IP Library Granted Patent US 11,305,665
Granted Patent B2
US 11,305,665 · App. 16/291,342 · Granted Apr 19, 2022

Cyber-attack detection and electrical system stability for electric vehicle charging infrastructure

Inventors: Hanchao Liu (Troy, NY); Honggang Monten Wang (Clifton Park, NY); Philip Hart (Rexford, NY); Yichao Zhang (Guilderland, NY)
Assignee: General Electric Company
B60L53/62B60L53/11H04L63/14H04L63/1441B60L2270/20G06F17/141
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,305,665
App. No.
16/291,342
Granted
Apr 19, 2022
Kind
B2
Abstract

Some embodiments provide a system to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure. An electric vehicle charging site may receive Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles. A sensor spoof observer and controller may receive information from at least two AC current sensors, wherein the observer calculates a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model. A system stability assurance platform may: (i) monitor current and voltage to detect resonance, (ii) identify impedance associated with a detected resonance, and (iii) apply a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm. A user interface platform may then provide information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

Claims (38)

1. A system to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure, comprising:

an electric vehicle charging site to receive Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles, including:

a sensor spoof observer and controller to receive information from at least two AC current sensors, wherein the observer calculates a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model;

a system stability assurance platform to: (i) monitor current and voltage to detect resonance, (ii) identify impedance associated with a detected resonance, and (iii) apply a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm; and

a user interface platform to provide information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the sensor spoof observer and controller and the system stability assurance platform are implemented in a hierarchical manner such that the sensor spoof observer and controller is deployed in an individual converter control layer and the system stability assurance platform is deployed in a charging station layer and a substation layer.

3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the sensor spoof observer and controller utilizes information from a second AC current sensor when it is determined that a first AC current sensor is being cyber-attacked.

4. The system of claim 1 , wherein the AC filter dynamic model is continuously corrected using a difference between a measured output and an observed output to minimize state-variable divergence.

5. The system of claim 1 , wherein the grid voltage disturbance is associated with AC unbalance.

6. The system of claim 1 , wherein the system stability assurance platform detects resonance associated with at least one of: (i) altered control parameters, and (ii) cycling setpoints.

7. The system of claim 1 , wherein the system stability assurance platform includes an AC system-level stability assurance algorithm and a DC system-level stability assurance algorithm.

8. The system of claim 1 , wherein the resonance is detected via at least one of: (i) a sliding Discrete Fourier Transform (“DFT”), and (ii) a wavelet analysis.

9. The system of claim 1 , wherein the impedance associated with the detected resonance is identified using analytical model predictions and a small-signal injection to improve signal-to-noise ratio.

10. The system of claim 1 , wherein the graphical user interface display includes at least one of: (i) static information regarding the charging site, (ii) a physical location of the charging site, (iii) a topology of the charging site, (iv) a number of charging ports, (v) indications of occupied charging ports, (vi) details regarding a nature of a cyber-attack, (vii) an indication regarding resonance, (viii) a frequency or magnitude of resonance, and (ix) a cyber-attack remediation recommendation.

11. The system of claim 1 , wherein the electric vehicle charging site is associated with extreme fast charging.

12. A computerized method to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure that receives Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles, comprising:

receiving, at a sensor spoof observer and controller, information from at least two AC current sensors;

calculating, by the sensor spoof observer and controller, a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model;

monitoring, by a system stability assurance platform, current and voltage to detect resonance;

identifying, by the system stability assurance platform, impedance associated with a detected resonance;

applying, by the system stability assurance platform, a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm; and

providing, by a user interface platform, information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein the sensor spoof observer and controller utilizes information from a second AC current sensor when it is determined that a first AC current sensor is being cyber-attacked.

14. The method of claim 12 , wherein the AC filter dynamic model is continuously corrected using a difference between a measured output and an observed output to minimize state-variable divergence.

15. The method of claim 12 , wherein the grid voltage disturbance is associated with AC unbalance.

16. The method of claim 12 , wherein the system stability assurance platform detects resonance associated with at least one of: (i) altered control parameters, and (ii) cycling setpoints.

17. The method of claim 12 , wherein the system stability assurance platform includes an AC system-level stability assurance algorithm and a DC system-level stability assurance algorithm.

18. A non-transitory, computer-readable medium storing program code, the program code executable by a computer processor to cause the processor to perform a method to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure that receives Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles, the method comprising:

receiving, at a sensor spoof observer and controller, information from at least two AC current sensors;

calculating, by the sensor spoof observer and controller, a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model;

monitoring, by a system stability assurance platform, current and voltage to detect resonance;

identifying, by the system stability assurance platform, impedance associated with a detected resonance;

applying, by the system stability assurance platform, a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm; and

providing, by a user interface platform, information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

19. The medium of claim 18 , wherein the resonance is detected via at least one of: (i) a sliding Discrete Fourier Transform (“DFT”), and (ii) a wavelet analysis.

20. The medium of claim 18 , wherein the impedance associated with the detected resonance is identified using analytical model predictions and a small-signal injection to improve signal-to-noise ratio.

21. The medium of claim 18 , wherein the graphical user interface display includes at least one of: (i) static information regarding the charging site, (ii) a physical location of the charging site, (iii) a topology of the charging site, (iv) a number of charging ports, (v) indications of occupied charging ports, (vi) details regarding a nature of a cyber-attack, (vii) an indication regarding resonance, (viii) a frequency or magnitude of resonance, and (ix) a cyber-attack remediation recommendation.

22. The medium of claim 18 , wherein the electric vehicle charging site is associated with extreme fast charging.

Assignments (2)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Jan 30, 2026
From: GE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING, LLC
To: DOLBY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING, LLC
Reel/Frame 074536/0682 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 4, 2019
From: LIU, HANCHAO; WANG, HONGGANG; HART, PHILIP; ZHANG, YICHAO
To: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Reel/Frame 048492/0799 →