IP Library Granted Patent US 11,537,713
Granted Patent B2
US 11,537,713 · App. 15/666,906 · Granted Dec 27, 2022

Ransomware attack onset detection

Inventors: Ajaykumar Rajasekharan (Longmont, CO); Matthew Mills Parker (Denver, CO); Daniel L. Sullivan (Denver, CO)
Assignee: CRASHPLAN GROUP LLC
G06F21/565G06F21/554G06F2221/034
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,537,713
App. No.
15/666,906
Granted
Dec 27, 2022
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method of detecting the onset of a ransomware attack is presented. In an example embodiment, file backup metadata for each of a plurality of computing devices is accessed and analyzed to detect anomalous file backup activity of individual ones of the computing devices. A determination is made as to whether the detected anomalous file backup activity of at least some of the computing devices is correlated in time. File description metadata for each of the computing devices is also accessed and analyzed to identify files in the computing devices that are anomalous to other files in the computing devices. A determination whether a ransomware attack has begun is based on a determination that the detected anomalous file backup activity of at least some of the computing devices is correlated in time, as well as on the identified anomalous files.

Claims (58)

1. A method for detecting a ransomware attack, the method comprising:

accessing file backup metadata for three or more computing devices;

analyzing, using at least one hardware processor of a machine, the file backup metadata to detect anomalous file backup activity for each of the computing devices of the three or more computing devices;

identifying, based on the analyzing, a respective detected anomalous file backup activity for each of the computing devices, wherein each detected anomalous file backup activity has an associated detected time;

determining whether the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a first computing device of the computing devices is within a predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a second computing device of the computing devices;

determining whether the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a third computing device of the computing devices;

in response to determining that the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the first computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device and that the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the third computing device, determining that the detected anomalous file backup activity for the first, second, and third computing devices are correlated in time;

accessing file description metadata for each of the computing devices;

analyzing the file description metadata to identify files in the three or more computing devices that are anomalous to other files in the three or more computing devices; and

determining whether a ransomware attack has begun based on the determination whether the detected anomalous file backup activity of the three or more computing devices is correlated in time, and based on the identified anomalous files.

2. The method of claim 1 , the three or more computing devices corresponding to a single organization.

3. The method of claim 1 , the file backup metadata for each of the three or more computing devices comprising at least one of a number of files selected for a backup operation and a size of the files selected for a backup operation.

4. The method of claim 1 , the analyzing of the file backup metadata comprising employing a separate one or more machine learning models for each of the three or more computing devices.

5. The method of claim 4 , at least one of the separate one or more machine learning models comprising a time-series model.

6. The method of claim 1 , the anomalous file backup activity comprising a change in file backup activity of a file backup operation compared to a plurality of other file backup operations exceeding a predetermined threshold.

7. The method of claim 6 , the change in file backup activity comprising one of an increase in a total number of new files backed up, an increase in a total size of new files backed up, an increase in a total number of previously existing files backed up, an increase in a total size of previously existing files backed up, a decrease in the total number of files backed up, and a decrease in the total size of files backed up.

8. The method of claim 1 , the determining whether the detected anomalous file backup activity of the three or more computing devices is correlated in time comprising performing cohort analysis of the detected anomalous file backup activity.

9. The method of claim 1 , the file description metadata comprising at least one of a filename, a file extension, a file MIME type, a file size, a file hash, and a time of file creation, reading, updating, and deletion.

10. The method of claim 1 , the analyzing of the file description metadata comprising applying a natural language processing algorithm to the file description metadata, and at least one of the files is identified as anomalous based on a distance of the at least one of the files from a cluster of other files on one of the computing devices.

11. The method of claim 1 , the analyzing of the file description metadata comprising identifying a first file on a first one of the three or more computing devices as being anomalous based on the first file having a same filename and at least one of a different file extension and a different file MIME type as a second file on a second one of the three or more computing devices that has been identified as anomalous.

12. The method of claim 1 , the determining whether a ransomware attack has begun being further based on a correlation in time of an appearance of the identified anomalous files to the detected anomalous file backup activity.

13. The method of claim 1 , the determining whether the detected anomalous file backup activity of at least some of the three or more computing devices is correlated in time is based on the detected anomalous file backup activity of the at least some of the three or more computing devices occurring within a predetermined length of time.

