Honeytoken tracker
Disclosed herein are methods, systems, and processes for tracking honeytokens. A malicious attack from an attacker is received at a honeypot and a determination is made that an attack event associated with the malicious attack has compromised deceptive credential information maintained by the honeypot. A unique credential pair that corresponds to the deceptive credential information sought by the attack event is generated and a honeytoken tracker state table is modified to include the unique credential pair and attack event metadata in association with the attack event. The unique credential pair is then transmitted to the attacker and the honeytoken tracker state table is synchronized with a honeypot management system. Another malicious attack is detected, the honeytoken tracker state table is accessed, and the malicious attacker is correlated to the attacker. A honeypot personality state table maintained by the honeypot management system is accessed and a present personality for the honeypot that is substantially similar to a past personality of the honeypot that existed during the malicious attack based on information in the honeypot personality state table is generated.
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
receiving a malicious attack from an attacker at a honeypot;
determining that an attack event associated with the malicious attack has compromised deceptive credential information maintained by the honeypot;
generating a unique credential pair that corresponds to the deceptive credential information sought by the attack event;
modifying a honeytoken tracker state table to comprise the unique credential pair and attack event metadata in association with the attack event;
transmitting the unique credential pair to the attacker;
synchronizing the honeytoken tracker state table with a honeypot management system;
detecting another malicious attack from the attacker;
accessing the honeytoken tracker state table;
correlating the another malicious attack to the attacker using a hash uniquely generated for the attacker in the honeytoken tracker state table or a dynamically generated username;
accessing a honeypot personality state table maintained by the honeypot management system; and
generating a present personality for the honeypot that comprises one or more mimicked services, banner information, an operating system, and protocol information of a past personality of the honeypot that existed during the malicious attack based on information in the honeypot personality state table.
2. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium comprising program instructions executable to:
receive a malicious attack from an attacker at a honeypot;
determine that an attack event associated with the malicious attack has compromised deceptive credential information maintained by the honeypot;
generate a unique credential pair that corresponds to the deceptive credential information sought by the attack event;
modify a honeytoken tracker state table to comprise the unique credential pair and attack event metadata in association with the attack event;
transmit the unique credential pair to the attacker;
synchronize the honeytoken tracker state table with a honeypot management system;
detect another malicious attack from the attacker;
access the honeytoken tracker state table;
correlate the another malicious attack to the attacker using a hash uniquely generated for the attacker in the honeytoken tracker state table or a dynamically generated username;
access a honeypot personality state table maintained by the honeypot management system; and
generate a present personality for the honeypot that comprises one or more mimicked services, banner information, an operating system, and protocol information of a past personality of the honeypot that existed during the malicious attack based on information in the honeypot personality state table.
3. A system comprising:
one or more processors; and
a memory coupled to the one or more processors, wherein the memory stores program instructions executable by the one or more processors to:
receive a malicious attack from an attacker at a honeypot;
determine that an attack event associated with the malicious attack has compromised deceptive credential information maintained by the honeypot;
generate a unique credential pair that corresponds to the deceptive credential information sought by the attack event;
modify a honeytoken tracker state table to comprise the unique credential pair and attack event metadata in association with the attack event;
transmit the unique credential pair to the attacker;
synchronize the honeytoken tracker state table with a honeypot management system;
detect another malicious attack from the attacker;
access the honeytoken tracker state table;
correlate the another malicious attack to the attacker using a hash uniquely generated for the attacker in the honeytoken tracker state table or a dynamically generated username;
access a honeypot personality state table maintained by the honeypot management system; and
generate a present personality for the honeypot that comprises one or more mimicked services, banner information, an operating system, and protocol information of a past personality of the honeypot that existed during the malicious attack based on information in the honeypot personality state table.