IP Library Granted Patent US 10,785,196
Granted Patent B2
US 10,785,196 · App. 15/913,942 · Granted Sep 22, 2020

Encryption key management of client devices and endpoints within a protected network

Inventors: Ramani Panchapakesan (Bangalore, IN); Suman Aluvala (Bangalore, IN); Niranjan Paramashivaiah (Bangalore, IN); Mahesh Kavatage (Bangalore, IN); Pavan Rajkumar Rangain (Bangalore, IN); Craig Farley Newell (Atlanta, GA)
Assignee: VMWARE, INC.
H04L63/0428H04L9/0891H04L63/029H04L63/0272H04L63/06H04L63/107H04L63/083H04L63/108
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,785,196
App. No.
15/913,942
Granted
Sep 22, 2020
Kind
B2
Abstract

Disclosed are various examples for establishing encrypted channels or tunnels within a TCP or other communication session between a tunnel endpoint and tunnel client on a client device. A tunnel endpoint on the client device can determine an encryption key based upon whether a client device is in compliance with encryption policies of the enterprise.

Claims (40)

1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium embodying at least one program executable in a tunnel endpoint, the tunnel endpoint providing a gateway to a software defined network, the at least one program, when executed by the tunnel endpoint, being configured to cause the tunnel endpoint to at least:

cause an encryption key to be deployed to a client device, wherein the client device is external to the software defined network and configured with a virtual private network (VPN) configuration from a management service with which the client device is enrolled as a managed device, the VPN configuration identifying the encryption key and an address of the tunnel endpoint;

cause the encryption key to be deployed to at least one endpoint internal to the software defined network, wherein the at least one endpoint uses the encryption key to encrypt communications within the software defined network and with the client device;

obtain a packet from the client device that is encrypted using the encryption key, the packet associated with an endpoint within the software defined network;

determine, based upon the packet encrypted using the encryption key, that the client device is non-compliant with at least one compliance rule based upon a packet header associated with the packet; and

cause revocation of the encryption key deployed to the client device by issuing a new encryption key to the at least one endpoint internal to the software defined network, wherein the at least one endpoint uses the new encryption key for communications within the software defined network and external to the software defined network.

2. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the at least one program further causes the tunnel endpoint to at least:

subsequently determine that the client device is compliant with the at least one compliance rule; and

issue the new encryption key to the client device.

3. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the at least one program determines that the client device is non-compliant based upon a geolocation of the client device, a network type associated with the client device, or a device posture determined from data embedded within the packet header.

4. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the tunnel endpoint causes revocation of the encryption key by issuing a third encryption key to the client device, wherein an encryption level associated with the third encryption key is stronger than the encryption key that is revoked.

5. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 4 , wherein the tunnel endpoint causes revocation of the encryption key by causing the management service to issue a third encryption key to the client device, wherein the encryption level associated with the third encryption key is stronger than the encryption key that is revoked.

6. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the tunnel endpoint causes revocation of the encryption key by discarding subsequent packets received from the client device that are encrypted using the encryption key.

7. A system, comprising:

at least one computing device; and

an application executable by the at least one computing device, the application configured to cause the at least one computing device to at least:

cause an encryption key to be deployed to a client device, wherein the client device is external to a protected network and configured with a virtual private network (VPN) configuration from a management service with which the client device is enrolled as a managed device, the VPN configuration identifying the encryption key and an address of the tunnel endpoint;

cause the encryption key to be deployed to at least one endpoint internal to the protected network, wherein the at least one endpoint uses the encryption key to encrypt communications within the protected network and with the client device;

obtain a packet from the client device that is encrypted using the encryption key, the packet associated with an endpoint within the protected network;

determine, based upon the packet encrypted using the encryption key, that the client device is non-compliant with at least one compliance rule based upon a packet header associated with the packet; and

cause revocation of the encryption key deployed to the client device by issuing a new encryption key to the at least one endpoint internal to the protected network, wherein the at least one endpoint uses the new encryption key for communications within the protected network and external to the protected network.

8. The system of claim 7 , wherein the application causes the at least one computing device to at least:

subsequently determine that the client device is compliant with the at least one compliance rule; and

issue the new encryption key to the client device.

9. The system of claim 7 , wherein determining that the client device is non-compliant is based upon a geolocation of the client device, a network type associated with the client device, or a device posture determined from data embedded within the packet header.

10. The system of claim 7 , wherein the at least one computing device causes revocation of the encryption key by causing the management service to issue a third encryption key to the client device, and an encryption level associated with the third encryption key is stronger than the encryption key that is revoked.

11. The system of claim 7 , wherein the at least one computing device causes revocation of the encryption key by causing the management service to issue a third encryption key to the client device, and an encryption level associated with the third encryption key is stronger than the encryption key that is revoked.

12. The system of claim 7 , wherein the at least one computing device causes revocation of the encryption key by discarding subsequent packets received from the client device that are encrypted using the encryption key.

13. A method implemented in a at least one computing device comprising:

causing an encryption key to be deployed to a client device, wherein the client device is external to a protected network and configured with a virtual private network (VPN) configuration from a management service with which the client device is enrolled as a managed device, the VPN configuration identifying the encryption key and an address of the tunnel endpoint;

causing the encryption key to be deployed to at least one endpoint internal to the protected network, wherein the at least one endpoint uses the encryption key to encrypt communications within the protected network and with the client device;

obtaining a packet from the client device that is encrypted using the encryption key, the packet associated with an endpoint within the protected network;

determining, based upon the packet encrypted using the encryption key, that the client device is non-compliant with at least one compliance rule based upon a packet header associated with the packet; and

causing revocation of the encryption key deployed to the client device by issuing a new encryption key to the at least one endpoint internal to the protected network, wherein the at least one endpoint uses the new encryption key for communications within the protected network and external to the protected network.

14. The method of claim 13 , further comprising

subsequently determining that the client device is compliant with the at least one compliance rule; and

issuing the new encryption key to the client device.

15. The method of claim 13 , wherein determining that the client device is non-compliant is based upon a geolocation of the client device, a network type associated with the client device or a device posture determined from data embedded within the packet header.

16. The method of claim 13 , wherein causing revocation of the encryption key further comprises issuing a third encryption key to the client device, and an encryption level associated with the third encryption key is stronger than the encryption key that is revoked.

17. The method of claim 13 , wherein causing revocation of the encryption key further comprises causing the management service to issue a third encryption key to the client device, and an encryption level associated with the third encryption key is stronger than the encryption key that is revoked.

Assignments (4)
PATENT ASSIGNMENT Recorded Aug 5, 2024
From: VMWARE LLC
To: OMNISSA, LLC
Reel/Frame 068327/0365 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 3, 2024
From: OMNISSA, LLC
To: UBS AG, STAMFORD BRANCH
Reel/Frame 068118/0004 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Apr 15, 2024
From: VMWARE, INC.
To: VMWARE LLC
Reel/Frame 067102/0395 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 7, 2018
From: PANCHAPAKESAN, RAMANI; ALUVALA, SUMAN; PARAMASHIVAIAH, NIRANJAN; KAVATAGE, MAHESH; RANGAIN, PAVAN RAJKUMAR; NEWELL, CRAIG FARLEY
To: VMWARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 045513/0589 →
Priority Claims (1)
IN 201841002522 · Jan 22, 2018 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20190230065A1 · Jul 25, 2019