IP Library Granted Patent US 9,942,206
Granted Patent B1
US 9,942,206 · App. 15/693,546 · Granted Apr 10, 2018

System and method for privacy-preserving genomic data analysis

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,942,206
App. No.
15/693,546
Granted
Apr 10, 2018
Kind
B1
Abstract

A method includes accessing genomic data of from a genomic database; generating, by a processor, a first hash by probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting a first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence, the first hash projecting the first portion into reduced dimensions such that the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence becomes statistically improbable to recover outside the first processor; generating, by the processor, a first cryptogram by deterministically and reversibly encrypting a second portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence; generating, by the processor, a look-up table by using at least the first cryptogram as a key and the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence as the value, and transmitting data encoding the first hash and the first cryptogram to one or more processors that are different from the first processor.

Claims (57)

1. A computer-implemented method, the method comprising:

accessing, by a first processor, genomic data of a particular patient from a genomic database, the genomic data encoding strings of nucleotide values from genomic sequences of the particular patient as well as information of respective chromosomes on which corresponding genomic sequences reside;

generating, by the first processor, a first hash by probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting a first portion of the genomic data encoding a first genomic sequence, the first hash projecting the first portion into reduced dimensions, wherein the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence becomes statistically improbable to recover outside the first processor;

generating, by the first processor, a first cryptogram by deterministically and reversibly encrypting a second portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence;

generating, by the first processor, a look-up table by using at least the first cryptogram as a key and the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence as the value,

transmitting, by the first processor, encrypted genomic data that includes the first hash and the first cryptogram to one or more processors without patient identifiable information;

receiving, from the one or more processors that are different from the first processor, processed results that include the encrypted genomic data of the particular patient; and

decoding the encrypted genomic data to match the processed results with the particular patient by, at least in part, using the look-up table to recover information of respective chromosomes on which corresponding genomic sequences reside.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting the first portion comprises probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting locus information that includes an identification (ID) of a particular chromosome on which the first genomic sequence resides as well a starting position of the first genomic sequence on the particular chromosome.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein deterministically and reversibly encrypting the second portion comprises deterministically and reversibly encrypting strings of nucleotide values from the first genomic sequence.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

generating, by the first processor, a second hash by deterministically encrypting the first portion of the genomic data.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein generating the look-up table comprises:

using the second hash as well as the first cryptogram as a key and the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence as a value such that the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence is retrievable at the first processor based on the combination of the second hash and the first cryptogram.

6. The method of claim 4 , wherein transmitting the information comprises transmitting the information encoding the first hash, the second hash, and the first cryptogram to one or more processors that are different from the first processor and without patient identifiable information.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

generating, by the first processor, a third hash by probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting the first portion of the genomic data encoding a second genomic sequence, the third hash projecting the first portion into reduced dimensions such that the first portion of the genomic data encoding a second genomic sequence becomes statistically improbable to recover outside the first processor.

8. The method of claim 7 , further comprising:

generating, by the first processor, a second cryptogram by deterministically and reversibly encrypting a second portion of the genomic data encoding the second genomic sequence.

9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

adding, by the first processor, a new key-value entry to the look-up table using at least the third hash as a key in the new key-value pair and the second cryptogram as a value for the new key-value pair.

10. The method of claim 7 , wherein the first hash and the third hash both point to chromosomal information from the same patient.

11. The method of claim 7 , wherein the first hash and the second hash point to chromosomal information from different patients.

12. The method of claim 1 , wherein probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting comprises performing a locality-sensitive hashing.

13. The method of claim 1 , wherein deterministically and reversibly encrypting the string of nucleotide values comprises using a reversible hash to encrypt the string of nucleotide values.

14. The method of claim 1 , wherein deterministically and reversibly encrypting the string of nucleotide values comprises encrypting using a key.

15. The method of claim 1 , wherein the information encoding the string of nucleotides values of the particular chromosome includes a reference genome sequence and an alteration sequence.

16. A computer system comprising at least one processor configured to perform the operations of:

accessing genomic data of a particular patient from a genomic database, the genomic data encoding strings of nucleotide values from genomic sequences of the particular patient as well as information of respective chromosomes on which corresponding genomic sequences reside;

generating a first hash by probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting a first portion of the genomic data encoding a first genomic sequence, the first hash projecting the first portion into reduced dimensions, wherein the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence becomes statistically improbable to recover outside the computer system;

generating a first cryptogram by deterministically and reversibly encrypting a second portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence;

generating a look-up table by using at least the first cryptogram as a key and the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence as the value,

transmitting information encoding encrypted genomic data that includes the first hash and the first cryptogram to one or more processors without patient identifiable information;

receiving, from the one or more processors that are different from the computer system, processed results that include the encrypted genomic data of the particular patient; and

decoding the encrypted genomic data to match the processed results with the particular patient by, at least in part, using the look-up table to recover information of respective chromosomes on which corresponding genomic sequences reside.

