IP Library Granted Patent US 11,104,300
Granted Patent B2
US 11,104,300 · App. 16/458,926 · Granted Aug 31, 2021

Radio frequency tag relay attack prevention and notification

Inventors: Yongbum Kim (Los Altos Hills, CA); Qiyan Wang (Mountain View, CA); Jerry L. Petree (San Jose, CA); Samir Agrawal (Milpitas, CA); Sandeep Dhull (Santa Clara, CA); Luna Chen (San Jose, CA); Jamie P. Carlson (San Jose, CA)
Assignee: NIO USA, Inc.
B60R25/24B60R25/01B60R25/209B60R2325/108B60R2325/205
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,104,300
App. No.
16/458,926
Granted
Aug 31, 2021
Kind
B2
Abstract

Remote devices have replaced keys as a means to access a secure feature of a vehicle. Remote door locks, starters, climate control, trunk openers, etc., have allowed vehicles to be more welcoming and easier to use. However, such functions often rely on radio frequency transmissions that can merely relay signals coming from an authorized device that may allow a nefarious user to access the vehicle or contents therein. By encoding sequence numbers and timestamps within an exchange, a vehicle may determine that an authorized user is too far away to be granted access to the secure feature, thereby denying access to the nefarious user implementing a relay attack on the vehicle.

Claims (60)

1. A vehicle, comprising:

a radio frequency component to receive and transmit messages;

a processor in communication with the radio frequency component; and

a memory;

a secure feature selectively enabled by the processor; and

wherein the processor, via the radio frequency component, conducts an interaction with a remote device;

wherein the processor, upon determining that the interaction is authentic, enables the secure feature, wherein the interaction is determined to be authentic upon determining that a distance between the radio frequency component and the remote device is within a previously determined distance maintained in the memory, and wherein the distance between the radio frequency component and the remote device is calculated as half of a difference between a round trip time and a residence time, the difference then being multiplied by a speed of radio waves through air; and

wherein the interaction comprises:

a first message;

a second message;

a third message, sent by the radio frequency component in response to receiving a device service request (DSR) and having a third message timestamp indicating a time that the third message was sent;

a fourth message, received by the radio frequency component, the fourth message comprising a sequence number and having an associated fourth message timestamp indicating a time that the fourth message was received; and

a fifth message, received by the radio frequency component, comprising the sequence number and having an associated fifth message timestamp indicating a time that the fifth message was received.

2. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the secure feature is disabled by the processor by default.

3. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein in response to the determination that the interaction is authentic, the processor enables the secure feature.

4. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the round trip time comprises a time one message of the interaction is sent from the vehicle to a time an associated response is received by the vehicle.

5. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the residence time comprises a time one message of the interaction is received by the remote device and transmission of an associated response is initiated.

6. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the first message of the interaction is associated with the second message of the interaction when the second message of the interaction includes the sequence number provided by the first message.

7. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein at least one message of the interaction is cryptographically protected.

8. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the interaction comprises:

the first message, sent by the radio frequency component and comprising the sequence number; and

the second message received by the radio frequency component and comprising the DSR.

9. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the interaction comprises:

the first message, received by the radio frequency component and comprising the sequence number; and

the second message sent by the radio frequency component and comprising the DSR.

10. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the fourth message comprises the residence time, wherein the residence time is the difference from a time the remote device received the third message and a time the remote device transmits the fourth message.

11. The vehicle of claim 10 , wherein the time the remote device received the third message is corrected to correct a delay cause by a processing component utilized to record the time the third message was received to transition from an idle state to an active processing state.

12. A method for authenticating a radio frequency interaction, comprising:

conducting, at a radio frequency component associated with a secure feature, the radio frequency interaction between the radio frequency component and a remote device;

determining whether the radio frequency interaction is authentic,

upon determining that the radio frequency interaction is authentic, enabling the secure feature; and

wherein the radio frequency interaction is determined to be authentic upon determining that a distance between the radio frequency component and the remote device is within a previously determined distance maintained in a data storage, and wherein the distance between the radio frequency component and the remote device is calculated as half of a difference between a round trip time and a residence time, the difference then being multiplied by a speed of radio waves through air; and

wherein the radio frequency interaction comprises:

a first message;

a second message;

a third message, sent by the radio frequency component in response to receiving a device service request (DSR) and having a third message timestamp indicating a time that the third message was sent;

a fourth message, received by the radio frequency component, the fourth message comprising a sequence number and having an associated fourth message timestamp indicating a time that the fourth message was received; and

a fifth message, received by the radio frequency component, comprising the sequence number and having an associated fifth message timestamp indicating a time that the fifth message was received.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein the round trip time comprises a time one message of the radio frequency interaction is sent from the radio frequency component to a time an associated response is received by the radio frequency component.

14. The method of claim 12 , wherein the residence time comprises a time one message of the radio frequency interaction is received by the remote device and transmission of an associated response is initiated.

15. The method of claim 12 , wherein the first message of the radio frequency interaction is associated with the second message of the radio frequency interaction when the second message of the radio frequency interaction includes the sequence number provided by the first message.

16. The method of claim 12 , wherein the round trip time comprises the difference between a received time of the fourth message and a sent time of the second message.

17. The method of claim 12 , wherein the residence time comprises the difference between the time the third message was sent by the radio frequency component and the receiving of the fourth message.

18. A system comprising:

a remote device comprising a radio frequency transmitter-receiver;

a radio frequency component to receive and transmit messages and to communicate with the remote device;

a processor in communication with the radio frequency component; and

a memory; and

a secure feature selectively enabled by the processor; and

wherein the processor, via the radio frequency component, is operable to conduct an interaction with the remote device;

wherein the processor, upon determining that the interaction is authentic, enables the secure feature, wherein the interaction is determined to be authentic upon determining that a distance between the radio frequency component and the remote device is within a previously determined distance maintained in the memory, and wherein the distance between the radio frequency component and the remote device is calculated as half of a difference between a round trip time and a residence time, the difference then being multiplied by a speed of radio waves through air;

wherein the interaction comprises a first message, sent by the radio frequency component and comprising a sequence number,

wherein the interaction comprises a second message, sent by the remote device and comprising a device service request (DSR);

wherein the interaction comprises a third message, sent by the radio frequency component in response to receiving the DSR and having a third message timestamp indicating a time that the third message was sent;

wherein the interaction comprises a fourth message, sent by the remote device, the fourth message comprising the sequence number and having an associated fourth message timestamp indicating a time that the fourth message was received;

wherein the interaction comprises a fifth message, sent by the remote device, comprising the sequence number and having an associated fifth message timestamp indicating a time the fifth message was received;

wherein the round trip time comprises the difference between a received time of the fourth message and the time that the third message was sent; and

wherein the residence time comprises the difference between the time that the third message was sent by the radio frequency component and the receiving of the fourth message.

19. The method of claim 12 , wherein at least one message of the radio frequency interaction is cryptographically protected.

20. The system of claim 18 , wherein at least one message of the interaction is cryptographically protected.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 24, 2022
From: NIO USA, INC.
To: NIO TECHNOLOGY (ANHUI) CO., LTD.
Reel/Frame 060171/0724 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 19, 2020
From: KIM, YONGBUM; WANG, QIYAN; PETREE, JERRY L.; AGRAWAL, SAMIR; DHULL, SANDEEP; CHEN, LUNA; CARLSON, JAMIE P.
To: NIO USA, INC.
Reel/Frame 054093/0925 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20210001806A1 · Jan 7, 2021
Cited By (1)
US 12,631,745