IP Library Granted Patent US 10,171,478
Granted Patent B2
US 10,171,478 · App. 15/639,436 · Granted Jan 1, 2019

Efficient and secure method and apparatus for firmware update

Inventors: Phillip McCauley (Carson, CA); Jana Mahen Fernando (Torrance, CA); Nathan Coerper (Corona, CA)
Assignee: FARADAY & FUTURE INC.
H04L63/123G06F8/65G06F21/57H04L9/3247H04L63/045H04L63/0428H04L63/0435H04L63/0442H04L67/34H04W4/40
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,171,478
App. No.
15/639,436
Granted
Jan 1, 2019
Kind
B2
Abstract

This relates to a vehicle and, more particularly to, a vehicle configured to perform a secure firmware update. Some examples of the disclosure include receiving a firmware update package including updated firmware for one or more electronic control units (ECUs) of a vehicle. According to the disclosure, the firmware update package can be transmitted to and stored on an untrusted ECU and distributed to one or more target ECUs in a secure firmware update process monitored by a secure ECU.

Claims (56)

1. A vehicle, comprising:

an untrusted electronic control unit (ECU) comprising a receiver, a processor, and a memory, the receiver configured for receiving from a secure server a firmware update package including one or more firmware updates, and the memory of the untrusted ECU configured to store the firmware update package;

a secure ECU operatively coupled to the untrusted ECU, the secure ECU configured for authenticating the firmware update package; and

one or more target ECUs, each operatively coupled to the untrusted ECU and to the secure ECU, each respective target ECU comprising a bootloader configured for computing a checksum for a respective firmware update of the one or more firmware updates and signing the checksum with a unique key associated with the respective target ECU.

2. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the firmware update package is encrypted with an asymmetric key and each of the one or more firmware updates is encrypted with the unique key corresponding to a respective target ECU of the one or more target ECUs.

3. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the untrusted ECU is further configured for:

decrypting the firmware update package; and

transmitting a signed update command to the secure ECU.

4. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the secure ECU is configured for:

receiving a signed update command from the untrusted ECU, the signed update command indicative of the received firmware update package;

authenticating the signed update command; and

in accordance with a determination that the signed update command is authentic, transmitting a signed distribution command to initiate a transmission of one or more firmware updates to one or more target ECUs.

5. The vehicle of claim 4 , wherein the secure ECU is configured for:

in accordance with a determination that the signed updated command is inauthentic, transmitting a signed erase command to the untrusted ECU to initiate an erasure of the firmware update package.

6. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the secure ECU is configured for:

receiving the signed checksum from one or more target ECUs;

verifying a signature of the signed checksum;

verifying a result of the signed checksum; and

in accordance with a determination that the signature is valid and the result is correct, transmitting one or more installation commands to the one or more target ECUs to install a respective firmware update corresponding to the signed checksum.

7. The vehicle of claim 6 , wherein the secure ECU is configured for:

in accordance with a determination that the signature is not valid or the result is incorrect, transmitting one or more erase commands to the one or more target ECUs to erase a respective firmware update corresponding to the signed checksum.

8. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein each unique key associated with each target ECU is a symmetric key.

9. A method for updating firmware at a vehicle, the method comprising:

receiving, from a secure server, a firmware update package including one or more firmware updates;

storing the firmware update package at a memory of an untrusted electronic control unit (ECU);

authenticating, with a secure ECU, the firmware update package;

in accordance with a determination that the firmware update package is authentic:

transmitting one or more firmware updates included in the firmware update package to one or more respective target ECUs;

computing, with a bootloader included in a target ECU of the one or more respective target ECUs, a checksum for a respective firmware update; and

signing, with the bootloader, the checksum using a unique key associated with the target ECU.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the firmware update package is encrypted with an asymmetric key and each of the one or more firmware updates is encrypted with the unique key corresponding to the respective target ECU.

11. The method of claim 9 , further comprising, at the untrusted ECU:

decrypting the firmware update package; and

transmitting a signed update command to the secure ECU.

12. The method of claim 9 , further comprising, at the secure ECU:

receiving a signed update command from the untrusted ECU, the signed update command indicative of the received firmware update package;

authenticating the signed update command; and

in accordance with a determination that the signed update command is authentic, transmitting a signed distribution command to initiate a transmission of one or more firmware updates to one or more target ECUs.