17. The computer system of claim 16 , wherein the operations further comprise:

generating a second hash by deterministically encrypting the locus information of the first chromosome.

18. The computer system of claim 17 , wherein generating the look-up table comprise:

using the second hash as well as the first cryptogram as a key and the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence as a value such that the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence is retrievable at the computer system based on the combination of the second hash and the first cryptogram.

19. The computer system of claim 17 , wherein transmitting the information comprises transmitting the information encoding the first hash, the second hash, and the first cryptogram to one or more processors that are different from the computer system and without patient identifiable information.

20. The computer system of claim 16 , wherein the operations further comprise:

generating a third hash by probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting the first portion of a second genomic sequence, the third hash projecting the first portion into reduced dimensions such that the first portion of the genomic data encoding the second genomic sequence becomes statistically improbable to recover outside the first processor.

21. The computer system of claim 20 , wherein the operations further comprise:

generating a second cryptogram by deterministically and reversibly encrypting a second portion of the genomic data encoding the second genomic sequence.

22. The computer system of claim 21 , wherein the operations further comprise:

adding, a new key-value entry to the look-up table using at least the third hash as a key in the new key-value pair and the second cryptogram as a value for the new key-value pair.

23. The computer system of claim 16 , wherein probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting comprises performing a locality-sensitive hashing.

24. The computer system of claim 16 , wherein deterministically and reversibly encrypting the string of nucleotide values comprises using a reversible hash to encrypt the string of nucleotide values.

25. The computer system of claim 16 , wherein deterministically and reversibly encrypting the string of nucleotide values comprises encrypting using a key.

26. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising software instructions that, when executed by a computer, causes the computer to perform the operations of:

accessing genomic data of a particular patient from a genomic database, the genomic data encoding strings of nucleotide values from genomic sequences of the particular patient as well as information of respective chromosomes on which corresponding genomic sequences reside;

generating a first hash by probabilistically and irreversibly encrypting a first portion of the genomic data encoding a first genomic sequence, the first hash projecting the first portion into reduced dimensions, wherein the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence becomes statistically improbable to recover outside the computer;

generating a first cryptogram by deterministically and reversibly encrypting a second portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence;

generating a look-up table by using at least the first cryptogram as a key and the first portion of the genomic data encoding the first genomic sequence as the value,

transmitting information encoding encrypted genomic data that includes the first hash and the first cryptogram to one or more processors without patient identifiable information;

receiving, from the one or more processors that are different from the computer, processed results that include the encrypted genomic data of the particular patient; and

decoding the encrypted genomic data to match the processed results with the particular patient by, at least in part, using the look-up table to recover information of respective chromosomes on which corresponding genomic sequences reside.

Assignments (9)
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Mar 12, 2026
From: IMS SOFTWARE SERVICES LTD.; IQVIA INC.; IQVIA RDS INC.; RULES-BASED MEDICINE, INC.
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Reel/Frame 075047/0061 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE CONVEYING PARTIES INADVERTENTLY NOT INCLUDED IN FILING PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 065709 FRAME: 618. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE SECURITY AGREEMENT. Recorded Dec 6, 2023
From: IQVIA INC.; IQVIA RDS INC.; IMS SOFTWARE SERVICES LTD.; Q SQUARED SOLUTIONS HOLDINGS LLC
To: U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 065790/0781 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 29, 2023
From: IQVIA INC.
To: U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 065709/0618 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 29, 2023
From: IQVIA INC.; IQVIA RDS INC.; IMS SOFTWARE SERVICES LTD.; Q SQUARED SOLUTIONS HOLDINGS LLC
To: U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 065710/0253 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 12, 2023
From: IQVIA INC.; IMS SOFTWARE SERVICES, LTD.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Reel/Frame 064258/0577 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 24, 2023
From: IQVIA INC.; IQVIA RDS INC.; IMS SOFTWARE SERVICES LTD.; Q SQUARED SOLUTIONS HOLDINGS LLC
To: U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Reel/Frame 063745/0279 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Oct 9, 2018
From: QUINTILES IMS INCORPORATED
To: IQVIA INC.
Reel/Frame 047207/0276 →
AGREEMENT DOCUMENT AFFECTING TITLE Recorded Dec 13, 2017
From: SHELL, DAVE
To: QUINTILES IMS INCORPORATED
Reel/Frame 044861/0565 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 8, 2017
From: MILLER, RONALD A.; DUNLAP, LUTHER; PARK, KENNETH; MULLER, JOHN
To: QUINTILES IMS INCORPORATED
Reel/Frame 044075/0564 →