IP Library Granted Patent US 12,608,501
Granted Patent B2
US 12,608,501 · App. 16/760,856 · Granted Apr 21, 2026

Privacy-preserving log analysis

Inventors: Carsten Franke (Stetten, CH); Theo Widmer (Birmenstorf, CH); Thomas Locher (Zürich, CH); Yvonne-Anne Pignolet (Zürich, CH)
Assignee: Hitachi Energy Ltd.
G06F21/6227G06F21/602G06F2221/2101
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,608,501
App. No.
16/760,856
Granted
Apr 21, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method can be used to analyze a log of a device or a plurality of devices of a first entity. The method includes generating an encrypted log by encrypting the log at the first entity, generating an encrypted query by encrypting a query at the first entity, transferring the encrypted log and the encrypted query from the first entity to a second entity, analyzing the encrypted log on the second entity by using the encrypted query, generating an encrypted analysis result at the second entity, transferring the encrypted analysis result from the second entity to the first entity, decrypting the encrypted analysis result on the first entity, and verifying the decrypted analysis result at the first entity.

Claims (84)

1 . A method for establishing cryptographic electronic transmission of an electronic utility log between a utility computer terminal of a utility and a service provider host computer terminal of a service provider host over a network channel to determine misuse of the utility based on suspicious events in the electronic utility log, the method comprising:

receiving, by the service provider host computer terminal, an encrypted electronic utility log from the utility computer terminal, the encrypted electronic utility log encrypted from an unencrypted electronic utility log with a k-deterministic encryption scheme comprising:

generating an encryption key using a key generation function KG of a probabilistic encryption scheme including an encryption function E;

generating an additional random bit string s;

generating k random components using a pseudo-random number generator with k, s, and the unencrypted electronic utility log as parameters; and

encrypting the entire unencrypted electronic utility log using the encryption function E with one of the k random components, selected uniformly at random as part of the input, to output a single ciphertext from one of at most k probabilistically-computed ciphertexts, k being an integer greater than 1;

receiving, by the service provider host computer terminal, an encrypted query from the utility computer terminal, the encrypted query encrypted with the k-deterministic encryption scheme;

analyzing, by the service provider host computer terminal, the encrypted electronic utility log by using the encrypted query;

generating, by the service provider host computer terminal, an encrypted electronic analysis result without decrypting the encrypted electronic utility log or the encrypted query; and

transmitting the encrypted electronic analysis result from the service provider host computer terminal to the utility computer terminal for decryption and verification;

decrypting the encrypted electronic analysis result to generate a decrypted analysis result at the utility computer terminal;

detecting the suspicious events based on the decrypted analysis result at the utility; and

determining that the misuse occurred based on the suspicious events at the utility.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the utility is a cluster of utilities.

3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the encrypted electronic utility log and the encrypted query are encrypted by a first private/secret key that is not known by the service provider host.

4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the electronic utility log is an electronic security log of the utility.

5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the electronic utility log is an electronic log of industrial equipment, an electronic security log of a network or an electronic log of an industrial controller.

6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the electronic utility log is an electronic log of an entire system that comprises multiple devices.

7 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the steps of receiving the encrypted electronic utility log, analyzing the encrypted electronic utility log and transmitting the encrypted electronic analysis result are executed periodically.

8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the encrypted electronic utility log and the encrypted query are received from the utility computer terminal via a secure network channel.

9 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the encrypted query is a filter query for locating and identifying a specific value in the electronic utility log, or an occurrence query for evaluating whether a particular value is present in the electronic utility log.

10 . A method for establishing cryptographic electronic transmission of an electronic utility log between a utility computer terminal of a utility and a service provider host computer terminal of a service provider host over a network channel to determine misuse of the utility based on suspicious events in the electronic utility log, the method comprising:

generating, by the utility computer terminal, an encrypted electronic utility log from an unencrypted electronic utility log by encrypting the unencrypted electronic utility log using a k-deterministic encryption scheme comprising:

generating an encryption key using a key generation function KG of a probabilistic encryption scheme including an encryption function E;

generating an additional random bit string s;

generating k random components using a pseudo-random number generator with k, s, and the unencrypted electronic utility log as parameters;

encrypting the entire unencrypted electronic utility log using the encryption function E with one of the k random components, selected uniformly at random as part of the input, to output a single ciphertext from one of at most k probabilistically-computed ciphertexts, k being an integer greater than 1;

generating an encrypted query by encrypting a query using the k-deterministic encryption scheme at the utility computer terminal;

transmitting the encrypted electronic utility log and the encrypted query from the utility computer terminal to the service provider host computer terminal so that the encrypted electronic utility log can be analyzed on the service provider host computer terminal using the encrypted query;

receiving, at the utility computer terminal, an encrypted electronic analysis result from the service provider host computer terminal, the encrypted electronic analysis result being an encrypted version of an electronic analysis result based on the electronic utility log and the encrypted query, without the service provider host decrypting the encrypted electronic utility log or the encrypted query;

decrypting, by the utility computer terminal, the encrypted electronic analysis result to generated a decrypted analysis result;

verifying, by the utility, the decrypted analysis result; and

detecting, by the utility, the suspicious events based on the encrypted electronic analysis result; and

determining, by the utility, that the misuse occurred based on the suspicious events.

11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the utility is a cluster of utilities.

12 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the electronic utility log is an electronic security log of the utility.