13. The method of claim 12 , further comprising, at the secure ECU:

in accordance with a determination that the signed updated command is inauthentic, transmitting a signed erase command to the untrusted ECU to initiate an erasure of the firmware update package.

14. The method of claim 9 , further comprising, at the secure ECU:

receiving a signed checksum from one or more target ECUs;

verifying a signature of the signed checksum;

verifying a result of the signed checksum; and

in accordance with a determination that the signature is valid and the result is correct, transmitting one or more installation commands to the one or more target ECUs to install a respective firmware update corresponding to the signed checksum.

15. The method of claim 14 , further comprising, at the secure ECU:

in accordance with a determination that the signature is not valid or the result is incorrect, transmitting one or more erase commands to the one or more target ECUs to erase a respective firmware update corresponding to the signed checksum.

16. The method of claim 9 , wherein each unique key associated with each target ECU is a symmetric key.

17. A non-transitory computer-readable medium including instructions, which when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a method for updating firmware at a vehicle, the method comprising:

receiving, from a secure server, a firmware update package including one or more firmware updates;

storing the firmware update package at a memory of an untrusted electronic control unit (ECU);

authenticating, with a secure ECU, the firmware update package;

in accordance with a determination that the firmware update package is authentic:

transmitting one or more firmware updates included in the firmware update package to one or more respective target ECUs;

computing, with a bootloader included in a target ECU of the one or more respective target ECUs, a checksum for a respective firmware update; and

signing, with the bootloader, the checksum using a unique key associated with the target ECU.

Assignments (9)
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 25, 2024
From: FARADAY&FUTURE, INC.
To: SENYUN INTERNATIONAL LTD.
Reel/Frame 069048/0676 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 15, 2022
From: FARADAY&FUTURE INC.
To: FF SIMPLICY VENTURES LLC
Reel/Frame 061176/0756 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME 050234/0069 Recorded Jun 8, 2022
From: ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS SUCCESSOR COLLATERAL AGENT
To: CITY OF SKY LIMITED; EAGLE PROP HOLDCO LLC; FARADAY & FUTURE INC.; FARADAY FUTURE LLC; FF EQUIPMENT LLC; FF HONG KONG HOLDING LIMITED; FF INC.; FF MANUFACTURING LLC; ROBIN PROP HOLDCO LLC; SMART KING LTD.; SMART TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD.; FARADAY SPE, LLC
Reel/Frame 060314/0263 →
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SUCCESSOR COLLATERAL AGENT UNDER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jul 29, 2021
From: BIRCH LAKE FUND MANAGEMENT, LP, AS RETIRING AGENT
To: ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS SUCCESSOR AGENT
Reel/Frame 057019/0140 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Oct 14, 2020
From: ROYOD LLC
To: BIRCH LAKE FUND MANAGEMENT, LP
Reel/Frame 054076/0157 →
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SUCCESSOR COLLATERAL AGENT UNDER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Mar 5, 2020
From: BIRCH LAKE FUND MANAGEMENT, LP, AS RETIRING AGENT
To: ROYOD LLC, AS SUCCESSOR AGENT
Reel/Frame 052102/0452 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 1, 2019
From: CITY OF SKY LIMITED; EAGLE PROP HOLDCO LLC; FARADAY FUTURE LLC; FE EQUIPMENT LLC; FF HONG KONG HOLDING LIMITED; FF INC.; FF MANUFACTURING LLC; ROBIN PROP HOLDCO LLC; SMART KING LTD.; SMART TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD.; FARADAY SPE, LLC; FARADAY & FUTURE INC.
To: BIRCH LAKE FUND MANAGEMENT, LP
Reel/Frame 050234/0069 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jan 14, 2019
From: SEASON SMART LIMITED
To: FARADAY&FUTURE INC.
Reel/Frame 048069/0704 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Dec 28, 2017
From: FARADAY&FUTURE INC.
To: SEASON SMART LIMITED
Reel/Frame 044969/0023 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 62357303 · Jun 30, 2016
Related Publication 20180145991A1 · May 24, 2018
Cited By (1)
US 12,585,451