IP Library Granted Patent US 11,386,198
Granted Patent B1
US 11,386,198 · App. 16/446,836 · Granted Jul 12, 2022

Systems and methods for detecting malicious in application transactions

Inventor: Josh Opos (Studio City, CA)
Assignee: NortonLifeLock Inc.
G06F21/52G06F21/554G06Q20/407G06Q20/4016G06F2221/034
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,386,198
App. No.
16/446,836
Granted
Jul 12, 2022
Kind
B1
Abstract

The disclosed computer-implemented method for detecting malicious in-application transactions may include identifying an application running on a computing device, wherein the application is granted access to a payment system, monitoring data between the application and the payment system, determining at least one characteristic associated with the application, determining the at least one characteristic is associated with a malicious transaction on the payment system, and performing at least one action to prevent the malicious transaction. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Claims (37)

1. A computer-implemented method for detecting malicious in-application transactions, at least a portion of the method being performed by a computing device comprising at least one processor, the method comprising:

identifying an application running on the computing device, wherein the application is granted access to a payment system for performing in-application transactions;

monitoring data between the application and the payment system;

identifying at least one characteristic of the application that is associated with confirming an in-application transaction;

determining, based on the at least one characteristic, that the application is attempting to trick a user of the computing device into confirming a malicious in-application transaction on the payment system by dimming a screen of the computer device; and

performing at least one action to prevent the malicious in-application transaction.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein monitoring the data between the application and the payment system comprises monitoring data packets transmitted from the computing device over a virtual private network.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one action comprises blocking the malicious in-application transaction.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 3 , wherein blocking the malicious in-application transaction comprises deleting data packets transmitted between the application and the payment system.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one action comprises delaying, on the computing device, the malicious in-application transaction for a predetermined time period.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one action comprises executing a two factor authentication procedure.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one action comprises sending an authorization message about the malicious in-application transaction to an authority figure of the user of the computing device.

8. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , further comprising placing the application on a blacklist based on determining that the application has executed a malicious transaction.

9. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one characteristic of the application that is associated with confirming the in-application transaction comprises a signature associated with the application.

10. A system for detecting malicious in-application transactions, the system comprising:

at least one physical processor; and

physical memory comprising computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the physical processor, cause the physical processor to:

identify an application running on a computing device, wherein the application is granted access to a payment system for performing in-application transactions;

monitor data between the application and the payment system;

identify at least one characteristic of the application that is associated with confirming an in-application transaction;

determine, based on the at least one characteristic, that the application is attempting to trick a user of the computing device into confirming a malicious in-application transaction on the payment system by dimming a screen of the computing device; and

performing at least one action to prevent the malicious in-application transaction.

11. The system of claim 10 , wherein monitoring the data between the application and the payment system comprises monitoring data packets transmitted from the computing device over a virtual private network.

12. The system of claim 10 , wherein the at least one action comprises blocking the malicious in-application transaction.

13. The system of claim 12 , wherein blocking the malicious in-application transaction comprises deleting data packets transmitted between the application and the payment system.

14. The system of claim 10 , wherein the at least one action comprises delaying, on the computing device, the malicious in-application transaction for a predetermined time period.

15. The system of claim 10 , wherein the at least one action comprises executing a two factor authentication procedure.

16. The system of claim 10 , wherein the at least one action comprises sending an authorization message about the malicious in-application transaction to an authority figure of the user of the computing device.

17. The system of claim 10 , further comprising placing the application on a blacklist based on determining that the application has executed a malicious transaction.

18. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising one or more computer-executable instructions that, when executed by at least one processor of a computing device, cause the computing device to:

identify an application running on the computing device, wherein the application is granted access to a payment system for performing in-application transactions;

monitor data between the application and the payment system;

identify at least one characteristic of the application that is associated with confirming an in-application transaction;

determine, based on the at least one characteristic that the application is attempting to trick a user of the computing device into confirming with a malicious in-application transaction on the payment system by dimming a screen of the computing device; and

performing at least one action to prevent the malicious in-application transaction.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18 , wherein monitoring the data between the application and the payment system comprises monitoring data packets transmitted from the computing device over a virtual private network.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18 , wherein the at least one action comprises blocking the malicious in-application transaction.

Assignments (6)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 6, 2023
From: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
To: GEN DIGITAL INC.
Reel/Frame 062714/0605 →
NOTICE OF SUCCESSION OF AGENCY (REEL 050926 / FRAME 0560) Recorded Sep 13, 2022
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 061422/0371 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Sep 13, 2022
From: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 062220/0001 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 14, 2020
From: SYMANTEC CORPORATION
To: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
Reel/Frame 051935/0228 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 4, 2019
From: SYMANTEC CORPORATION; BLUE COAT LLC; LIFELOCK, INC,; SYMANTEC OPERATING CORPORATION
To: JPMORGAN, N.A.
Reel/Frame 050926/0560 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 20, 2019
From: OPOS, JOSH
To: SYMANTEC CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 049534/0951 →