14. The method of claim 1 , the file description metadata of at least one of the three or more computing devices having been generated during a file search operation to determine a scope of a file backup operation to be performed on the at least one of the three or more computing devices.

15. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

for each of the three or more computing devices:

determining an earliest point in time at which the ransomware attack began; and

identifying a previous file backup operation occurring prior to the earliest point in time.

16. The method of claim 15 , the identifying of the previous file backup operation comprising identifying a most recent file backup operation of a plurality of previous file backup operations occurring prior to the earliest point in time.

17. The method of claim 15 , further comprising:

for each of the three or more computing devices: initiating a restore operation using saved file data generated by the identified previous file backup operation.

18. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

detecting an appearance of an executable file in at least one of the three or more computing devices in conjunction with at least one of the detected anomalous file backup activity and the identified anomalous files; and

identifying the executable file as being associated with the ransomware attack based on the appearance of the executable file.

19. The method of claim 18 , further comprising:

detecting an absence of the executable file in another of the three or more computing devices; and

causing prevention of a transfer of the executable file to the other of the three or more computing devices in response to the detecting of the absence of the executable file in the other of the three or more computing devices.

20. A system comprising:

one or more hardware processors; and

a memory storing instructions that, when executed by at least one of the one or more hardware processors, causes the system to perform operations comprising:

accessing file backup metadata for three or more computing devices;

analyzing the file backup metadata to detect anomalous file backup activity for each of the computing devices of the three or more computing devices;

identifying, based on the analyzing, a respective detected anomalous file backup activity for each of the computing devices, wherein each detected anomalous file backup activity has an associated detected time;

determining whether the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a first computing device of the computing devices is within a predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a second computing device of the computing devices;

determining whether the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a third computing device of the computing devices;

in response to determining that the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the first computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device and that the associated detected time of the detected anomalous, file backup activity for the second computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the third computing device, determining that the detected anomalous file backup activity for the first, second, and third computing devices are correlated in time;

accessing file description metadata for each of the computing devices;

analyzing the file description metadata to identify files in the three or more computing devices that are anomalous to other files in the three or more computing devices; and

determining whether a ransomware attack has begun based on the determination whether the detected anomalous file backup activity of at least some of the three or more computing devices is correlated in time, and based on the identified anomalous files.

21. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more hardware processors of a system, cause the system to perform operations comprising:

accessing file backup metadata for three or more computing devices;

analyzing the file backup metadata to detect anomalous file backup activity for each of the computing devices of the three or more computing devices;

identifying, based on the analyzing, a respective detected anomalous file backup activity for each of the computing devices, wherein each detected anomalous file backup activity has an associated detected time;

determining whether the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a first computing device of the computing devices is within a predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a second computing device of the computing devices:

determining whether the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for a third computing device of the computing devices;

in response to determining that the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the first computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device and that the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the second computing device is within the predetermined time period of the associated detected time of the detected anomalous file backup activity for the third computing device, determining that the detected anomalous file backup activity for the first, second, and third computing devices are correlated in time;

accessing file description metadata for each of the computing devices;

analyzing the file description metadata to identify files in the three or more computing devices that are anomalous to other files in the three or more computing devices; and

determining whether a ransomware attack has begun based on the determination whether the detected anomalous file backup activity of at least some of the three or more computing devices is correlated in time, and based on the identified anomalous files.

Assignments (5)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Oct 10, 2022
From: NORTH ACQUISITION LLC
To: CRASHPLAN GROUP LLC
Reel/Frame 061632/0260 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 10, 2022
From: CODE42 SOFTWARE, INC.
To: NORTH ACQUISITION LLC
Reel/Frame 060773/0574 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 27, 2022
From: NORTH ACQUISITION LLC
To: BRIGHTWOOD LOAN SERVICES LLC, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 060646/0279 →
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT TO THE FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION Recorded Jul 19, 2022
From: CODE 42 SOFTWARE, INC.
To: CODE42 SOFTWARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 060726/0762 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 30, 2018
From: RAJASEKHARAN, AJAYKUMAR; PARKER, MATTHEW MILLS; SULLIVAN, DANIEL L.
To: CODE 42 SOFTWARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 044768/0512 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20190042744A1 · Feb 7, 2019
Cited By (8)
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