IP Library Granted Patent US 10,318,779
Granted Patent B2
US 10,318,779 · App. 15/964,697 · Granted Jun 11, 2019

Systems and methods for robust protection of item authentication, tracking and tracing against tag duplication

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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,318,779
App. No.
15/964,697
Granted
Jun 11, 2019
Kind
B2
Abstract

Systems and methods for facilitating tag authenticity validation. The methods comprise: detecting a tag's arrival/presence at a waypoint along a supply chain path; obtaining a ChainStart Value and a first ChainEnd Value from the tag; generating a public key and a private key; transforming the first ChainEnd Value into a second ChainEnd Value using the private key; storing in a data store at least a hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the second ChainEnd Value, and the public key as a transaction record entry; causing the first ChainEnd Value of the tag to be replaced with the second ChainEnd Value; and validating the tag's authenticity at a second waypoint along the supply chain path using at least the ChainStart Value, the second ChainEnd Value, and the transaction record entry comprising the hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the first ChainEnd Value and the public key.

Claims (50)

1. A method for facilitating tag authenticity validation, comprising:

detecting a tag's arrival or presence at a waypoint along a supply chain path;

obtaining, by a processor, a ChainStart Value and a first ChainEnd Value from the tag;

generating, by the processor, a first key pair comprising a public key and a private key;

transforming, by the processor, the first ChainEnd Value into a second ChainEnd Value using the private key;

storing in a data store at least a hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the second ChainEnd Value, and the public key as a transaction record entry;

causing the first ChainEnd Value of the tag to be replaced with the second ChainEnd Value; and

validating the tag's authenticity at a second waypoint along the supply chain path using at least the tag's ChainStart Value, the tag's second ChainEnd Value, and a first transaction record entry comprising the hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the second ChainEnd Value and the public key.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the processor is disposed in at least one of the tag, a tag reader/writer device, or a computing device remote from the tag and the tag reader/writer device.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the second ChainEnd Value comprises the first ChainEnd Value signed with the private key.

4. The method according to claim 3 , wherein the validating comprises using the public key to un-sign the second ChainEnd Value to obtain a previous ChainEnd Value.

5. The method according to claim 4 , wherein the tag's authenticity is incrementally validated when the previous ChainEnd Value matches the first ChainEnd Value contained in the another transaction record entry.

6. The method according to claim 5 , wherein the method is repeated until no further matches are found among one or more transaction record entries creating a chain of linked transaction records.

7. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the first waypoint is a first intermediary waypoint along the supply chain path.

8. The method according to claim 7 , further comprising:

detecting the tag's arrival or presence at a second intermediary waypoint along the supply chain path;

obtaining the ChainStart Value and the second ChainEnd Value from the tag;

generating a second key pair comprising a public key and a private key;

transforming the second ChainEnd Value into a third ChainEnd Value using the private key of the second key pair;

storing in the data store at least the hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the third ChainEnd Value, and the public key of the second key pair as a second another transaction record entry; and

causing the second ChainEnd Value of the tag to be replaced with the third ChainEnd Value.

9. The method according to claim 8 , wherein the third ChainEnd Value and the second another transaction record entry are also used to validate the tag's authenticity.

10. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the transaction record entry further comprises a transaction block and a hash of the transaction block signed by the first private key.

11. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the tag is a wired or wireless communications enabled tag, a printed barcode, an etched barcode, or an allocation of memory in a digital device.

12. A system, comprising:

a processor; and

a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising programming instructions that are configured to cause the processor to implement a method for facilitating tag authenticity validation, wherein the programming instructions comprise instructions to:

detect a tag's arrival or presence at a waypoint along a supply chain path;

obtain a ChainStart Value and a first ChainEnd Value from the tag;

generate a first key pair comprising a public key and a private key;

transform the first ChainEnd Value into a second ChainEnd Value using the private key;

store in a data store at least a hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the second ChainEnd Value, and the public key as a transaction record entry;

cause the first ChainEnd Value of the tag to be replaced with the second ChainEnd Value; and

validate the tag's authenticity using at least the tag's ChainStart Value, the tag's second ChainEnd Value, and a first transaction record entry comprising the hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the second ChainEnd Value and the public key.

13. The system according to claim 12 , wherein the processor is disposed in at least one of the tag, a tag reader/writer device, or a computing device remote from the tag and the tag reader/writer device.

14. The system according to claim 12 , wherein the second ChainEnd Value comprises the first ChainEnd Value signed with the private key.

15. The system according to claim 14 , wherein the tag's authenticity is incrementally validated by using the public key to un-sign the second ChainEnd Value to obtain a previous ChainEnd Value.

16. The system according to claim 15 , wherein the tag's authenticity is validated when the previous ChainEnd Value matches the first ChainEnd Value contained in the another transaction record entry.

17. The system according to claim 16 , wherein the method is repeated until no further matches are found among one or more transaction record entries creating a chain of linked transaction records.

18. The system according to claim 12 , wherein the first waypoint is a first intermediary waypoint along the supply chain path.

19. The system according to claim 18 , wherein the programming instructions comprise instructions to:

detect the tag's arrival or presence at a second intermediary waypoint along the supply chain path;

obtain the ChainStart Value and the second ChainEnd Value from the tag;

generate a second key pair comprising a public key and a private key;

transform the second ChainEnd Value into a third ChainEnd Value using the private key of the second key pair;

store in the data store at least the hash of the ChainStart Value, a hash of the third ChainEnd Value, and the public key of the second pair as a second another transaction record entry; and

cause the second ChainEnd Value of the tag to be replaced with the third ChainEnd Value.

20. The system according to claim 19 , wherein the third ChainEnd Value and the second another transaction record entry are also used to validate the tag's authenticity.

21. The system according to claim 12 , wherein the transaction record entry further comprises a transaction block and a hash of the transaction block signed by the first private key.

22. The system according to claim 12 , wherein the tag is a wired or wireless communications enabled tag, a printed barcode, an etched barcode, or an allocation of memory in a digital device.

Assignments (3)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 3, 2018
From: TYCO FIRE & SECURITY GMBH
To: SENSORMATIC ELECTRONICS, LLC
Reel/Frame 047188/0715 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 2, 2018
From: TYCO FIRE & SECURITY GMBH
To: SENSORMATIC ELECTRONICS, LLC
Reel/Frame 047182/0674 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 27, 2018
From: RAYNESFORD, STEVEN J.
To: TYCO FIRE & SECURITY GMBH
Reel/Frame 045655/0144 →