IP Library Granted Patent US 10,999,072
Granted Patent B2
US 10,999,072 · App. 16/207,011 · Granted May 4, 2021

Trusted remote proving method, apparatus and system

Inventors: Yingfang Fu (Beijing, CN); Peng Xiao (Beijing, CN)
Assignee: Alibaba Group Holding Limited
H04L9/321H04L9/30H04L9/3268H04L9/3271H04L63/0442H04W12/069
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,999,072
App. No.
16/207,011
Granted
May 4, 2021
Kind
B2
Abstract

The method includes receiving a challenge request sent by a first service trusted server and obtaining to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server in the challenge request; sending a verification request to a trusted remote proving server, wherein the verification request includes the to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server; and obtaining a verification response returned by the trusted remote proving server.

Claims (102)

1. A method, performed by a second service trusted server, the method comprising:

sending a platform metric policy request to a trusted policy management server, the platform metric policy request including:

a certificate and a serial number of the second service trusted server, and

respective component of the second service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through a public key of the trusted policy management server;

receiving a platform metric policy response returned by the trusted policy management server, the platform metric policy response including:

a sequence number of the second service trusted server,

a certificate of the trusted policy management server, and

a ciphertext encrypted through a public key of the second service trusted server;

verifying that the certificate of the trusted policy management server in the platform metric policy response is legitimate;

decrypting the ciphertext through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain the respective component of the second service trusted server, the metric policy identifier corresponding to the respective component, and a component metric algorithm;

deploying the metric policy identifier and the component metric algorithm in the respective component;

receiving a challenge request sent by a first service trusted server, the challenge request comprising:

a certificate of the first service trusted server, and

a serial number and a first random number of the first service trusted server encrypted through a public key of the second service trusted server;

obtaining to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server in the challenge request;

sending a verification request to a trusted remote proving server, the verification request including the to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server; and

obtaining a verification response returned by the trusted remote proving server in response to the verification request.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the challenge request further comprises: respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through a public key of the trusted remote proving server.

3. The method according to claim 2 , wherein sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server comprises:

in the case where the to-be-verified information further includes respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, according to a certificate of the second service trusted the server, a sequence number of the second service trusted server, a second random number, the sequence number of the first service trusted server, and respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, generating the verification request; and

sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server.

4. The method according to claim 3 , wherein sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server comprises:

in the case where the to-be-verified information further includes respective component of the second service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, according to a certificate of the second service trusted the server, the sequence number of the second service trusted server, the second random number, the sequence number of the first service trusted server, respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, and respective component of the second service trusted server and the corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, generating the verification request; and

sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server.

5. The method according to claim 1 , wherein obtaining the to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server in the challenge request comprises:

determining whether the certificate of the first service trusted server is legitimate;

upon determining that the certificate is legitimate, decrypting a ciphertext in the challenge request through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain the to-be-verified information, the to-be-verified information including the serial number and the first random number of the first service trusted server; and

upon determining that the certificate is not legitimate, terminating operation.

6. The method according to claim 1 , wherein obtaining the verification response returned by the trusted remote proving server comprises:

in the case where a ciphertext in the verification response is the public key of the second service trusted server, determining whether a certificate of the trusted remote proving server in the verification response is legitimate;

upon determining that the certificate is legitimate, decrypting the ciphertext through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain an identity of the first service trusted server and legitimacy of a platform in which the first service trusted server is located; and

upon determining that the certificate is not legitimate, terminating operation.

7. One or more computer-readable media, stored thereon instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform acts including:

sending a platform metric policy request to a trusted policy management server, the platform metric policy request including:

a certificate and a serial number of the second service trusted server, and

respective component of the second service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through a public key of the trusted policy management server;

receiving a platform metric policy response returned by the trusted policy management server, the platform metric policy response including:

a sequence number of the second service trusted server,

a certificate of the trusted policy management server, and

a ciphertext encrypted through a public key of the second service trusted server;

verifying that the certificate of the trusted policy management server in the platform metric policy response is legitimate;

decrypting the ciphertext through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain the respective component of the second service trusted server, the metric policy identifier corresponding to the respective component, and a component metric algorithm;

deploying the metric policy identifier and the component metric algorithm in the respective component;

receiving a challenge request sent by a first service trusted server, the challenge request comprising:

a certificate of the first service trusted server, and

a serial number and a first random number of the first service trusted server encrypted through a public key of a second service trusted server;

obtaining to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server in the challenge request;

sending a verification request to a trusted remote proving server, the verification request including the to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server; and

obtaining a verification response returned by the trusted remote proving server in response to the verification request.

8. The one or more computer-readable media according to claim 7 , wherein the challenge request further comprises: respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through a public key of the trusted remote proving server.

9. The one or more computer-readable media according to claim 8 , wherein sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server comprises:

in the case where the to-be-verified information further includes respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, according to a certificate of the second service trusted the server, a sequence number of the second service trusted server, a second random number, the sequence number of the first service trusted server, and respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, generating the verification request; and

sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server.

