IP Library Granted Patent US 11,128,473
Granted Patent B1
US 11,128,473 · App. 16/359,723 · Granted Sep 21, 2021

Systems and methods for assuring authenticity of electronic sensor data

Inventors: Daniel Kats (Culver City, CA); Christopher Gates (Culver City, CA); Acar Tamersoy (Culver City, CA); Daniel Marino (Los Angeles, CA)
Assignee: NortonLifeLock Inc.
H04L9/3247G06F21/602G06F21/72
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,128,473
App. No.
16/359,723
Granted
Sep 21, 2021
Kind
B1
Abstract

The disclosed method for assuring authenticity of electronic sensor data may include (i) capturing, using a sensor within a device, electronic sensor data, and (ii) digitally signing, using a cryptoprocessor embedded within the device, the electronic sensor data to create a digital signature that verifies that the signed electronic sensor data has not been modified since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Claims (43)

1. A method for assuring authenticity of electronic sensor data, at least a portion of the method being performed by a computing device comprising at least one processor, the method comprising:

capturing, using a sensor within a device, electronic sensor data; and

digitally signing, using a cryptoprocessor embedded within the device, the electronic sensor data to create a digital signature that verifies that the signed electronic sensor data has not been deceptively modified since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor;

wherein:

the computing device prevents deceptive modification of the electronic sensor data rather than simply preventing any modification of the electronic sensor data;

the computing device permits a substantially non-deceptive media modification operation that enhances the electronic sensor data in a non-deceptive manner prior to the digitally signing; and

a timeframe for performing the digitally signing within a data pipeline spans from a point in time when a component for performing the substantially non-deceptive media modification operation becomes available until a point in time when a component for performing a deceptive media modification operation becomes available.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the cryptoprocessor comprises a Trusted Platform Module.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the cryptoprocessor is positioned adjacent the sensor; and

the cryptoprocessor digitally signs the electronic sensor data from the sensor prior to the electronic sensor data being exposed to the component of the device that is capable of deceptively modifying the electronic sensor data.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the digital signature verifies that a component of the device has not deceptively modified the electronic sensor data since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the digital signature verifies that a user of the device has not used the device to deceptively modify the signed electronic sensor data since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the device includes an enclave embedded adjacent to the sensor.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein a trusted channel connects the enclave to the cryptoprocessor.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the data pipeline of the device ensures that the digital signature is created subsequent to the sensor capturing the electronic sensor data and prior to deceptive modification of the electronic sensor data.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the digital signature further includes a digital signature of metadata describing the electronic sensor data.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the digital signature verifies that the signed electronic sensor data has not been deceptively modified since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor as distinct from verifying that the signed electronic sensor data has not been deceptively modified since the electronic sensor data was extracted from the device.

11. A system for assuring authenticity of electronic sensor data, the system comprising:

a capturing module, stored in memory, that captures, using a sensor within a device, electronic sensor data;

a signature module, stored in memory, that digitally signs, using a cryptoprocessor embedded within the device, the electronic sensor data to create a digital signature that verifies that the signed electronic sensor data has not been deceptively modified since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor; and

at least one physical processor configured to execute the capturing module and the signature module;

wherein:

the system prevents deceptive modification of the electronic sensor data rather than simply preventing any modification of the electronic sensor data;

the system permits a substantially non-deceptive media modification operation that enhances the electronic sensor data in a non-deceptive manner prior to the digitally signing; and

a timeframe for performing the digitally signing within a data pipeline spans from a point in time when a component for performing the substantially non-deceptive media modification operation becomes available until a point in time when a component for performing a deceptive media modification operation becomes available.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the digital signature verifies that the signed electronic sensor data has not been deceptively modified since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor.

13. The system of claim 11 , wherein:

the cryptoprocessor is positioned adjacent the sensor; and

the cryptoprocessor digitally signs the electronic sensor data from the sensor prior to the electronic sensor data being exposed to a component of the device that is capable of deceptively modifying the electronic sensor data.

14. The system of claim 11 , wherein the digital signature verifies that a component of the device has not deceptively modified the electronic sensor data since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor.

15. The system of claim 14 , wherein the digital signature verifies that a user of the device has not used the device to deceptively modify the signed electronic sensor data since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor.

16. The system of claim 11 , wherein the device includes an enclave embedded adjacent to the sensor.

17. The system of claim 16 , wherein a trusted channel connects the enclave to the cryptoprocessor.

18. The system of claim 11 , wherein the data pipeline of the device ensures that the digital signature is created subsequent to the sensor capturing the electronic sensor data and prior to deceptive modification of the electronic sensor data.

19. The system of claim 11 , wherein the digital signature further includes a digital signature of metadata describing the electronic sensor data.

20. A device that is configured to:

capture, using a sensor within the device, electronic sensor data; and

digitally sign, using a cryptoprocessor embedded within the device, the electronic sensor data to create a digital signature that verifies that the signed electronic sensor data has not been deceptively modified since the electronic sensor data was captured by the sensor;

wherein:

the device prevents deceptive modification of the electronic sensor data rather than simply preventing any modification of the electronic sensor data;

the device permits a substantially non-deceptive media modification operation that enhances the electronic sensor data in a non-deceptive manner prior to the digitally signing; and

a timeframe for performing the digitally signing within a data pipeline spans from a point in time when a component for performing the substantially non-deceptive media modification operation becomes available until a point in time when a component for performing a deceptive media modification operation becomes available.

Assignments (6)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 6, 2023
From: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
To: GEN DIGITAL INC.
Reel/Frame 062714/0605 →
NOTICE OF SUCCESSION OF AGENCY (REEL 050926 / FRAME 0560) Recorded Sep 13, 2022
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 061422/0371 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Sep 13, 2022
From: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 062220/0001 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 14, 2020
From: SYMANTEC CORPORATION
To: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
Reel/Frame 051935/0228 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 4, 2019
From: SYMANTEC CORPORATION; BLUE COAT LLC; LIFELOCK, INC,; SYMANTEC OPERATING CORPORATION
To: JPMORGAN, N.A.
Reel/Frame 050926/0560 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 20, 2019
From: KATS, DANIEL; GATES, CHRISTOPHER; TAMERSOY, ACAR; MARINO, DANIEL
To: SYMANTEC CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 048653/0070 →