocking traffic from a communication device, or determining a group associated with a user and scanning communication devices associated with the group.

14. The method of claim 8 , wherein the forensic gateway determines a classification of the security event based at least in part on a communication session between the first VSN and the second VSN.

15. A non-transitory computer-readable device having instructions stored thereon that, when executed by at least one computing device, causes the at least one computing device to perform operations comprising:

detecting a security event associated with one or more communication devices in a first virtual service network (VSN);

automatically creating a second VSN in response to detecting the security event;

inserting a forensic gateway between the first VSN and the second VSN in response to creating the second VSN;

moving the one or more communication devices from the first VSN to the second VSN in response to detecting the security event, wherein the second VSN isolates the one or more communication devices from the first VSN;

implementing a corrective action that mitigates the security event; and

in response to implementing the corrective action that mitigates the security event:

moving the one or more communication devices back to the first VSN; and

removing the second VSN that isolates the one or more communication devices from the first VSN.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable device of claim 15 , wherein the operations further comprise:

determining a region of communication devices affected by the security event based on one of: a sub-net of a network address, a group of a user, a range of addresses, a list of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), or other communication devices that have communicated with the one or more communication devices within a time period.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable device of claim 16 , wherein the creating the second VSN comprises:

creating the second VSN based at least in part on the determined region of communication devices affected by the security event.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable device of claim 15 , wherein the security event is one of: an access of a defined Uniform Resource Locator (URL), an access of an Internet Protocol (IP) address, an attempt to use a defined port, a change in amount of traffic, a pattern in network traffic, an amount of telephone calls greater than a threshold value, an unexpected communication session, an unexpected type of network traffic, or a denial of service attack.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable device of claim 15 , wherein the corrective action is one of: performing a virus scan on the one or more communication devices, disabling a port on a firewall, removing software from the one or more communication devices, sending traffic to a designated device, blocking traffic to a communication device, blocking traffic from a communication device, or determining a group associated with a user and scanning communication devices associated with the group.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable device of claim 15 , wherein the forensic gateway determines a classification of the security event based at least in part on a communication session between the first VSN and the second VSN.

Assignments (9)
AMENDED SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Aug 18, 2023
From: EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.; AEROHIVE NETWORKS, INC.
To: BANK OF MONTREAL
Reel/Frame 064782/0971 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 1, 2018
From: EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.
To: BANK OF MONTREAL
Reel/Frame 046050/0546 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 1, 2018
From: SILICON VALLEY BANK
To: EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.
Reel/Frame 046051/0775 →
BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDER RELEASING ALL LIENS INCLUDING THE SECURITY INTEREST RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME 041576/0001 Recorded Dec 15, 2017
From: CITIBANK, N.A.
To: AVAYA INC.; AVAYA INTEGRATED CABINET SOLUTIONS INC.; OCTEL COMMUNICATIONS LLC (FORMERLY KNOWN AS OCTEL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION); VPNET TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Reel/Frame 044893/0531 →
THIRD AMENDED AND RESTATED PATENT AND TRADEMARK SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Oct 31, 2017
From: EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.
To: SILICON VALLEY BANK
Reel/Frame 044639/0300 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 15, 2017
From: AVAYA INC.; AVAYA COMMUNICATION ISRAEL LTD; AVAYA HOLDINGS LIMITED
To: EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.
Reel/Frame 043569/0047 →
SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED PATENT AND TRADEMARK SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jul 14, 2017
From: EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.
To: SILICON VALLEY BANK
Reel/Frame 043200/0614 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jan 27, 2017
From: AVAYA INC.; AVAYA INTEGRATED CABINET SOLUTIONS INC.; OCTEL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; VPNET TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
To: CITIBANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Reel/Frame 041576/0001 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 3, 2016
From: YAJNIK, SHALINI; KRISHNAKUMAR, ANJUR S.; KRISHNASWAMY, VENKATESH; PHILONENKO, LAURENT
To: AVAYA INC.
Reel/Frame 039923/0831 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 62300616 · Feb 26, 2016
Related Publication 20170250956A1 · Aug 31, 2017