10. The one or more computer-readable media according to claim 9 , wherein sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server comprises:

in the case where the to-be-verified information further includes respective component of the second service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, according to a certificate of the second service trusted the server, the sequence number of the second service trusted server, the second random number, the sequence number of the first service trusted server, respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, and respective component of the second service trusted server and the corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, generating the verification request; and

sending the verification request to the trusted remote proving server.

11. The one or more computer-readable media according to claim 7 , wherein obtaining the to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server in the challenge request comprises:

determining whether the certificate of the first service trusted server is legitimate;

upon determining that the certificate is legitimate, decrypting a ciphertext in the challenge request through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain the to-be-verified information, the to-be-verified information including the serial number and the first random number of the first service trusted server; and

upon determining that the certificate is not legitimate, terminating operation.

12. The one or more computer-readable media according to claim 7 , wherein obtaining the verification response returned by the trusted remote proving server comprises:

in the case where a ciphertext in the verification response is the public key of the second service trusted server, determining whether a certificate of the trusted remote proving server in the verification response is legitimate;

upon determining that the certificate is legitimate, decrypting the ciphertext through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain an identity of the first service trusted server and legitimacy of a platform in which the first service trusted server is located; and

upon determining that the certificate is not legitimate, terminating operation.

13. An apparatus, comprising:

one or more processors; and

memory communicatively coupled to the one or more processors, the memory storing computer-executable modules executable by the one or more processors, the computer-executable modules including:

a receiving module configured to:

receive a challenge request sent by a first service trusted server, the challenge request comprising:

a certificate of the first service trusted server, and

a serial number and a first random number of the first service trusted server encrypted through a public key of the second service trusted server, and

obtain to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server in the challenge request;

a sending module configured to send a verification request to a trusted remote proving server, the verification request including the to-be-verified information of the first service trusted server; and

an obtaining module configured to obtain a verification response returned by the trusted remote proving server in response to the verification request,

wherein, prior to the receiving module receiving the challenge request sent by the first service trusted server:

the sending module is further configured to send a platform metric policy request to a trusted policy management server, the platform metric policy request including:

a certificate and a serial number of a second service trusted server, and

respective component of the second service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through a public key of the trusted policy management server;

the receiving module is further configured to:

receive a platform metric policy response returned by the trusted policy management server, the platform metric policy response including:

a sequence number of the second service trusted server,

a certificate of the trusted policy management server, and

a ciphertext encrypted through a public key of the second service trusted server;

verify that the certificate of the trusted policy management server in the platform metric policy response is legitimate; and

decrypt the ciphertext through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain the respective component of the second service trusted server, the metric policy identifier corresponding to the respective component, and a component metric algorithm; and

the sending module is further configured to deploy the metric policy identifier and the component metric algorithm in the respective component.

14. The apparatus according to claim 13 , wherein the challenge request further comprises:

respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through a public key of the trusted remote proving server.

15. The apparatus according to claim 14 , wherein the sending module is further configured to:

generate the verification request, according to a certificate of the second service trusted the server, a sequence number of the second service trusted server, a second random number, the sequence number of the first service trusted server, and respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving serve, in the case where the to-be-verified information further includes respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server; and

send the verification request to the trusted remote proving server.

16. The apparatus according to claim 15 , wherein the sending module is further configured to:

generate the verification request, according to a certificate of the second service trusted the server, the sequence number of the second service trusted server, the second random number, the sequence number of the first service trusted server, respective component of the first service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, and respective component of the second service trusted server and the corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server, in the case where the to-be-verified information further includes respective component of the second service trusted server and corresponding metric policy identifier encrypted through the public key of the trusted remote proving server; and

send the verification request to the trusted remote proving server.

17. The apparatus according to claim 13 , wherein the receiving module is further configured to:

determine whether the certificate of the first service trusted server is legitimate;

upon determining that the certificate is legitimate, decrypt a ciphertext in the challenge request through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain the to-be-verified information, the to-be-verified information including the serial number and the first random number of the first service trusted server; and

upon determining that the certificate is not legitimate, terminate operation.

18. The apparatus according to claim 13 , wherein the obtaining module is further configured to:

determine whether a certificate of the trusted remote proving server in the verification response is legitimate, in the case where a ciphertext in the verification response is a public key of a second service trusted server;

decrypt the ciphertext through a private key of the second service trusted server to obtain an identity of the first service trusted server and legitimacy of a platform in which the first service trusted server is located, upon determining that the certificate is legitimate; and

terminate operation, upon determining that the certificate is not legitimate.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 29, 2026
From: ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED
To: CLOUD INTELLIGENCE ASSETS HOLDING (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED
Reel/Frame 075499/0384 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 26, 2019
From: FU, YINGFANG; XIAO, PENG
To: ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED
Reel/Frame 051369/0194 →
Priority Claims (1)
CN 201711015965.8 · Oct 25, 2017 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20190123903A1 · Apr 25, 2019