Systems and methods for protecting against password attacks by concealing the use of honeywords in password files

1. A computer-implemented method for protecting against password attacks by concealing the use of honeywords in password files, at least a portion of the method being performed by one or more computing devices comprising at least one processor, the method comprising:

receiving, by the one or more computing devices, a login request comprising a candidate password for a user;

authenticating, by the one or more computing devices, the login request by determining whether a hash of a true password for the user stored in a honeyserver matches a hash of the candidate password, wherein the hash of the true password for the user stored in the honeyserver is generated by computing a triple, the triple comprising a data structure including a user identification, a salt, and the true password, wherein the salt comprises a randomly generated string that is stored and the true password is associated with the user identification;

determining, by the one or more computing devices, whether the hash of the candidate password matches a hash of a honeyword stored in a password file when the hash of the true password fails to match the hash of the candidate password, wherein the password file stores a set of cryptographic hashes containing the honeyword only for a random subset of a plurality of users in a user group;

classifying, by the one or more computing devices, the password file as being potentially compromised when the hash of the candidate password matches the hash of the honeyword stored in the password file; and

performing, by the one or more computing devices, a security action that protects against a password attack utilizing the potentially compromised password file.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein determining whether the hash of the true password for the user stored in the honeyserver matches the hash of the candidate password comprises determining whether a cryptographic hash including a user identification and a salt for the user and the candidate password matches the triple.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein determining whether the hash of the candidate password matches the hash of the honeyword stored in the password file comprises determining whether a cryptographic hash including a user identification and a salt for the user and the candidate password matches a cryptographic hash including the salt for the user and the honeyword.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein a predetermined number of the cryptographic hashes contains the honeyword.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein performing the security action comprises:

denying the login request; and

generating an alert notifying a user account administrator of the potentially compromised password file.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein performing the security action comprises accepting the candidate password for logging into an isolated phony user account.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the honeyword comprises a false password.

8. A system for protecting against password attacks by concealing the use of honeywords in password files, the system comprising:

at least one physical processor;

physical memory comprising computer-executable instructions and one or more modules that, when executed by the physical processor, cause the physical processor to:

receive, by a receiving module, a login request comprising a candidate password for a user;

authenticate, by an authentication module, the login request by determining whether a hash of a true password for the user stored in a honeyserver matches a hash of the candidate password, wherein the hash of the true password for the user stored in the honeyserver is generated by computing a triple, the triple comprising a data structure including a user identification, a salt, and the true password, wherein the salt comprises a randomly generated string that is stored and the true password is associated with the user identification;

determine, by a determining module, whether the hash of the candidate password matches a hash of a honeyword stored in a password file when the hash of the true password fails to match the hash of the candidate password, wherein the password file stores a set of cryptographic hashes containing the honeyword only for a random subset of a plurality of users in a user group;

classify, by a classification module, the password file as being potentially compromised when the hash of the candidate password matches the hash of the honeyword stored in the password file; and

perform, by a security module, a security action that protects against a password attack utilizing the potentially compromised password file.

9. The system of claim 8 , wherein the authentication module determines whether the hash of the true password for the user stored in the honeyserver matches the hash of the candidate password by determining whether a cryptographic hash including a user identification and a salt for the user and the candidate password matches the triple.

10. The system of claim 8 , wherein the determining module determines whether the hash of the candidate password matches the hash of the honeyword stored in the password file by determining whether a cryptographic hash including a user identification and a salt for the user and the candidate password matches a cryptographic hash including a concatenation of the salt for the user and the honeyword.

11. The system of claim 8 , wherein a predetermined number of the cryptographic hashes contains the honeyword.

12. The system of claim 8 , wherein the security module performs the security action by:

denying the login request; and

generating an alert notifying a user account administrator of the potentially compromised password file.

13. The system of claim 8 , wherein the security module performs the security action by accepting the candidate password for logging into an isolated phony user account.

14. The system of claim 8 , wherein the honeyword comprises a false password.

15. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising one or more computer-executable instructions that, when executed by at least one processor of a computing device, cause the computing device to:

receive a login request comprising a candidate password for a user;

authenticate the login request by determining whether a hash of a true password for the user stored in a honeyserver matches a hash of the candidate password, wherein the hash of the true password for the user stored in the honeyserver is generated by computing a triple, the triple comprising a data structure including a user identification, a salt, and the true password, wherein the salt comprises a randomly generated string that is stored and the true password is associated with the user identification;

determine whether the hash of the candidate password matches a hash of a honeyword stored in a password file when the hash of the true password fails to match the hash of the candidate password, wherein the password file stores a set of cryptographic hashes containing the honeyword only for a random subset of a plurality of users in a user group;

classify the password file as being potentially compromised when the hash of the candidate password matches the hash of the honeyword stored in the password file; and

perform a security action that protects against a password attack utilizing the potentially compromised password file.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the one or more computer-executable instructions cause the computing device to determine whether the hash of the true password for the user stored in the honeyserver matches the hash of the candidate password by determining whether a cryptographic hash including a user identification and a salt for the user and the candidate password matches the triple.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein a predetermined number of the cryptographic hashes contains the honeyword.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the one or more computer-executable instructions cause the computing device to perform the security action by:

denying the login request; and

generating an alert notifying a user account administrator of the potentially compromised password file.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the one or more computer-executable instructions cause the computing device to perform the security action by accepting the candidate password for logging into an isolated phony user account.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the honeyword comprises a false password.