Method for verifying forgery and falsification of executable file in image forming apparatus and image forming apparatus using same

1. An image forming apparatus comprising:

a memory to store an operating system (OS) kernel image and to store a computer-executable instruction;

at least one processor to read the OS kernel image from the memory and to generate a hash value for the OS kernel image; and

a trusted platform module (TPM) to store the hash value for the OS kernel image, to generate an encryption key by using the hash value for the OS kernel image, and to store the encryption key,

wherein the at least one processor is further to execute the computer-executable instruction to:

verify forgery or falsification of an execution file based on the encryption key;

during a booting time of the image forming apparatus, receive and store the encryption key from the TPM and set a hash value for the execution file by using the received encryption key;

when the execution file is requested to be executed, determine whether the hash value set during the booting time is changed, by newly obtaining a hash value for the execution file by using the stored encryption key; and

according to an integrity measurement architecture (IMA) function provided by a Linux kernel, during the booting time of the image forming apparatus, generate the hash value for the execution file by using the received encryption key and store the generated hash value in a header of the execution file.

2. The image forming apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor further executes the computer-executable instruction to, according to the IMA function provided by the Linux kernel, determine whether the hash value stored in the header of the execution file during the booting time is identical to that obtained when the execution file is requested to be executed.

3. The image forming apparatus of claim 2 , wherein the at least one processor further executes the computer-executable instruction to, when it is determined that the hash value stored in the header of the execution file is not identical to that obtained when the execution file is requested to be executed, stop execution of the execution file and notify that the execution file is forged or falsified.

4. The image forming apparatus of claim 1 , wherein, during a booting time of the image forming apparatus, the TPM generates the encryption key by using the hash value for the OS kernel image and a random value generated by the TPM and stores the generated encryption key in a predetermined area of the TPM.

5. The image forming apparatus of claim 4 , wherein the TPM generates the encryption key by further using at least one of an electronic signature value generated by the TPM or unique device information.

6. The image forming apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor further executes the computer-executable instruction to, upon a request by an external apparatus, obtain an encryption key to be transmitted from the TPM to the external apparatus, and

the image forming apparatus further comprises a communicator to transmit the obtained encryption key to the external apparatus so that the external apparatus may verify forgery or falsification of the execution file according to an IMA function provided by a Linux kernel of the external apparatus.

7. A method of an image forming apparatus for verifying forgery or falsification of an execution file, the method comprising:

storing an operating system (OS) kernel image in a memory of the image forming apparatus;

reading the OS kernel image from the memory;

generating a hash value for the OS kernel image;

storing the hash value by a trusted platform module (TPM);

generating an encryption key by using the hash value for the OS kernel image, the generating being performed by the TPM;

storing the generated encryption key; and

verifying forgery or falsification of an execution file based on the generated encryption key,

wherein the verifying of the forgery or falsification comprises:

during a booting time of the image forming apparatus, receiving and storing the encryption key from the TPM and setting a hash value for the execution file by using the received encryption key; and

when the execution file is requested to be executed, determining whether the hash value set during the booting time is changed by newly obtaining a hash value for the execution file by using the stored encryption key, and

wherein the setting of the hash value for the execution file comprises:

according to an integrity measurement architecture (IMA) function provided by a Linux kernel, during the booting time of the image forming apparatus, generating the hash value for the execution file by using the received encryption key; and

storing the generated hash value in a header of the execution file.

8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the determining of whether the hash value set during the booting time is changed comprises, according to the IMA function provided by the Linux kernel, determining whether the hash value stored in the header of the execution file during the booting time is identical to that obtained when the execution file is requested to be executed.

9. The method of claim 7 , wherein the generating of the encryption key comprises:

during a booting time of the image forming apparatus, generating the encryption key by using the hash value for the OS kernel image and a random value generated by the TPM; and

storing the generated encryption key in a predetermined area of the TPM.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the generating of the encryption key comprises generating the encryption key by further using at least one of an electronic signature value generated by the TPM or unique device information.

11. A non-transitory computer-readable recording medium having instructions recorded thereon for performing a method of verifying forgery or falsification of an execution file, the non-transitory computer-readable recording medium comprising:

instructions to store an operating system (OS) kernel image in a memory;

instructions to read the OS kernel image from the memory;

instructions to generate a hash value for the OS kernel image;

instructions to store the hash value by a trusted platform module (TPM);

instructions to generate an encryption key by using the hash value for the OS kernel image, the generating being performed by the TPM;

instructions to store the generated encryption key; and

instructions to verify forgery or falsification of an execution file based on the generated encryption key,

wherein the instructions to verify the forgery or falsification comprise:

instructions to, during a booting time of the image forming apparatus, receive and store the encryption key from the TPM and set a hash value for the execution file by using the received encryption key; and

instructions to, when the execution file is requested to be executed, determine whether the hash value set during the booting time is changed by newly obtaining a hash value for the execution file by using the stored encryption key, and

wherein the instructions to set the hash value for the execution file comprise:

instructions to, according to an integrity measurement architecture (IMA) function provided by a Linux kernel, during the booting time of the image forming apparatus, generate the hash value for the execution file by using the received encryption key; and

instructions to store the generated hash value in a header of the execution file.