13 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the steps of generating the encrypted electronic utility log, transmitting the encrypted electronic utility log and receiving the encrypted electronic analysis result are executed periodically.

14 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the electronic utility log is organized in columns and rows and the encrypted electronic utility log is generated by encrypting one or more of:

only parts of the columns separately, or

only parts of the rows separately.

15 . The method claim 14 , wherein the electronic utility log comprises additional dummy rows, dummy columns or dummy entries.

16 . The method claim 14 , wherein the electronic utility log comprises one or more of:

permutated rows,

permutated columns, or

additional flags for providing additional information.

17 . A method for establishing cryptographic electronic transmission of an electronic utility log between a utility computer terminal of a utility and a service provider host computer terminal of a service provider host over a network channel to determine misuse of the utility based on suspicious events in the electronic utility log, the method comprising:

generating, by the utility computer terminal, an encrypted electronic utility log from an unencrypted electronic utility log by encrypting the electronic utility log using a k-deterministic encryption scheme comprising:

generating an encryption key using a key generation function KG of a probabilistic

encryption scheme including an encryption function E;

generating an additional random bit string s;

generating k random components using a pseudo-random number generator with k, s, and the unencrypted electronic utility log as parameters;

encrypting the entire unencrypted electronic utility log using the encryption function E with one of the k random components, selected uniformly at random as part of the input, to output a single ciphertext from one of at most k probabilistically-computed ciphertexts, k being an integer greater than 1;

generating, by the utility computer terminal, an encrypted query by encrypting a query using the k-deterministic encryption scheme;

transmitting, by the utility computer terminal, the encrypted electronic utility log and the encrypted query from the utility computer terminal to the service provider host computer terminal;

analyzing, by the service provider host computer terminal, the encrypted electronic utility log using the encrypted query;

generating, by the service provider host computer terminal, an encrypted electronic analysis result without decrypting the encrypted electronic utility log or the encrypted query;

transmitting, by the service provider host computer terminal, the encrypted electronic analysis result to the utility computer terminal;

decrypting, by the utility computer terminal, the encrypted electronic analysis result to generate a decrypted analysis result;

verifying, by the utility, the decrypted analysis result;

detecting, by the utility, the suspicious events based on the encrypted electronic analysis result; and

determining, by the utility, that the misuse occurred based on the suspicious events.

18 . The method of claim 17 , wherein the utility is a cluster of utilities.

19 . The method of claim 17 , wherein the steps of generating the encrypted electronic utility log, analyzing the encrypted electronic utility log and transmitting the encrypted electronic analysis result are executed periodically.

20 . A system configured to establish cryptographic electronic transmission of an electronic utility log between a utility computer terminal of a utility and a service provider host computer terminal of a service provider host over a network channel to determine misuse of the utility based on suspicious events in the electronic utility log, the system comprising:

the utility computer terminal having a first non-transitory computer readable medium, the utility computer terminal being configured to:

generate an encrypted electronic utility log from an unencrypted electronic utility log by encrypting the unencrypted electronic utility log using a k-deterministic encryption scheme comprising:

generating an encryption key using a key generation function KG of a probabilistic encryption scheme including an encryption function E;

generating an additional random bit string s;

generating k random components using a pseudo-random number generator with k, s, and the unencrypted electronic utility log as parameters;

encrypting the entire unencrypted electronic utility log using the encryption function E with one of the k random components, selected uniformly at random as part of the input, to output a single ciphertext from one of at most k probabilistically-computed ciphertexts, wherein k is an integer greater than 1;

generate an encrypted query by encrypting a query using the k-deterministic encryption scheme; and

transmit, via a secure network channel, the encrypted electronic utility log and encrypted query to the service provider host computer terminal; and

the service provider host computer terminal having a second non-transitory computer readable medium, the service provider host computer terminal being configured to:

receive, via the secure network channel, the encrypted electronic utility log and the encrypted query from the utility;

analyze the encrypted electronic utility log by using the encrypted query;

generate an encrypted electronic analysis result without decrypting the encrypted electronic utility log or the encrypted query; and

transmit, via the secure network channel, the encrypted electronic analysis result to the utility;

wherein the utility computer terminal is further configured to:

receive, via the secure network channel, the encrypted electronic analysis result from the service provider host computer terminal;

decrypt the encrypted electronic analysis result to generate a decrypted analysis result;

verify the decrypted analysis result;

detect the suspicious events based on the decrypted analysis result; and

determine that the misuse occurred based on the suspicious events.

21 . The system of claim 20 , wherein the utility is a cluster of utilities.

Assignments (4)
MERGER Recorded Nov 13, 2023
From: HITACHI ENERGY SWITZERLAND AG
To: HITACHI ENERGY LTD
Reel/Frame 065548/0905 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Dec 31, 2021
From: ABB POWER GRIDS SWITZERLAND AG
To: HITACHI ENERGY SWITZERLAND AG
Reel/Frame 058601/0692 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 15, 2021
From: ABB SCHWEIZ AG
To: ABB POWER GRIDS SWITZERLAND AG
Reel/Frame 055589/0769 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 15, 2020
From: FRANKE, CARSTEN; LOCHER, THOMAS; PIGNOLET, YVONNE-ANNE; WIDMER, THEO
To: ABB SCHWEIZ AG
Reel/Frame 054068/0925 →
Priority Claims (1)
EP 17199282 · Oct 30, 2017 · regional
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20210097195A1 · Apr 1, 2021
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